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Abstract
Unobserved heterogeneity is one of the main concerns for applied economists,
this is particularly so when modelling health and health related behaviours. This
thesis illustrates four studies on modelling unobserved heterogeneity using some
recent developments in latent class analysis. Chapter 2 examines two sources
of individual unobserved heterogeneity when subjective indicators are used to
measure health status: variations in unobservable true health and dierences in
self-reporting behaviour for a given level of \true health". These two sources
are separately identied using both objective (biomarkers) and subjective health
indicators.
Chapter 3 examines the so called positive correlation test. This test rejects
the null of absence of private information in a given insurance market when
individuals with greater coverage experience more of the insured risk. This test
is shown to lead to puzzling results where there exists multiple sources of private
information (multidimensional heterogeneity). An alternative strategy proposed
uses a nite number of heterogeneous types and extends the standard adverse and
favourable selection denitions into local and global ones. We implement a nite
mixture model to identify the unobserved types and test the multidimensionality
of private information. We apply these approaches to the US long-term care and
Medigap insurance markets.
Chapter 4 further considers the issue of the asymmetric information in
the insurance markets, by investigating how to disentangle the incentive eect,
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due to the structure of insurance contracts, from the selection eect. Alternative
econometric strategies are evaluated to empirically disentangle these two eects
when multiple dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity aect the reliability of
the standard positive correlation. The proposed application focuses on the eect
of Medigap insurance on having an inpatient hospital stay and compares the
probit and the recursive bivariate probit model with a discrete multiresponse
nite mixture model.
Finally Chapter 5 examines the relationship between unobserved risk pref-
erences and four insurance purchase decisions in the US: Medigap, long-term
insurance, life insurance and annuity. Standard economic theory assumes that
individuals take decisions over a set of risky domains according to their own risk
preferences which are stable across decision contexts. This assumption of context-
invariant risk preference has caused debate in the literature concerning its validity.
This chapter proposes an empirical strategy to test whether risk preferences are
multidimensional and whether they dier across insurance choices. This empir-
ical appraisal provides a simple way to model non-preference factors - such as
context specicity - which can play an important role in determining multiple
demand for insurance conditional on individual general risk preferences. Our
ndings are largely consistent with the hypothesis of domain-general components
of risk preferences, although context specicity is important especially between
choices over insurance contracts that are \closer" in context (e.g. long-term care
and Medigap insurance).
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Many concepts that are of interest to applied social scientists cannot be observed
directly. Examples of these constructs involve individual preferences, health sta-
tus, attitudes towards risky behaviours or utilization of health care resources.
Since these dimensions are often not directly observed or only partially observed,
they introduce important sources of unobserved heterogeneity in empirical anal-
ysis of many issues relevant in economics (Heckman [69]).
Unobserved heterogeneity is one of the main concerns for applied economists
and particularly when health related issues are investigated since health status
is intrinsically multidimensional and unobservable. There are several dierent
strategies that applied economists exploit to overcome this issue and to model
unobserved heterogeneity. The adopted solution is usually related specically
to the research context and depends more generally on the availability of data
(experimental or observational data) or on the econometric strategy employed to
deal with unobservables.
In the policy evaluation setting, for example, researchers focus on the
relationship between the outcome and a variable describing a policy or a pro-
gramme. Causal interpretation of this relationship can be achieved as long as
unobserved factors do not aect the programme participation decision, otherwise
model parameters are not identiable. The endogeneity of the policy variable has
motivated the use of social experiments as oering a potential solution to iden-
tify causal eects. Experimental data are well suited to control for unobserved
factors since they make it possible to vary the particular variable of interest,
holding other covariates at controlled levels. This is possible because the ex-
perimental environment data generating process can be directly controlled. In
contrast observational data, which usually come from population surveys, are
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generated in an uncontrolled environment, leaving open the possibility that un-
observed factors aect the relationships of interest. Since experimental data are
expensive to produce (on a large scale) and their implementation may pose some
ethical concerns, most applied economic studies use survey data (sometimes with
some specic characteristics) and develop econometric techniques to deal with
unobserved factors. A common strategy is to use proxy or observable indica-
tors derived from questionnaire items designed to elicit responses related to these
unobservable dimensions. An important technique is based on latent class mod-
elling.
A latent variable model is generally constructed using a set of observable
individual characteristics, often termed \indicators" or \responses", that are con-
sidered a manifestation of the underlying latent construct of interest. This type
of model is often non-linear and, in addition to the manifest variables, the model
includes one or more unobserved or latent variables representing the constructs of
interest. Two main assumptions dene the causal mechanisms underlying the re-
sponses. First, it is assumed that the responses on the indicators are the result of
an individual's position on the latent variable(s). The second assumption, known
as the local independence axiom, states that manifest variables have nothing in
common after controlling for the latent variable(s). Depending on the distri-
bution of the latent and manifest variables one obtains dierent types of latent
variable models. When both indicators and latent variables are categorical, and
therefore assumed to come from a multinomial distribution, the latent variable
model takes the specic name of latent class analysis (Bartholomew and Knott
[11]).
This thesis uses survey data and some recent developments in latent class
analysis to model individual unobserved heterogeneity in three dierent contexts:
health status, health care utilization and insurance coverage, and multiple de-
mand for insurance and individual risk preference stability. The rst study uses
data from the Health Survey for England to disentangle the eect of individ-
ual characteristics on health production on the one hand, and its self-reporting
eect on the other. Our focus is to study unobserved heterogeneity in the self-
assessment of health after conditioning on unobserved heterogeneity in health
production. Our econometric approach relies on latent class analysis to identify
unobserved health and employs a wide set of health indicators including both ob-
jective and self-reported measures. In addition we use some recent developments
in latent class analysis which allow us to model explicitly the residual associa-
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tion between subjective indicators and self-assessed health by setting an explicit
recursive structure. This is the rst contribution of the paper, which makes our
approach substantially dierent from those relying on the traditional MIMIC
model. The second contribution of this study is related to the indicators used as
manifestations of individual health status. In fact \true" health is constructed
using not only self-assessed health and other self-reported health measures, but
also objective indicators observed through biomarkers. Our results show the ex-
istence of two unobserved classes of individuals representing those in good health
and those in ill-health. Moreover, our ndings provide further evidence of the
existence of unobserved heterogeneity in self reporting behaviour since individual
characteristics, such as socio-economic status and education, cannot be ignored as
predictors of self-assessed health even after conditioning on unobserved individual
`true' health-types.
The third and the fourth chapters are intrinsically related since they both
focus on the role of unobserved heterogeneity in the demand for health insurance
and health care utilization. In particular the third chapter examines the stan-
dard prediction of the well-known Rothschild-Stiglitz adverse selection model.
This model predicts that when individuals have private information about their
actual risk, the insurance contract will be adversely selected, with high risk in-
dividuals choosing higher insurance coverage. Ex post, this will cause a positive
correlation between risk and coverage. This observation has been empirically
implemented using the so called positive correlation (PC) test which rejects the
null of absence of asymmetric information in a given insurance market when,
conditional on consumers' characteristics used by companies to price contracts,
individuals with more coverage experience more of the insured risk. Contrary
to the theoretical prediction of positive rick-coverage correlation, a number of
empirical studies of insurance markets have found a negative risk-coverage cor-
relation, a phenomenon which has been named favourable selection. This has
been justied by claiming that there are two conicting sources of private infor-
mation, namely individual's actual risk and risk attitudes, so that two types of
people buy insurance: high risk individuals and high risk averse individuals. Ex
post, the former are higher risk than predicted and the latter are lower risk; in
aggregate, those who buy more insurance do not have higher claims. The main
contribution of the chapter is to evaluate how the standard PC test performs in
the presence of multidimensional private information. Our claim is that under
multidimensional private information there is the possibility that the insurance
contract is both adversely and favourably selected by dierent individuals. Since
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the PC test relies on a single statistic to appraise the risk-coverage correlation,
multidimensional private information may cause serious problems in detecting
selection eects using observable data, since the PC test averages out selection
eects which may pull in dierent directions.
We provide a substantially new methodology, relying on latent class anal-
ysis, to investigate the existence of private information which has three appealing
characteristics: 1) it is possible to identify unobserved types by cross-classifying
the relevant private information variables, 2) it extends the standard adverse and
favourable selection denitions into local and global ones, 3) it is possible to test
directly for the absence of selection eects into insurance contracts and for the
multidimensionality of private information by imposing restrictions on the be-
haviour of these unobservable types. To show the validity of our approach we
study separately the Medigap and the long-term insurance markets in the US.
These two markets dier not just by the type of insurance, but also for in the
level of regulation imposed in the Medigap market. Results show that the PC test
shows an absence of signicant residual risk-coverage correlation in both samples,
while our nite mixture model reveals the existence of signicant residual hetero-
geneity with large selection eects, which is stronger for the regulated Medigap
market.
The fourth chapter is also focused on asymmetric information, but provides
substantially dierent information compared to the previous paper. In particular
it studies how Medigap aects the utilization of health care services and then
focuses on disentangling the incentive eect, induced by insurance contracts on
health care utilization, from selection eects due to the unobserved private in-
formation in insurance purchase decisions. Our main contribution is to provide
evidence on how the standard econometric strategies developed to deal with this
issue perform compared with a discrete multiresponse nite mixture model which
controls for selection. In particular we compare our results to those obtained by
the probit and the bivariate probit model, and nd the residual eect of insurance
on health care is small after controlling for individual unobserved types.
The nal chapter studies whether individual risk preferences are stable
across multiple insurance choices. In general there are two dierent points of view
regarding risk preference generality. Classical economic theory assumes that in-
dividuals have the same attitude to bear risk in dierent contexts, while a recent
and important literature, mostly related to behavioral economics, nds that con-
text is the main factor and poses serious concerns for the internal validity of the
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risk-preference invariance principle. This issue has motivated a growing body of
research. A subset of these studies focus on this principle by looking at multiple
demand for insurance. In particular they study whether individuals who bear
risk in one insurance domain are also willing to bear the same risk in another
insurance domain. Clearly if risk preferences are general, the risk preferences
pattern across insurance domains should be stable. To test this principle they
consider the residual correlation between insurance choices after conditioning on
predicted and realized risk. We propose an alternative framework to examine
this issue using latent class analysis to identify unobserved types which dier in
their level of risk aversion. Our approach has two appealing characteristics: 1)
it allows us to disentangle the eect of risk preference on insurance choice from
the residual correlation introduced by non-preference factors; this can be done
by modelling correlations between insurance choices conditioned on unobserved
risk preferences; 2) if risk preferences are stable across the relevant choices then
there exists a unique latent variable which aects each of these choices; this can
be tested directly by imposing restrictions on the relevant insurance behaviours.
To show the applicability of our methodology, we use data from the Health and
Retirement Study on four insurance purchase decisions: life insurance, Medicare
supplemental insurance (Medigap), log-term care insurance and annuity. Our
results show the existence of a stable pattern of individual risk preferences over
dierent insurance domains, which supports the idea of a domain-general com-
ponent of preferences. In addition we also provide further evidence that context
plays an important role in determining insurance choices particularly when in-
surance coverage decisions are \closer" in coverage type.
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Chapter 2
Reporting Heterogeneity in Subjective
Health Measures: an Extended Latent
Class Approach
2.1 Introduction
Self-assessed health status (SAH) is a widely employed subjective health indica-
tor in empirical research. It is based on the simple question \How is your health
in general?" with a response framed in ordered categories ranging from \very
good" or \excellent" to \poor" or \very poor". It is often assumed that these
responses are generated by a corresponding continuous latent variable represent-
ing self-perceived health. Several studies found that SAH is a good predictor
of mortality, morbidity and subsequent use of health care (Idler and Benyamini
[77]). Furthermore Gerdtham et al. [62] showed that a continuous health mea-
sure obtained from the ordinal responses of SAH is highly correlated with other
individual health measures.
As subjective indicator SAH has caused some concern among researchers
related to the idea that individuals may link dierently the same level of true
health with the SAH's categories. The existence of these dierences in self-
reporting behavior is convincingly supported by empirical ndings (Crossley and
Kennedy [31], Groot [65]). For example, Crossley and Kennedy [31] exploit a
particular feature of the Australian National Survey in which SAH question was
asked to respondents and again to a random subsample. Results show that the
distribution of SAH for this subgroup of respondents changes signicantly be-
tween the two questions and that this variation depends on age, income and
occupation. Bago d'Uva et al. [44] nd that reporting heterogeneity may de-
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pend on the individuals' concept of what health means, on their expectations
of their own health, their use of health care, and on their comprehension of the
the health questions asked in the survey. Etile and Milcent [50] nd evidence
that reporting heterogeneity is associated with socioeconomics status, while Lin-
deboom and van Doorslaer [90] nd that age and gender, but not income or
education, aect reporting behaviour. Johnston et al. [79] studied reporting
heterogeneity in hypertension and found that the probability of false negative
reporting is signicantly income graded and then self-reported health measures
might underestimate true income-related inequalities in health.
This source of measurement error in the mapping of true health into SAH
that we call - following Shmueli [107] - unobserved reporting heterogeneity, has
also been termed `state-dependent reporting bias' (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom [85]),
`scale of reference bias' (Groot [65]), `response category cut-point shift' (Sadana
et al. [105], 2000; Murray et al. [96]).
To account for self-reporting behavior a possible approach is to use an
ordered probit with cut point shift. This model allows the cut-points dening
the mapping of latent health into the SAH's categories to depend on observable
variables (Terza [110]). Although this approach allows for both index and cut
o points shifts, it requires strong a priori restrictions on parameters to solve
identiability problems especially when the set of covariates on latent health and
the cut-o point overlap (Lindeboom and van Doorslaer [90]).
There are many other papers that have analysed SAH. Van Doorslaer and
Jones [112] use the McMaster `Health Utility Index Mark' (HUI) to scale the
intervals of SAH. They assume a stable mapping of HUI on the latent health
determining SAH. Therefore the position of an individual ranked according to
HUI should correspond to her rank according to SAH. They exploit this relation-
ship between HUI and SAH to estimate an interval regression model where the
upper (lower) bound of these intervals corresponds to the upper (lower) value
on HUI's empirical distribution corresponding to the empirical cumulative fre-
quency of SAH. A second approach was proposed by Kerkhofs and Lindeboom
[85] and Lindeboom and van Doorslaer [90]. They stratify the population in
several groups according to some individual characteristics and then estimate an
ordered response model of SAH on HUI as proxy of true health. This estimation
approach allows dierences both with respect to cut-points and index-shift. On
the same fashion Etile and Milcent [50] use latent class analysis to construct a
synthetic measure of clinical health and estimate a generalized ordered logit to
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investigate the eect of socio-economic status (e.g income level) on self reporting
behavior. To assess the magnitude of reporting heterogeneity related to income
they follow Kerkhofs and Lindeboom [85] and assume that all the information on
true health are captured by the synthetic measure of clinical health, that is, they
argue that individual characteristics should be ignorable to predict SAH. There-
fore reporting heterogeneity is tested considering whether these characteristics
have a signicant eect after conditioning on clinical health.
Etile and Milcent's [50] approach follows a two steps procedure. First
they build a synthetic index of \true" health based on a set of self-reported
health conditions including SAH and then regress the SAH on this index and
other socioeconomic characteristic to test self reporting heterogeneity. However
this approach does not model endogenously the self reporting behaviour and
the heterogeneity in the health production. Thus, another possible approach
which allow to model jointly self reporting and \true" health status heterogeneity
relies on the use of multiple indicators. Shmueli [107] estimates a structural
equation model exploiting some features of multiple indicators-multiple causes
(MIMIC) modelling to shape the relationships between true health and a set of
indicators (Joreskog and Goldberger [81]). The latent class approach oer the
same advantage of the MIMIC model to undertake in a single step the estimation
of the eect of covariates on both SAH and `true' health.
In this paper we use some recent developments on nite mixture mod-
els to provide an empirical assessment of reporting heterogeneity using a set of
\manifest" (objective and subjective) health indicators in a recursive model with
unobserved latent classes. In particular our aim is to investigate how to disen-
tangle the eect of individual characteristics on health production on the one
hand, and its self-reporting eect on the other hand. Further we evaluate the
magnitude of some individual characteristics on self-reporting heterogeneity con-
sidering the residual association between self-reported indicators conditioning on
true health. Our econometric approach allows us to model explicitly the resid-
ual association between indicators allowing an explicit recursive structure, which
make our approach substantially dierent from those relying on MIMIC (Shmueli
[107]).
Our approach also diers from the previous literature regarding the type
of indicators exploited to measure \true" health. In fact \true" health, intended
as clinical and physical health status, is constructed using both subjective (SAH
and other self reported health conditions) and objective indicators (biomarkers).
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On the one hand, this avoids the arbitrariness of excluding SAH itself from the set
of measures indicating clinical health. On the other hand, there is a great deal of
interest among researchers on biological measures for several reasons. Biomarkers
can be used not only to validate respondents' self-reported health measures but
also to identify true health status and compare dierent groups of individuals
(Banks et al. [7]); using biological measures give also the possibility to take
into account the preclinical levels of disease even when the respondents may not
have been aware. Using individual biomarkers, Johnston et al. [79] provide an
important piece of evidence and show the existence of reporting heterogeneity
comparing self-reported and objective hypertension.
We identify two unobserved classes representing people in good health and
those in ill-health respectively. Our main nding provides further evidence of
heterogeneity in self reporting behavior. In fact after conditioning on unobserved
individual `true' health-types personal characteristics cannot be ignored to predict
SAH. In particular for a given level of \true" health people with higher income,
better education and living in less deprived areas tend to report systematically
better health. Moreover there is evidence that individual characteristics aect
dierently the reporting behaviour in each category of SAH.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the
data we use on our analysis. The following section explains the methods and the
empirical strategy we exploit. Empirical ndings are found in section 2.4. The
last section discusses the results and concludes.
2.2 Data and variable denition
We use cross-sectional data from two waves (2003 and 2004) of the Health Survey
for England (HSE). This is a large survey covering a wide range of elds related
to socioeconomic status, health and life-style. In 2003 the major focus of the
survey was cardiovascular disease (including heart attacks and strokes), which is
one of the largest causes of death in England. Even when this type of disease is
not fatal, it brings ill-health and disability which might deeply aect individuals'
life. Therefore it is extremely important to obtain objective measures of health
risk in order to measure individual \true" health, intended as absence of physical
disability or illness. For this reason HSE is very suitable for our aims because
it contains some biological measures (biomarkers) obtained from a blood sample
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and used in general as an indicator of a biological state. The same biological
measures are available for all the sample aged 16 years or over in 2003, while only
for a subgroup which represents minority ethnic groups in 2004.
The Health Survey for England is composed by two parts, an interviewer-
administered interview (Stage 1), and a visit by a nurse to carry out measurements
and take a blood sample (Stage 2). At each stage participants are asked to decide
whether to proceed with the following stage or not. Therefore someone may agree
to take part at Stage 1 but decide not to continue to Stage 2.
In the rst stage an individual questionnaire is administered in order to
collect information on general health, eating habits, physical activity, smoking,
drinking, family cardiovascular disease history and socioeconomic status (e.g. in-
come, employment status, educational background). At the end of this stage
respondents are asked to proceed with stage 2 by xing an appointment with a
qualied nurse. In this second stage nurses ask more information on health and
health care utilization. For those to older than 35 in 2003 and 16 in 2004 the
nurses also ask to provide a fasting blood sample and a blood pressure measure-
ment.
For our analysis we consider a homogeneous sample of individuals aged 30
or over excluding cases with incomplete or inconsistent information on the rel-
evant socioeconomic, demographic, health and life-style variables. The original
sample size of individuals eligible to have a nurse visit was about 10,000 obser-
vations. After cleaning for missed (or inconsistent) observations, the remaining
sample size consists of 3,381 observations. This reduction in the sample size is
mainly due to the biomarker variables which are of main interest in the analysis.
First notice that these variables are available only for an eligible subsample. Sec-
ond for each measures used to dene the objective health measures, we consider
only those individuals with a valid lab test result. This derived measure is di-
rectly available in the HSE data set and excludes observation with a potentially
unreliable lab test result - for example individual has eaten or smoked before the
blood test, etc.
There are three important sets of variables relevant for our analysis (see
tables A.1 and A.2). The rst set includes three binary objective health indica-
tors obtained considering only valid measures of the lab tests and excluding all
the cases in which lab test results have been aected by individual behavior (e.g.
people that have smoked or eaten before the nurse visit, etc.). The rst indicator
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(BPN) takes a value 1 if individual has normal blood pressure measured by a
qualied nurse with Dinamap and Omron measures. Our second objective indi-
cator (CHL) is a binary measure derived from the total cholesterol/high density
lipoprotein ratio in the blood. This ratio is more indicative of cardiovascular dis-
ease than total cholesterol since it consider both high and low density lipoprotein
cholesterol. Then the variable CHL takes a value 1 if individual has the choles-
terol ratio below a sex-adjusted threshold indicating a low risk of cardiovascular
disease. In particular for men an acceptable ratio of total cholesterol/high den-
sity lipoprotein is 4.5 or below, and for women is 4.0 or below. Finally our last
objective indicator is based on the c-reactive protein (CRP) blood test. CRP may
be used to screen apparently healthy people for cardiovascular disease (CVD). If
the CRP level in the blood drops, it means that individual are getting better and
CVD risk factor is being reduced. The CRP indicator takes 1 if individual have a
lab test score lower 3.0 mg/L, associated to low chance of having a sudden heart
problem.
Since available biomarkers capture mainly cardiovascular risk and thus
have a limited role in capturing overall true health, we also include two ad-
ditional health indicators: SAH and self-reported limiting longstanding illness
(LLI). This latter variable is available directly from the survey and it was de-
rived considering whether individual has longstanding illness and whether daily
activities are limited due to this illness. LLI takes 1 if individual has no chronic
limitations on daily activities.
As part of the health questionnaire of the HSE, respondents were asked:
\how is your health in general?" The response categories were excellent, very
good, good, fair, bad or very bad. We combine three SAH's categories (very bad,
bad and fair) in one category representing poor health, because only a relatively
small fraction (5.5%) of the sample reports very bad health. The SAH variable
thus consists of three ordered categories: poor, good and very good health. Notice
however that our denition of \true" health is dierent from the broader denition
which include individual mental and psychosocial status. In fact these indicators
refer mainly to \true" health as absence of physical pain, physical disability, or
an objective measured condition that is likely to cause illness (e.g. high blood
pressure can be interpreted as symptoms of a cardiovascular disease, etc.).1
1Notice that this denition of \true" health can be extend to include mental health using
a mental score included in the HSE dataset. However its inclusion would render slower the
estimation of the model throughout the EM algorithm, since this indicator is primarily coded
using a score dened in 12 point scale and a binary discretization would be arbitrary.
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Finally we follow Johnston et al. [79] to dene the last set of variables
which provides information on socio-economic status, demographic characteristics
and life-style. Socioeconomic status is measured using the equivalised income and
an overall index of multiple deprivation (IMD2004). This is a composite index
of relative deprivation at small area level, based on seven domains of deprivation
involving for example income, employment, health deprivation and disability,
education, crime and living environment.2 This survey is also rich in information
on individual life-style. These variables oer a good opportunity to better identify
individual health. In particular there are detailed information on past and present
smoking behavior as well as physical activities, sport intensity and the daily
number of portion of fruits and vegetables. HSE provides also a three levels fat
score ranged from \low fat" to \high fat" eating habits derived considering the
consumption of cheese, sh, fried food, meat, etc. However including life-style
variables across regressors may introduce an important source of endogeneity
since individuals who are in good health may also have healthier behaviours.
2.3 The Model
Our aim is to study the association between SAH and \true" health, using re-
cent developments on latent class analysis, which allow covariates to aect latent
class membership, and possibly residual association among indicators after con-
ditioning on latent health-types (Huang and Bandeen-Roche [75], Bartolucci and
Forcina [13] and Dardanoni, Forcina and Modica [36]).
Since we are mainly interested into disentangle the eect of individual on
self-reporting behaviour, let U be a latent discrete variable with two categories
representing individuals in good (U = 0) and bad (U = 1) health. The main
problem when one wants to study the relationship between true health and self-
reported health is to disentangle the eect that some personal characteristics
have on \true" health's variations from the eect that the same variables have
on self-reporting.
Following Kerkhofs and Lindeboom [85], Etile and Milcent [50] suggest
the following strategy to distinguish between these two eects. They assume
2The Equivalised income variable is provided by the HSE. It is computed using the Mc-
Clement score for each household (dependent on number, age and relationships of adults and
children in the household), and then dividing the total household income by this score to get
an equivalised household income.
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that \true" health is entirely captured by a synthetic measure of clinical health
(which they denote H0) for which the following ignorability condition holds (see
Wooldridge [121], p. 63):
Pr(Ysah = i j H0;z) = Pr(Ysah = i j H0) i = 1; 2; 3 (2.1)
where H0 was obtained using a latent class model with self-reported health mea-
sures as indicators. The assumption above relies on the fact that the eect of
covariates z on \true" health is entirely captured by H0. Thus, if SAH is a reli-
able indicator of individual health, then any dierences on personal characteristics
should not aect the distribution of SAH after conditioning on H0, which means
that z is ignorable to predict SAH. Therefore if the assumption above holds, a
test of self-reporting behavior can be easily performed regressing Ysah on H
0 and
z and testing whether parameters of personal characteristics are still signicant
conditioning on the synthetic measure of clinical health.
Our approach can be considered an extension of Etile and Milcent's [50]
test from two points of view. First, using a LC approach the estimation of
the eect of covariates on `true' health and SAH is undertaken in a single step.
This means that we estimate endogenously individual \true" health U by taking
information both from subjective (SAH, LLI) and objective indicators (BPN,
CRP, CHL), so that all available information from health indicators, including
SAH, are used to estimate individual \true" health. This also makes clear the
eect of covariates on both unobserved U and SAH. Second we allow for residual
association between health indicators in order to capture any adaptation eect of
individuals to their own health condition. This means that the eect of subjective
health measure, such as Ylli, on SAH status is not only driven by U but it could
also aect indirectly self-reporting behavior of SAH itself - for example people may
adapt to a chronical limitation status measured by Ylli and report systematically
better health (see e.g. Groot [65]).
Let Y = (Ysah; Ylli; Ybpn; Ychl; Ycrp) be the vector of observable response
variables. As a simple starting point, consider the traditional latent class analysis
(see e.g. Goodman [63]), which implies the existence of a discrete U such that
these observables Y are independent conditionally on U . This is also named
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\local independence" and is expressed as:
Pr(Ysah; Ylli; Ybpn; Ychl; Ycrp) =
1X
u=0
Pr(Ysah j u)   Pr(Ycrp j u)Pr(u)
Clearly a U that makes these responses conditionally independent captures ele-
ments of individuals' \true" health. However, the local independence assumption
is too restrictive for our purposes since it does not allow responses and latent
health-types to depend on covariates, and it does not allow residual association
between any response after conditioning on U .
Our model assumes that the joint distribution of responses (U;Y ) condi-
tional on the set of observable covariates z (describing demographic, socioeco-
nomic and life-style individual characteristics) is fully determined by the following
set of conditional distributions of observables, and by the marginal distribution
of U :
Pr(U = 1 j z);
P r(Ysah = i j Ylli; z; U)
Pr(Ylli = 1 j U)
Pr(Ybpn = 1 j U)
Pr(Ychl = 1 j U)
Pr(Ycrp = 1 j U)
(2.2)
which can be equivalently formulated in terms of the directed acyclic graph (see
Pearl [98]) reported in gure 2.3.
Figure 2.1: Directed Acyclic Graph of model (2.2)
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We then model these conditional probabilities as linear functions of the covariates
z using a logit link to form a multivariate regression system of logit equations:
Pr (U = 1 jz ) =  (u (u) + z0)
Pr (Ysah > 1 ju; ylli; z ) =  (1 (u; ylli) + z01)
Pr (Ysah > 2 ju; ylli; z ) =  (2 (u; ylli) + z02)
Pr (Ylli = 1 ju) =  (3 (u))
Pr (Ybpn = 1 ju) =  (4 (u))
Pr (Ycrp = 1 ju) =  (5 (u))
Pr (Ychl = 1 ju) =  (6 (u))
(2.3)
where  is a logit link function  = et=(1 + et). Note that j (u; ylli), j = 1; 2,
represents all the possible combinations between U and Ylli; since U and Ylli
are binary this means we have 4  parameters in the second and third equation
that could be alternatively expressed as aj;1 + aj;2U + aj;3Ylli + aj;4YlliU . Notice
that for sake of generality we do not assume any relationships between individual
characteristics, \true" health and self-reported health status. Thus the same
set of covariates aecting \true" unobserved health may also potentially aect
reporting behavior. The system of equations (2.3) makes clear how the eect of
individual characteristics on \true" health is separated from the eect on reported
health, since individual characteristics aect separately the unobserved latent
health status U and the SAH. In particular  parameters capture the eect of
individual characteristics on health status, while the 's the eect on reported
health status.
Parameters in model (2.3) are estimated by the EM algorithm.3 In the E
step the posterior probability of latent class U given the observed conguration y
is computed. The M-step maximizes a likelihood function that is further rened
in each iteration by the E-step. Details on estimation and identication of model
(2.3) can be derived by looking at the Appendix of Dardanoni, Forcina and
Modica [36] and at Bartolucci and Forcina [13].
It is well known that the EM algorithm may converge even if the model
is not identied, a crucial issue for nite mixture models. Local identication of
model (2.3) can be obtained using the numerical test described by Forcina [59],
which consists in checking that the Jacobian of the transformation between the
parameters of the observable responses and the mixture model parameters is of
full rank for a wide range of parameter values.
3We are grateful to Antonio Forcina for kindly providing the Matlab code for the estimation.
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We propose two tests of reporting heterogeneity. The rst test is nothing
but the ignorability condition of z in the equation determining SAH (compare
with Etile and Milcent's [50] equation (1) above and Kerkhofs and Lindeboom
[85]), that is:
Pr(Ysah = i j U; Ylli;z) = Pr(Ysah = i j U; Ylli) i = 1; 2; 3 (2.4)
which can be performed by testing whether z has a signicant inuence on SAH in
model (2.3), that is, 1 = 2 = 0. Our second test is more specic and is focused
on whether individual characteristics aect dierent parts of SAH distribution
after conditioning on U and Ylli, that is, testing whether 1 = 2. Both tests are
performed by estimating a restricted model and computing a LR-test which has
a chi-square asymptotic distribution.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Generalized ordered logit results
As benchmark of our analysis we use the results obtained by a generalized ordered
logit model of SAH on the set of indicators and individual characteristics:
Pr (Ysah > 1 jz;w ) =  (1 + z01 +w0)
Pr (Ysah > 2 jz;w ) =  (2 + z02 +w0)
(2.5)
(compare with the second and third equations of system (2.3)), where z is the
vector of socio-economic, demographic and life styles characteristics as above, and
w is a vector of health variables. Notice that following Etile and Milcent [50] (and
to make the regression systems (2.3) and (2.5) directly comparable), we assume
that only the coecients of z are allowed to vary across the categories of SAH;
while health variables are assumed to aect uniformly the SAH's distribution.
We rst tested the null hypothesis of parallel lines - called the proportional
odds assumption in the statistical literature (Agresti [4], p. 275) - by imposing
the restriction that 1 = 2; the likelihood ratio test is equal to 63.25 with 37 df
(p-value .0045). Thus, the hypothesis of parallel lines is rejected.
Table (A.4) shows the estimated coecients from the generalized ordered
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logit. Results show that with this specication there are several individual char-
acteristics that aect SAH. Under the assumption that biomarkers fully capture
\true" health, dierences in SAH should reect heterogeneity in reporting be-
haviours, rather than genuine variation in the health status. Thus people with
higher income who live in less deprived area tend to report better health. There-
fore our results on income related dierences in the probability to report better
health are close to many other papers about the existence of income-related re-
porting heterogeneity (Hernandez-Quevedo et al. [71], Etile and Milcent [50],
Lindeboom and van Doorslaer [90]). Let consider now results on health related
life variables. One observes that sport and physical activities, also increase the
probability to report good health, while individuals who eat more portions of
fruits and vegetables per day, are more likely to report very good health than
just at least good health. Clearly it is hard in this framework to claim that the
eect of individual characteristics on the probability to report subjective health is
only due to reporting heterogeneity since it doesn't clearly distinguish the eect of
personal characteristics on\true" health from the eect on self-reporting behavior
- for example life styles may have a positive eect on \true" health, but they may
also systemically induce individual to over(under) report individual subjective
health. For this reason we then also estimate model (2.3) where observables are
allowed to aect both individuals' health and reporting heterogeneity.
2.4.2 Results from model (2.3)
Intercepts
Since U is binary, table (A.5) shows 24 + 222 + 1 = 17 estimated intercepts .
In particular there is 1 parameter to describe the class membership probability, 2
parameters for each of the 4 health indicators, and 4 parameters to describe the
eect of U and YLLI on SAH for people who report at least good or very good
health.
A glance at the table reveals that people with good health (U = 0) are
much more likely to have desirable lab test scores and no limiting longstanding
illness compared to people with ill-health (U = 1). Furthermore, it is easily
checked that people with U = 0 are also much more likely to report at least
good or very good health conditional on Ylli = 0; 1. Regarding the eect of Ylli
on SAH, it is also easily checked that the probability to report at least good or
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very good health is also increasing in Ylli conditional on U = 0; 1.
4 This result
provides signicant evidence on the existence of heterogeneity in self-reporting
behavior related to dierences in self-perceived limiting illness.
Variations in the unobserved \true" health U .
The rst column of table (A.6) reports the estimated parameters u of both
health related variables and socioeconomic characteristics:
 the eects of demographics characteristics on unobserved \true" health have
the expected sign. In fact, ill-health is positive and statistically related
to age, but negatively with sex and ethnicity. As expected women tend
generally to have better health than men (Wingard [119]);
 socio-economic characteristics play an important role in health determina-
tion. In particular those with higher education have lower probability of
being classied with poor health than those with no qualication. Health
status is also strongly and positively correlated with income and social class
as showed by estimated coecients of equivalised income and social class.
This results support ndings obtained by Johnston et al. [79] who found
in the same data no signicant income gradient for self-reported chronic
hypertension, but a clear negative gradient for objective 140/90 hyperten-
sion. This indicates that individuals living in most deprived household are
signicantly more likely to have hypertension. Another important role on
determining individual health is also played by the index of multiple depri-
vation. Individuals who live in highly deprived area register a lower level of
health than those living in less deprived area, although the eect seems to
statistically vanishes as the deprivation decreases. Finally there is a small
and negative statistical signicant eect on health of the number of months
individual lived in the same area;
 unobserved health is also related with individual life-style characteristics;
individual who are no smokers who practice sport regularly with a moder-
ate physical activity and follow a diet with a low fat content have a greater
probability of having good unobserved health; the opposite holds for indi-
viduals who are obese with cardiovascular conditions in the family. Finally
4Just as an example, the probability that people with U = 0 report very good health is on
average .52 if Ylli = 0 while it is .97 if Ylli = 1.
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ill-health seems to be negatively correlated with the parents' age and with
to the number of units drank in the heaviest day in the last seven days.
This last result is clearly unexpected, although it could be related to a sort
of measurement error in the drinking-unit variable.
Variations in reporting behaviour
The discussion above shows signicant variation in unobservable health status
by personal characteristics, representing a considerable source of unobserved het-
erogeneity in health production which should be taken into account. In the
present section, we analyse the direct relationships between self-reported health
and observable characteristics conditional on true unobserved health status and
no limiting longstanding illness. Recall that for the sake of generality we have
assumed (see (2.3)) that the set of covariates z aecting \true" unobserved health
may also potentially aect reporting behavior.
We rst tested the parallel line assumption by estimating a restricted
model in which individual characteristics have the same eect on dierent cate-
gories of the SAH distribution. The value of log-likelihood for the restricted and
unrestricted model is equal to -10979 and -10953. The value of likelihood ratio
test is 53.72 which is clearly rejected with 37 d.f (p-value = .037). Results on
unobserved heterogeneity in self-reported behavior are reported in the last four
columns of table (A.6). They dier slightly with respect of SAH classes and can
be summarized as:
 after conditioning on U and Ylli a wide set of variables (such as ethnicity,
education and individual life styles) are not anymore statistically signi-
cant in model (2.3) in both SAH's categories as compared with the results
obtained in the generalized order logit model discussed above. In fact only
some variables which appeared to signicantly aect both SAH'categories in
model (2.5) are also signicant in both at least good and very good health in
model (2.3). For example, after conditioning for unobserved health-types,
having any qualication or being an individuals from ethnic minorities has
no eect on SAH, contrary to the generalized logit model.
 individual with higher income tend to self report better health status. On
the contrary people living in the most deprived area and with low ed-
ucational attainment report systematically a worse level of health. The
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magnitude of the eect does not dier signicantly among SAH's classes.
Therefore our results support the idea that reporting heterogeneity in SAH
depends on socio-economic conditions, as suggested by [50];
 age aects self-reporting behavior. In particular elders tend to report better
health than expected. This result seems plausible with previous ndings
(Lindeboom and van Doorslaer [90], Groot [65]) and conrms the appar-
ently puzzle between self reported health and age, which is related to the
existence of individual adaption to chronical ill conditions;
 individual's life-styles tend also to aect dierently reporting behavior.
Physical activities and sports increases the probability to report \very
good" health but not at least \good" health. Thus, our ndings are very
similar to those obtained by Johnston et al. [79], indicating that individual
with healthy life may over estimate their health status and then tend to
over report subjective health. This eect is also increasing in the eort
required by the activity itself, but is smaller compared with those obtained
with the generalized ordered logit. However notice that these relationships
between SAH, unobserved health and individual's health related behaviour
may also reect a potential source of endogeneity. A possible solution which
can be addressed in the future is to include in this framework individual
behaviour in the past which should aect subsequent health status.
2.5 Discussion and nal remarks
The present study explores the relationships between socio-economic, demo-
graphic and life-style personal characteristics and health. In particular we test the
existence of reporting heterogeneity on SAH implementing the approach proposed
by Etile and Milcent [50] and Kerkhofs and Lindeboom [85]. Our empirical strat-
egy is innovative in two ways. First we use some recent developments on LCA to
disentangle the eect of personal characteristics on self-reporting behavior from
the eect on heterogeneity in health production, and we allow residual associ-
ation between self-reported indicators in order to capture dierences related to
reporting heterogeneity after conditioning on latent \true" health. Second, to
identify unobserved individual latent health we use not only subjective measures,
but also objective indicators, such as biological measures, which help to validate
respondents' self reports and to identify individual health by taking into account
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the pre-clinical levels of disease even when the respondents may not have been
aware (Banks et al. [7]).
Our results conrm the existence of systematic self-reporting bias which
has been found in many other empirical investigations. However, after condition-
ing on individual unobserved health-type, we nd that several individual char-
acteristics do not have a statistically signicant eect on self-reporting behavior
compared with the generalized order logit which does not distinguish explicitly
between heterogeneity in health and reporting behavior.
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Appendix A
Tables
Table A.1: Variable Denitions
Variable Denition
chl Total/high density lipoprotein cholesterol (1 = if lab test score is good, 0 otherwise)
crp C-reactive protein (1 = if lab test score is lower than 3 mg/L, 0 otherwise)
bpn Blood pressure (1 = normotensive with Dinamap and Omron readings), 0 otherwise)
lli Limiting Longstanding Illness (1 = if no Limiting Longstanding Illness, 0 otherwise)
sah Self-Assessed Health status (1 = \poor health", 2 = \good", 3 = \very good")
mar 1 = if individual is married, 0 otherwise
age age of individuals
women 1 = female, 0 otherwise
black 1 = black, 0 otherwise
white 1 = white, 0 otherwise
noqual 1 = no qualication, 0 otherwise
eduh 1 = second level or higher, 0 otherwise
scl2 1 = social class for skilled non-manual and skilled manual
scl3 1 = social class professional and managerial technical
eqvinc Equivalised income
imd3 1 = third quintile of Overall Index of Multiple Deprivation
imd4 1 = fourth quintile of Overall Index of Multiple Deprivation
imd5 1 = fth quintile of Overall Index of Multiple Deprivation (most deprived)
hse04 1 = if individual belongs to HSE 2004, 0 otherwise
bmil value of Body Mass Index if it is lower than 18.5, 0 otherwise
bmih value of Body Mass Index if it is higher than 29.9, 0 otherwise
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Table A.2: Variable Denitions
Variable Denition
drinkun # of drinking units in the heaviest day
agema age of mother
agepa age of father
demam 1 = whether the mother is dead
depa 1 = whether the father is dead
famcvd 1 = whether there are cardiovascular conditions in the family history
smacc 1 = if someone smokes in the accommodation
smkc 1 = if individual smokes currently
smkevr 1 = if individual has ever smoked
smkex 1 = if individual is an ex smoker
smkoc 1 = if individual smokes occasionally and is an ex-smoker
sportm 1 = moderate sport activity
sportr 1 = regular sport activity
hrsspt # of hours of sport per week
phy2 1 = medium physical activity level
phy3 1 = high physical activity level
veg # of portions of fruits and vegetables per day
fatt2 1 = if individual's diet has a medium fat score
fatt3 1 = if individual's diet has a high fat score
livehm # of months individual has lived in this local year
urban 1 = if individual lives in an urban area
Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics
Mean S.D Mean S.D
chl 0.5927 0.4913 drinkun 3.1656 2.4252
crp 0.7403 0.4385 agema 70.1709 11.9926
bpn 0.6613 0.4733 agepa 68.9665 11.5362
lli 0.5862 0.4925 demam 0.4285 0.4949
sah 2.1572 0.7579 depa 0.5894 0.4920
mar 0.7071 0.4551 famcvd 0.1230 0.3285
age 49.3688 13.0599 smacc 0.8041 0.3968
women 0.5211 0.4996 smkc 0.1736 0.3788
black 0.0337 0.1805 smkevr 0.3921 0.4883
white 0.8550 0.3520 smkex 0.2729 0.4455
noqual 0.1878 0.3906 smkoc 0.1401 0.5106
eduh 0.7749 0.4176 sportm 0.2691 0.4435
scl2 0.3620 0.4806 sportr 0.1227 0.3281
scl3 0.5034 0.5000 hrsspt 1.2022 3.0489
eqvinc 3.1720 2.7412 phy2 0.4046 0.4908
imd3 0.2037 0.4028 phy3 0.3022 0.4593
imd4 0.1768 0.3816 veg 3.8218 2.4619
imd5 0.1336 0.3403 fatt2 0.1520 0.3590
hse04 0.1685 0.3744 fatt3 0.0301 0.1710
bmil 0.5025 3.0435 livehm 160.0535 208.1209
bmih 18.8296 14.3018 urban 0.1792 0.3836
Sample Size=3,381
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Table A.4: Results for the Ordered Logit Model
1 S.E. 2 S.E.
mar 0.198* 0.11 0.063 0.09
age 0.000 0.01 0.003 0.01
women 0.105 0.11 -0.035 0.08
black 0.313 0.28 0.405 0.25
white 0.777** 0.22 0.689** 0.17
noqual -0.862** 0.31 -0.594** 0.22
eduh -0.695 0.31 -0.281 0.21
scl2 0.066 0.14 -0.202 0.13
scl3 0.219 0.16 0.060 0.13
eqvinc 0.711** 0.26 0.397** 0.16
imd3 -0.076 0.14 -0.139 0.11
imd4 -0.254* 0.15 -0.227* 0.11
imd5 -0.798** 0.16 -0.429** 0.14
hse04 -0.058 0.18 -0.005 0.13
bmil 0.010 0.01 -0.011 0.01
bmih -0.002 0.00 -0.008** 0.01
drinkun 0.022 0.02 0.017 0.02
agema -0.004 0.00 -0.001 0.01
agepa 0.009* 0.00 0.002 0.01
demam -0.231 0.14 0.099 0.11
depa 0.014 0.14 0.101 0.10
famcvd -0.243 0.16 -0.105 0.13
smacc 0.276* 0.16 0.054 0.12
smkc -0.271 0.25 -0.237 0.18
smkevr -0.164 0.20 0.141 0.14
smkex -0.045 0.21 -0.034 0.15
smkoc 0.007 0.14 0.008 0.09
sportm 0.405** 0.15 0.230** 0.06
sportr 0.522* 0.27 0.419** 0.16
hrsspt -0.013 0.02 0.026** 0.01
phy2 0.622** 0.12 0.269** 0.10
phy3 0.715** 0.15 0.436** 0.11
veg 0.004 0.02 0.034 0.01
fatt2 0.209 0.15 0.016 0.10
fatt3 -0.032 0.28 0.084 0.23
livehm -0.000 0.01 -0.000 0.00
urban 0.201 0.14 0.073 0.11
intercept -0.426** 0.66 -2.761** 0.50
Parameters of vector w
 S.E.
lli 1.589** .07
crp 0.162* .08
chl 0.172 .09
bpn 0.157** .07
** Signicant at the 5% level;
* Signicant at the 10% level.
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Table A.5: Estimated intercepts of model 2.3
 S.E. Prob.
U = 1 0.1615 0.1249 0.54
chl j U = 0 1.6278 0.0853 0.84
chl j U = 1 -0.5323 0.0596 0.37
crp j U = 0 1.8694 0.0852 0.86
crp j U = 1 0.5100 0.0539 0.62
bpn j U = 0 1.9212 0.0934 0.87
bpn j U = 1 -0.1277 0.0556 0.47
lli j U = 0 0.8031 0.0599 0.69
lli j U = 1 -0.0378 0.0521 0.49
sah > 1 j U = 0; lli = 0 -0.1717 0.1109 0.46
sah > 1 j U = 0; lli = 1 2.5915 0.1517 0.93
sah > 1 j U = 1; lli = 0 -1.6320 0.1219 0.16
sah > 1 j U = 1; lli = 1 0.6901 0.1063 0.67
sah > 2 j U = 0; lli = 0 0.0806 0.1097 0.52
sah > 2 j U = 0; lli = 1 3.4650 0.2195 0.97
sah > 2 j U = 1; lli = 0 -1.3091 0.1478 0.21
sah > 2 j U = 1; lli = 1 1.3354 0.1652 0.79
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Table A.6: Estimated covariates' coecients of model 2.3
u S.E. 1 S.E. 2 S.E
mar -0.1079 0.2216 -0.0159 0.1303 0.1689 0.1172
age 0.1493** 0.0183 -0.0070 0.0103 0.0130** 0.0067
women -2.5172** 0.2734 -0.0290 0.1366 -0.0849 0.1199
black -2.2479** 0.5418 0.6449 0.3430 0.1330 0.3403
white -0.1400 0.3893 1.1140** 0.2352 0.3628 0.2324
noqual -0.2231 0.6467 -0.5668 0.3942 -0.7306** 0.2591
eduh -1.0248 0.6119 -0.3372 0.3477 -0.4912* 0.2532
scl2 -0.5605 0.3170 0.0747 0.2156 -0.2078 0.1485
scl3 -0.3788 0.3267 0.1987 0.2198 0.1065 0.1601
eqvinc -0.8082* 0.2967 0.5116** 0.2334 0.5070** 0.2174
imd3 0.3715 0.2514 -0.1228 0.1463 -0.0855 0.1373
imd4 0.4941* 0.2775 -0.0789 0.1684 -0.3462** 0.1472
imd5 1.5698** 0.3452 -0.8177** 0.2251 -0.4448** 0.1659
hse04 0.2451 0.3162 0.1559 0.1990 -0.2741 0.1878
bmil -0.0721 0.0468 0.0042 0.0134 -0.0510 0.0399
bmih 0.1355** 0.0119 -0.0083* 0.0046 0.0044 0.0057
drinkun -0.1297** 0.0456 0.0364 0.0284 0.0057 0.0236
agema -0.0137 0.0108 0.0083 0.0076 -0.0078 0.0048
agepa -0.0183* 0.0106 -0.0027 0.0069 0.0082 0.0046
demam 0.0627 0.2542 0.0705 0.1646 -0.0412 0.1427
depa -0.0534 0.2495 0.0554 0.1482 0.1146 0.1529
famcvd 0.5728* 0.3313 -0.2160 0.2311 -0.1146 0.1499
smacc -0.6574** 0.3137 -0.1505 0.1971 0.2991** 0.1556
smkc 0.8732** 0.4396 -0.7655** 0.2664 0.2281 0.2349
smkevr -0.0649 0.3346 0.1928 0.2082 -0.0301 0.1961
smkex 0.0471 0.3558 -0.0078 0.2282 -0.0309 0.1929
smkoc 0.0710 0.2354 -0.0269 0.1363 0.0546 0.1340
sportm -1.1110** 0.2469 -0.1289 0.1425 0.4725** 0.1519
sportr -1.1047** 0.3918 -0.1735 0.2262 0.8126** 0.2994
hrsspt 0.0487 0.0324 0.0706** 0.0281 -0.0432 0.0288
phy2 -0.5596** 0.2572 0.5506** 0.1708 0.3364** 0.1229
phy3 -1.3925** 0.2989 0.5664** 0.1809 0.6059** 0.1489
veg 0.0005 0.0400 0.0270 0.0245 0.0344 0.0219
fatt2 -0.0002 0.2652 -0.2242 0.1615 0.2951** 0.1393
fatt3 0.7564 0.5752 0.6370 0.4567 -0.2132 0.2617
livehm -0.0011** 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0002
urban 0.3106 0.2605 0.0596 0.1620 0.1475 0.1448
** Signicant at the 5% level;
* Signicant at the 10% level.
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Chapter 3
Testing for Selection Eects
in Insurance Markets with
Unobservable Types
3.1 Introduction
The eects of private information on the ecient operation of insurance mar-
kets has been one of the most active research topics in economics, starting from
the classic Rothschild and Stiglitz [104] (RS) paper. The standard RS adverse
selection model predicts that when individuals have private information about
their actual risk, the insurance contract will be adversely selected, with high risk
individuals choosing higher insurance coverage; ex post, this will cause a positive
correlation between risk and coverage. This observation has inspired the seminal
contribution by Chiappori and Salanie [25], who considered the testable impli-
cations of asymmetric information in insurance markets, and proposed the so
called Positive Correlation (PC) test. The PC test rejects the null of absence of
private information in a given insurance market when, conditional on consumers'
characteristics used by companies to price contracts, individuals with more cov-
erage experience more of the insured risk. The coverage-risk correlation has been
shown to be a robust implication of competitive insurance markets under private
information in many dierent settings (see e.g. Chiappori et al. [24]).
The PC test has inspired a large and growing literature on empirical testing
for asymmetric information in insurance markets. A recent paper by Cohen
and Spiegelman [30] reviews almost a hundred empirical applications focusing on
automobile, annuities, life, reverse mortgages, long-term care, crop and health
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insurance markets.1
Contrary to the theoretical prediction, a number of empirical analyses of
insurance markets have found negative risk-coverage correlation, a phenomenon
which has been named favorable selection.2 For example, in their seminal paper
on favourable selection in the US long-term care insurance market, Finkelstein
and McGarry [58] nd negative correlation between insurance purchase and nurs-
ing home use, both unconditionally and after conditioning on risk classication
by insurers. As an explanation of this puzzle, Finkelstein and McGarry argue
that there are two conicting sources of private information, namely individual's
actual risk and risk attitudes, so that two types of people buy insurance: high
risk individuals and high risk aversion individuals. Ex post, the former are higher
risk then predicted; the latter are lower risk; in aggregate, those who buy more
insurance do not have higher claims. The same puzzling negative risk-coverage
correlation has also been found in a recent paper by Fang et al. [53], who show
that, conditional on controls for Medigap prices, individuals with Medigap insur-
ance tend to spend less on medical care. This is explained again by the existence
of multiple dimensions of private information, with cognitive ability being one
of the key sources of favourable selection. The possibility that multidimensional
private information may invalidate standard insurance model predictions has also
been the subject of recent theoretical work, which has shown that the positive
risk-coverage correlation may not necessarily follow from the existence of private
information (see e.g. Chiappori et al. [24], de Meza and Webb [37], Smart [108],
Villeneuve [114], Wambach [117]).
In practice, especially when insurance companies do not use all relevant
information to price insurance contracts, either because it is unobservable or
because it cannot be used for regulatory constraints or political economy consid-
erations, it is quite likely that there are many individual characteristics which are
not used by insurance companies to price contracts but may inuence insurance
coverage and actual risk occurrence. Thus, in many instances it is possible that
there is multidimensional residual heterogeneity which aects the risk-coverage
correlation, even after conditioning on variables used by insurers to price con-
tracts. Notice however that multidimensionality of private information does not
1See also Einav et al. [47] for a recent review of testing for asymmetric information in
insurance markets.
2Alternatively, some authors refer to this situation as advantageous or propitious selection.
See Hemenway [70] for an early discussion of the relevance of favourable selection in insurance
markets.
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need to be necessarily related to regulation, which can have many additional
other eects on market.
The rst question addressed by this paper is then: How does the standard
PC test perform in the presence of multidimensional private information? We ar-
gue that under multidimensional private information there is the possibility that
the insurance contract is both adversely and favourably selected by dierent indi-
viduals. Since the PC test relies on a single statistic to appraise the risk-coverage
correlation, multidimensional private information may cause serious problems in
detecting selection eects using observable data, since the PC test averages out
selection eects which may pull in dierent directions.
We then show how unobserved heterogeneity can be modeled by assum-
ing a nite number of heterogeneous \types", which result by cross-classifying
the relevant private information variables, and extend the standard adverse and
favourable selection denitions into local and global ones. Using recent advances
in nite mixture modelling, we show how risk and coverage probabilities can be
estimated for the unobserved types in order to detect selection eects in the mar-
ket. Tests for the absence of selection and the multidimensionality of private
information can be performed by imposing restrictions on the behavior of these
unobservable types.
To show the potential applicability of our approach, we look at the US
long-term care and Medigap insurance markets, which dier substantially since
the former is not heavily regulated as the latter. While the PC test shows absence
of signicant residual risk-coverage correlation in both samples, our nite mixture
model shows the existence of signicant residual heterogeneity with large selection
eects. Not surprisingly, we nd that selection eects are stronger in the regulated
market.
3.2 The Positive Correlation test
In this section we review the main properties of the PC test in the standard
Rothschild-Stiglitz model of adverse selection. As explained by Cohen and Spiegel-
man [30], when looking at the risk-coverage correlation, there is no unique way to
dene coverage and risk. When insurers oer dierent contracts, high risk indi-
viduals may choose contracts with more comprehensive coverage; when insurers
29
oer a single product, high risk agents have a greater probability to buy insur-
ance. Similarly, risk may be dened by higher expected claims, higher payouts
in the event of a claim, or both.
To keep the analysis simple, we follow the original Chiappori and Salanie
[25] analysis and assume we observe a binary variable I 2 f0; 1g which takes value
1 if an individual has bought an insurance contract which protects from a xed
loss, and a binary variable O 2 f0; 1g which takes value 1 if the individual incurs
the loss. The terms of the contract depend on a set of individual observable
characteristics x used by the insurance company. Thus, individuals with the
same x are oered the same contract. In practice conditioning on x is key in
these testing procedures. We consider rst the analysis conditional on x, that is,
we consider the population of individuals who have the same characteristics x.
Let R 2 f0; 1g be a private information variable denoting risk type. Since
R is not observed, the underlying question is what can we learn about the distri-
bution of O; I;R when we observe only O; I. An important point to notice is that
the positive risk-coverage correlation may arise, even in the absence of adverse
selection, because of moral hazard. In particular, since moral hazard implies ex
post positive correlation between risk and coverage even in the absence of adverse
selection, nding positive risk-coverage correlation in the data does not provide
concluding evidence of adverse selection, but negative or zero correlation in the
data is not compatible with adverse selection. This is a well known issue, and
an important task of current literature is disentangling the two eects. Advances
are being made exploiting exogenous variations or the panel structure of data
(see e.g. Abbring [2]-[1], Cardon and Hendel [21], Chiappori et al. [26], Dionne
et al. [41], Einav et al. [48]); the issue is discussed with references in the reviews
of Cohen and Spiegelman [30] and Einav et al. [47].
To focus on selection eects, let us assume that there is no moral hazard.
This assumption is only partially restringing. Notice, in fact, that moral hazard
eect of insurance diers between individuals. In particular some individuals
whose behaviour is more responsive to insurance may be also more likely to buy
(ex ante) insurance. Thus, we would still view this as selection, in the sense that
individuals are selecting insurance on the basis of their anticipated behavioural
response to it. Therefore the moral hazard eect we are not considered is then
net net of the moral hazard induced by the selection of a contract by dierent
types, who anticipate that their behavior will change after buying the contract.
In particular it could be viewed as a variation aecting each individual in the
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loss occurrence and consumption subsequent to the contract purchasing.3 Under
this assumption we have:
P (O = 1 j R; I = 0) = P (O = 1 j R; I = 1): (3.1)
The classic RS denition of adverse selection, that higher risk individuals (i.e.
those with higher loss probability) are more likely to buy insurance, can be written
as:4
Denition 1. (Adverse Selection 1): The insurance contract I is adversely se-
lected if
 
P (O = 1 j R = 1) P (O = 1 j R = 0) P (I = 1 j R = 1) P (I = 1 j R = 0) > 0:
An alternative denition of adverse selection in this context can be derived by
noting that riskier types, when compared to the population, are more likely to
experience the loss; the insurance contract I is adversely selected by them since
they are also more likely to buy insurance compared to the population. On the
other hand, less risky types, who have lower expected claims, also adversely select
I since they are less likely to buy insurance compared to the population. If we
denote by PO and PI the average loss and insurance probabilities,
5 the insurance
contract I is adversely selected by type R = i if
 
P (O = 1 j R = i)  PO
   P (I = 1 j R = i)  PI > 0:
Denition 2. (Adverse Selection 2): The insurance contract I is adversely se-
lected if it is adversely selected by types R = 0; 1:
Now, Denitions 1 and 2 are not directly testable since they involve the unob-
served variable R. Consider then the following two testable conditions:
3This assumption is crucial to show simply the theoretical equivalence between the dieren
denitions of the positive correlation test. However, notice that since our paper is mainly
concentrated on studying the existence of residual (multidimensional) private information in
the insurance markets, without disentangling the eect of adverse selection from moral hazard,
we follow several other studies on this issue which assume no moral hazard (see e.g. Chiappori
and Salanie [25], Cohen and Einav [29], Finkelstein and McGarry [58], Fang et al. [53], Cutler
et al. [32]).
4If we label R = 1 as the high risk individuals, Denition 1 could be written as P (O = 1 j
R = 1) > P (O = 1 j R = 0) and P (I = 1 j R = 1) > P (I = 1 j R = 0). Denition 1 is
slightly more general since it does not imply any label on R, which will be useful later when
unobservable types could reect multidimensional characteristics.
5That is, PO = P (R = 0)P (O = 1 j R = 0) + P (R = 1)P (O = 1 j R = 1) and PI = P (R =
0)P (I = 1 j R = 0) + P (R = 1)P (I = 1 j R = 1).
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Denition 3. (Positive Correlation Test 1):
P (O = 1 j I = 1) > P (O = 1 j I = 0);
and
Denition 4. (Positive Correlation Test 2):
P (O = 1; I = 1)  P (O = 0; I = 0)
P (O = 1; I = 0)  P (O = 0; I = 1) > 1:
Denitions 3 and 4 are two ways to implement the PC test in this context.
Denition 3 says that the expected loss for consumers who chose to insure is
greater than for consumers who did not. Denition 4 says that the odds ratio
between O and I should be greater than one, that is, O and I should be positively
correlated, and goes back to the original implementation of Chiappori and Salanie
[25]. Both alternative denitions of the PC test are discussed in the literature;
for example, the review of Einav et al. [47] privileges the rst, while the review
of Cohen and Spiegelman [30] considers both. The following result claries the
relationship between the four denitions, and is proved in the appendix.
Proposition 1. Denitions 1, 2, 3, and 4 are equivalent under Assumption (3.1).
The proposition shows that under no moral hazard, adverse selection, which
involves the unobservable risk type R, is equivalent to the positive correlation
property which involves only observables.
In practice, since the insurance contract depends on the observable vari-
ables x, the PC test is performed conditional on x. As suggested by Chiappori
and Selanie [25], when the variables in x are discrete with a very limited number
of distinct congurations, one can dene a nite number of mutually exclusive and
exhaustive congurations (strata), and test the independence of I and O in each
stratum. Since this is equivalent to imposing no restriction on how P (O; I j x)
depends on x, the analysis is nonparametric. On the other hand, if covariates are
continuous or take so many values that most strata contain too few subjects, the
nonparametric approach is not viable, and Chiappori and Selanie [25] suggest to
test the conditional correlation between O and I with a standard binary probit
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model
I = 1(x
0
I + I > 0); (3.2)
O = 1(x
0
O + O > 0) (3.3)
with I and O standard normal errors. In particular, since risk type R is not
observed, one can always rewrite, say, I = IR+ I and O = OR+ O, with I
and O being idiosyncratic errors and I and O positive constants, so that the
null of the absence of private information amounts to testing that the correlation
between I and O is zero. Notice that model (3.2,3.3) assumes no moral hazard
since I has no direct eect on O. In their seminal application of the PC test to the
automobile insurance market, Chiappori and Selanie [25] nd that the null of the
absence of private information cannot be rejected under both the nonparametric
and parametric testing procedures.
3.2.1 The Positive Correlation test with multidimensional
private information
Suppose now there are two unobserved binary variables, R and P , so that, after
cross classication R  P , there are four unobservable \types" (L;L), (L;H),
(H;L) and (H;H). As argued in the Introduction, the existence and the eect
of multidimensional private information in insurance markets has been analyzed
both in the theoretical and the empirical literature. For example, Smart [108]
studied a competitive insurance market in which individuals dier with respect
to both accident probability and degree of risk aversion showing that multiple di-
mension of private information can change the nature of equilibrium introducing
\noise" into the problem of inferring agents' type. However, it is important to no-
tice that both the theoretical and empirical literature use dierent interpretations
of \risk preference" P , which have included not only the canonical Arrow-Pratt
risk aversion specication, but also context's specic risk perceptions which may
aect both insurance choice and loss occurrence (see Einav et al. [49] for a recent
contribution on context's specic risk perceptions).
Suppose that insurance and loss follow a standard bivariate probit model
with
I = 1(x
0
I + IR + IP + I > 0);
O = 1(x
0
O + OR + OP + O > 0)
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so that, letting I = IR + IP + I and O = OR + OP + O, model (3.2,3.3)
above is a special case with I = O = 0. Consider the following four examples,
where for simplicity we assume that x has been centered and the analysis is
conditional on x = 0:
1. In the rst example, suppose I = O = O = 1 and I = -1; thus, as in
the standard model, risk type has a positive eect on both the insurance
and claim probabilities, but there is an additional unobservable variable
(risk preference) which has a positive eect on claims and a negative eect
on insurance. Let R and P be independent, respectively with support
f 1; 2g with probability (2/3,1/3), and support f 2; 1g with probability
(1/3,2/3). It can be checked that there is zero correlation between I and
O, so that the PC test would conclude that there is no selection in this
insurance contract. However, after calculating the population probabilities
PO and PI and the insurance and outcome probabilities for the four types,
it can be seen that the while the insurance contract is adversely selected by
types (H;H), there is favourable selection by types (L;L) since, compared
with the population, types (L;L) have lower claim probability but a greater
probability of buying the insurance contract.
2. In the second example, let I = O = 1, I = -1 and O = 0. This captures a
simple extension of the standard model which assumes that risk preference
has a negative eect on insurance purchase. Let R and P be independent,
equiprobable, and with support respectively equal to f 1; 1g and f 2; 2g.
There is positive correlation between I and O, which is interpreted by the
PC test as evidence of adverse selection. However, after calculating the in-
surance and outcome probabilities for the four types and for the population,
it can be seen that the insurance contract is favourably selected by types
(L;L) and (H;H), and adversely selected by types (L;H) and (H;L).
3. In the third example, let I = O = 1 and I = O = 0, so that insurance
choice is aected only by risk preference, and claim probability only by
risk type, and suppose R and P be independent. There is zero correlation
between I and O, but the insurance contract is adversely selected by types
(L;L) and (H;H), and favourably selected by types (L;H) and (H;L).
4. In the nal example, let I = O = 0, O = 1 and I = -1, so that actual
risk has no eect on I and O, but risk preference has a negative eect on
insurance choice and a positive one on claim probabilities. There is negative
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correlation between I and O, and the insurance contract is favourably
selected by both types P = L and P = H; the interest of this example
lies in the fact that there is favourable selection in this market, but private
information is actually unidimensional.6
It is important to stress that lacking a sound and universally accepted
equilibrium insurance model under multidimensional unobserved heterogeneity,
the examples above are only suggestive and just sketch some empirically or the-
oretically relevant cases. However, these examples do point at possible problems
with the positive correlation test under multidimensional heterogeneity, which
stem from the fact that using a single statistic to calculate correlation is bound
to average out selection eects which pull in dierent directions.
3.3 Testing for selection eects with multidi-
mensional private information: The FMP
test
In an important stream of papers dealing with selection eects in insurance mar-
kets with multidimensional private information, Finkelstein and Poterba [57],
Finkelstein and McGarry [58] and Cutler et al. [32] suggest using variables which
are observable by the econometricians but not used by the insurance companies
as proxies of private information variables. In practice, this involves adding such
variables as covariates in the equations for the loss and insurance probabilities; if
any of these proxies is found signicant, this is taken as evidence of the existence
of residual private information. As argued by Cutler et al. [32], the test can be
performed both conditionally on insurers' risk classication x as suggested by
Chiappori and Selanie [25], or unconditionally. They argue that \the uncondi-
tional relationships may be of greater interest, since we are primarily interested
6Of course this begs the question about the relationship between this example and those
papers (e.g. Finkelstein and McGarry [58] and Fang et al. [53]) that, having found evidence
for favourable selection in some insurance market, conclude that this implies the presence of
multidimensional private information. The two views can be reconciled only if one assumes
the existence of a further unobservable, namely actual risk R, which has a positive eect on
both I and O. In other words, if one assumes that I and O are strictly positive, a necessary
condition for nding negative correlation between I and O is that there must be some other
unobservable with contrasting eect on I and O. Thus, having assumed the presence of one
dimension of private information (actual risk), one concludes that private information must be
multidimensional.
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in how preferences mediate the insurance - risk occurrence relationship" ([32], p.
160), but in practice they nd that in their applications the two sets of results
are very similar. We refer to this testing procedure as the Finkelstein-McGarry-
Poterba (FMP) test.
In a seminal application of this testing procedure to the long-term care
insurance market, Finkelstein and McGarry [58] nd that, after conditioning for
risk classication by insurance companies, and proxing risk preference by seat belt
use, preventive care activity, and wealth, all of these variables have a positive ef-
fect on the probability of buying insurance but a negative eect on nursing home
use, which is taken as evidence of favourable selection in this market. In another
application of the FMP test, Cutler et al. [32] consider ve insurance markets
(namely life, annuity, long-term care, Medigap, acute health) and concentrate
in nding whether, extending the standard RS model of adverse selection, risk
preference is a signicant determinant of insurance choices and loss occurrence.
As observable proxies for risk preference they use ve variables (namely smoking,
drinking, job risk, preventive care, seat belt); if, after controlling for x, these
variables are found to have the same (opposite) eect on the insurance and loss
probabilities, this is interpreted as evidence of adverse (favourable) selection.
Cutler et al. [32] nd that individuals who engage in risky behaviours are less
likely to buy insurance in all ve markets considered. In addition, more risk tol-
erant individuals tend to have higher claims in life and long-term care insurance,
but lower claims for annuities, while no systematic relationship is found in the
Medigap and acute health insurance. They suggest that while in the annuity mar-
ket the standard adverse selection model cannot be rejected, there is evidence for
favourable selection in the life and long-term care insurance markets, and there
is no concluding evidence on the nature of the selection eects in the Medigap
and acute health markets.
3.4 Selection eects with multidimensional un-
observable types
Suppose there is a set V1; : : : ; VK of residual heterogeneity variables which af-
fect insurance choice and outcomes after conditioning on x. We assume that
V1; : : : ; VK are discrete, with Vk taking say lk levels, k = 1; : : : ; K. This is a fairly
innocuous assumption since any continuous variable can be approximated arbi-
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trarily well by a discrete one, and it implies that we can cross-classify V1; : : : ; VK
into a single discrete variable which takes l1      lK values, which identies
the set of heterogeneous \types". We do not make any assumption either on K
or on each lk; in practice, many dierent types are very close to each other and
thus are empirically undistinguishable and can be lumped together. Let then T
= f1; 2; : : : ;Mg be the set of dierent unobserved heterogeneous types, and let
T be a random variable with support in T . Clearly since the label of the types
is arbitrary, no order is assumed on T : for example, with two binary private
information variables capturing risk type and risk preference, as shown by Smart
[108] there is no ordering of the four types since single crossing of the indierence
curves fails to hold. In this setting, dierent types are simply meant to capture
heterogeneous insurance and claim behaviours after conditioning on x, without
any assumption on the underlying structure; what matters here is that a su-
cient number of types is used to capture residual heterogeneity. Notice also that
even if we could estimate insurance and loss probabilities for each type, without
further assumptions one cannot disentangle the individual eect of each single
unobservable characteristic.
Now, how can we dene selection eects and test for multidimensional
private information in the presence of a nite set of unobservable types? For the
time being, consider again the analysis conditional on x, and, to isolate selection
eects, assume again no moral hazard:
P (O j T = t; I = 1) = P (O j T = t; I = 0); t 2 T : (3.4)
Now, when private information is multidimensional it is well possible that an
insurance contract is both adversely and favourably selected by dierent types.
Thus, it makes sense to have both a local and a global denition of selection eects
which naturally extends the unidimensional case:
Denition 5. (Local Selection): The insurance contract I is adversely (favourably)
selected by type t 2 T if
 
P (O = 1 j T = t)  PO
   P (I = 1 j T = t)  PI > (<)0; (3.5)
if an insurance contract is adversely (favourably) selected by all types t 2 T ,
since the labeling of the types is arbitrary, we have
Denition 6. (Global Selection:) There is global adverse (favourable) selection
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when there is an appropriate rearrangement of the types such that
Pr(O = 1 j x; T = 1)      Pr(O = 1 j x; T = M)
Pr(I = 1 j x; T = 1)  ()     ()Pr(I = 1 j x; T = M) (3.6)
with some inequality holding strictly.
Now, it is worth noting that if each private information variable V1; : : : ; VK is
monotonic in O and I, when a contract is globally selected we cannot exclude
that private information is actually unidimensional (i.e. a globally selected con-
tract under multidimensional private information is observationally equivalent to
a unidimensional private information one). In other words, under the assumptions
of no moral hazard and that outcome and insurance probabilities are monotone in
each private information variable, we can reject the unidimensionality of private
information only when the global selection inequalities do not hold, since if each
Vk has a monotone eect, then there must be at least two unobservable charac-
teristics which pull I or O in dierent directions. This observation suggests an
empirical test for the unidimensionality of private information, when there are
more than two types.
3.4.1 Implementation
In practice, since individuals dier by the set of variables used by insurers to
price contracts, the analysis has to be performed conditional on x. A key point is
then the choice of x. In many insurance markets there are many observable char-
acteristics which cannot be used either by regulatory laws or political economy
concerns. Thus, a natural choice is to use as conditioning variables those which
are eectively used by insurers to price contracts so as to look at how people
behave conditional on the menu of contracts they actually face. In highly com-
petitive and unregulated markets, presumably the insurance companies' choice
of x reects more accurately actual insurance and loss probabilities, compared
with heavily regulated markets. Therefore, in the latter markets it is more likely
to nd heterogeneous behavior of the types compared to the former (see e.g. Pol-
born et al. [99] on `regulatory selection eects' ). In this sense the unobserved
heterogeneity T is implicitly captured by whatever aects O and I but is not
used by insurance companies to price contracts.
The empirical implementation of the test requires identication of the
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insurance and outcome probabilities Pr(I = 1 j x; t) and Pr(O = 1 j x; t),
and the possibility to estimate probabilities in terms of the unobserved types for
each vector x of insurance used controls. The practical implementation of the
test thus suggests the assumption that Pr(I = 1 j x; t) and Pr(O = 1 j x; t) are
linearly additively separable in x and T , for example by assuming that
Pr(I = 1 j x; t) = F (I(t) + x0I);
P r(O = 1 j x; t) = F (O(t) + x0O)
(3.7)
for some appropriate link function F . Under this assumption, to analyze selection
eects we need estimating the individual types eects I(t) and O(t) for t 2 T ;
appropriate equality and inequality restrictions on I(T ) and O(T ) can then be
imposed to test for the absence of selection eects and the unidimensionality of
private information.
3.5 Estimation
To analyze selection eects we need to estimate the parameters 's and 's in the
nonlinear system (3.7), jointly with the membership probabilities P (t), t 2 T .
This can be accomplished by use of a semiparametric nite mixture model; this
kind of models, which have become popular in economics after the seminal paper
by Heckman and Singer [68], decompose the observed conditional joint distribu-
tion of O and I into a nite number of components with mixing probabilities
P (t):
P (O; I j x) =
X
t2T
P (t)F (O(t) + x
0
O)F (I(t) + x
0
I):
Estimation of nite mixture models involves rst a choice of an appropriate link
function F ; we use logit. Notice however that while relying on the parametric
choice of F for modeling each component probability, no parametric structure is
imposed on the unobserved heterogeneity variable T . Well known applications
of semiparametric nite mixture models are Deb and Trivedi ([38] and [39]) in
health economics and Cameron and Heckman [20] in education.
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3.5.1 A discrete multiresponse nite mixture model
The semiparametric nite mixture model is well established and achieves non-
parametric estimation of the unobserved heterogeneity parameters 's. However,
conditionally on x we observe only two binary variables (that is, 3 parameters),
while even with two mixture types there are 5 parameters to estimate (four 's
and a mixture probability). Thus, it must rely on covariates' variation to achieve
parameters' identication. In practice, it typically achieves identication of very
few unobserved types; in many applications only two types are identied.
To achieve sharper identication of the heterogeneous types we may use a
set of observable indicators, that is, observable manifestations of the unobserved
heterogeneity which aects insurance choice and loss occurrence after condition-
ing on x. Following the logic of the FMP testing procedure, appropriate indica-
tors can be chosen as variables which are observable by the econometricians but
not used by the insurance companies. Examples of variables which can be used as
indicators include: wealth, cognitive abilities, occupational risk, risk reducing or
increasing behavior such as preventive care, seat belt use, smoking and drinking
or, if panel data are available, past insurance choices and claims. For simplicity,
we assume that chosen indicators are actually binary variables (this restriction
aims to simplify the notation, but our econometric analysis can be performed as
long as these indicators are discrete).
Having found a set Z1; : : : ; ZH of suitable indicators, the main model of
interest is then augmented by an auxiliary system of conditional probabilities for
the indicators
Pr(Zh = 1 j t) = F (Zh(t)); h = 1; : : : ; H (3.8)
which is instrumental for identifying the mixture components probabilities in
(3.7), which are of primary interest. Notice that, since T denes mutually exclu-
sive and exhaustive types, the auxiliary equation system (3.8) is saturated and
the choice of the link function is purely one of convenience since no parametric
assumption is imposed.7
7In the auxiliary system (3.8) one could also condition the probability of each indicator to
the controls x, in which case the unobservable types are dened relatively to x. For example, if
Zh is the choice of wearing seat belts which acts as an indicator of risk preference, conditioning
say on age, helps identifying risk attitudes relatively to age, while if no conditioning is made, one
tends to identify unadjusted risk preferences. In our experience, for the purpose of estimating
the parameters of the main system of interest, in practice there is little dierence in the results
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The discrete multiresponse nite mixture model is completed by the types
membership probabilities P (t). To force the types probabilities to lie between zero
and one and sum to one, it is convenient use a multinomial logit parameterization:
Pr(T = t) =
exp(T (t))PM
t=1 exp(T (t))
; T (M) = 0 (3.9)
so that the M   1 logit parameters T are simply reparametrization of the mem-
bership probabilities, and do not impose any parametric restriction on the distri-
bution of T .
The discrete multiresponse nite mixture model is dened by equations
(3.7)-(3.8)-(3.9), with 's and 's being the model parameters. Model (3.7)-
(3.8)-(3.9) can be seen as an instance of a discrete multivariate MIMIC (Joreskog
and Goldberger[81]) model (see Goodman [63] for the seminal paper on nite
mixture models with multivariate binary responses, and Huang and Bandeen-
Roche [75] for a recent general treatment), which uses information on x and
the observable joint distribution of the response variables [I; O; Z1; : : : ; ZH ] 
Y to learn some relevant features of the unobservable conditional distribution
P (Y j x; T ). Contrary to the MIMIC model, the unobserved heterogeneity T
is not a continuous univariate variable on the real line, but an unstructured
nonparametric variable.8
When F is the standard binary logit link, we can rewrite the model (3.7)-
(3.8)-(3.9) in terms of M logits for I, O and each of the indicators Zh, and M  1
multinomial logits for the type membership probabilities. Thus, under the logit
link, model (3.7)-(3.8)-(3.9) can be written more compactly as
(x) = B(x) (3.10)
where  is the vector which collects the (S +1)M   1 logits, B(x) is a design
matrix whose dependence on x reects the dependence of the conditional distri-
obtained under the two approaches.
8For an intuitive explanation on how this can be done, let S = H + 2 denote the size of Y ,
and consider the analysis conditional on a given value of x. Conditionally on x, we observe
the joint distribution of Y , which has 2S   1 free parameters, but (3.7)-(3.8)-(3.9) contains
(S+1)M  1 parameters. Therefore, if a sucient number of indicators are available, a large
number of types can in principle be identied. For example, if H = 4, there are 63 observable
parameters and 7M   1 parameters to estimate, so that in principle up to 9 dierent types
can be identied. However, this is only a necessary condition for the identication of the
unobservable parameters; there are well known pathological examples in the literature on nite
mixture models which show that this counting condition is not sucient.
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bution of I and O on x, and  is the vector which collects the model parameters
's and 's. Now, it can be easily seen that 's are the only model parameters
after conditioning for a given value of x. However, since the 's are one-to-one
and dierentiable functions (i.e. reparametrizations) of the probabilities of inter-
est, model (3.10) is actually nonparametric conditional on a given value of x. It
follows that when the variables in x are discrete, take a limited number of distinct
congurations (strata), and sucient observations are available for each stratum,
in principle one can analyze selection eects in the discrete multiresponses nite
mixture model in a nonparametric fashion, analogously to the PC test discussed
in section 3.2 above. In particular, notice that the unconditional model is non-
parametric, and that model (3.10) imposes the same parametric restriction to
the data as the PC test -namely, the choice of the link function F in the two
equations (3.7)- although nonparametric estimation of our model requires more
observations in each strata.
Estimation of the model parameters in (3.10) can be obtained by the EM
algorithm, which is the standard approach for maximum likelihood estimation of
nite mixture models, and has been shown (Dempster et al. [40]) to converge
to the maximum of the true likelihood. Given the binary nature of the response
variables, the E-step is equivalent to compute, for each subject, the posterior
probability of belonging to each unobservable type. The M-step requires maxi-
mization of a multinomial likelihood with individual covariates, with a suitable
modication to allow for linear inequality constraints.9 It is well known that
the EM algorithm may converge even if the model is not identied, a crucial
issue for nite mixture models. Conditions for parametric identication of model
(3.10) are discussed in Theorem 1 of Huang and Bandeen Roche [75]; local iden-
tication in the nonparametric model can be obtained using the the numerical
test described by Forcina [59], which consists in checking that the Jacobian of
the transformation between the parameters of the observable responses and the
mixture model parameters 's is of full rank for a wide range of parameter values.
Within model (3.10), the absence of selection eects and the multidimen-
sionality of private information can be formally tested by imposing appropriate
restrictions on the  parameters. For example, one rejects the null of the absence
of selection eects when each of the equality constraints I(1) =    = I(M)
and O(1) =    = O(M) is rejected. On the other hand, since nite mixture
9We are grateful to Antonio Forcina for kindly providing the Matlab code for the EM
estimation.
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models are invariant to types' permutation, the standard RS insurance model
(i.e. the null of global adverse selection) for example can be tested by setting
the inequalities I(1)      I(M) and O(1)      O(M); techniques
of order restricted inference can be used to show that the LR test statistic is
asymptotically distributed as a mixture of chi-squared distributions.10
Despite the usefulness of nite mixture models to detect underlying resid-
ual heterogeneity, one unresolved issue in their application is how to determine
the number of unobserved types M . The currently preferred approach suggests
the use of Schwartz's Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to guide this choice,
which in certain conditions is known to be consistent and generally helps pre-
venting overparametrization (see McLachlan and Peel [93] for a thorough intro-
duction to nite mixture models and a review of existing criteria for the choice of
the number of types). BIC is calculated from the maximized log-likelihood L( )
by penalizing parameters' proliferation, BIC( ) =  2L( ) + log(n), where n
denotes sample size and  the number of parameters; the model with the lowest
BIC is preferred.
Finally, it may be worth noticing that, since the number of types M is not
predetermined, formal hypotheses tests performed in nite mixture models are
in fact conditional on M , and pre-testing for the number of types may invalidate
distributional results of the test statistics employed. Of course, while pre-testing
is a common problem in most applied research whenever nal estimates are ob-
tained after searching for appropriate specication, this is an issue which should
be kept in mind whenever test results dier signicantly when performed under
dierent values of M .
3.5.2 Relationship with FMP test
The multivariate discrete nite mixture model uses the same data as the FMP
test, namely the response variables of main interest I and O, the set of variables
used by insurers to price contracts x, and the set of auxiliary observable variables
Zh. The main dierence is that while the variables Zh are used as proxies of resid-
ual private information by FMP, they act as indicators of the unobserved types
in our model. While FMP test can appropriately detect the existence of private
information in a simple and robust procedure, it may run into diculties when
10See Gourieroux and Monfort [64] for a general exposition, and Dardanoni and Forcina [34]
for a discussion on how the mixing weights can be calculated by simulations.
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one tries to interpret the results in terms of selection eects and multidimensional
private information. Our procedure, on the other hand, by clearly identifying a
nite number of unobservable types, allows a precise interpretation of the nature
of selection mechanisms in the insurance contract. Notice that the nite mixture
model, while capturing relevant residual heterogeneity in a parsimonious and di-
rect way, does not come at a cost of stronger parametric assumptions imposed
on the data.11
3.5.3 Multiple outcomes
In many circumstances the insurance contract protects against multiple losses.
For example, Medigap protects against high out of pocket expenses for several
health care services, such as inpatient, outpatient and specialist visits. The frame-
work above can then be extended by simultaneously considering say J binary
outcomes Oj, j = 1; : : : ; J , which take value one if the individual experiences
the loss of type j for which he is insured. Assuming again linear additive sepa-
rability (which is key for implementing the proposed approach) the conditional
probabilities of interest are
Pr(I = 1 j x; t) = F (I(t) + x0I)
Pr(Oj = 1 j I;x; t) = F (Oj(t) + x0Oj); j = 1; : : : ; J
(3.11)
for a suitable link function F . For sharper identication of the mixture com-
ponents, this system of equations of main interest is integrated by the auxiliary
system, and the complete model is (3.8)-(3.9)-(3.11).
3.6 Application to the US long-term care insur-
ance market
In a recent seminal paper Finkelstein and McGarry [58] (henceforth FM) study
the long-term care insurance market in the USA. Long-term care expenditure
11In particular, the main parametric restriction imposed to the data by both approaches is the
choice of the link function F in the I and O equations. However, if the test is performed uncon-
ditionally as suggested by Cutler et al. [32], the nite mixture model does not impose paramet-
ric restrictions, contrary to the FMP test where parameters' estimates of P (O j Z1; : : : ; ZH)
and P (I j Z1; : : : ; ZH) still depend on the choice of a link function, if a linear separability
assumptions is imposed to help interpretation of results.
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risk is one the greatest nancial risks faced by the elderly in the US; to get
a quantitative feeling of its importance, the amount of expenditure in nursing
home care in 2004 was about 1.2% of the US GDP. Furthermore, as argued by
FM, long-term care insurance is a good market to study since it is not heavily
regulated. Their data comes from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS); the
average age of respondent is 77.
FM notice that in the sample there is negative correlation between insur-
ance purchase and nursing home use; they also perform the PC test conditioning
on risk classication by calculating, by means of a standard actuarial model,12
the probability of nursing home use as estimated by insurance companies. They
nd no conditional correlation when they apply the test to the whole sample, and
slightly signicant negative conditional correlation when the test is applied to a
more homogenous subsample of individuals who are likely to face the same menu
of options.
Their overall interpretation of these results is that individuals may have
private information not only on their risk type, but also on their preferences
for insurance coverage, which operate in osetting directions. They show that
individuals who exhibit more cautious behavior - as measured either by their in-
vestment in preventive health care or by seat belt use are both more likely to have
long-term care insurance coverage and less likely to use long-term care, so they
conclude that the market is favorably selected. Since empirical evidence suggests
that demand for nursing home use is relatively price inelastic, FM suspect that
their results most likely reect ex ante more than ex post private information.
3.6.1 Data and variables denition
We implement our testing procedure by using FM dataset as reported in table 4
of their paper (FM [58] pg. 948). This is a subsample of individuals in the top
quartile of the wealth and income distribution without any health characteristics
that might make them ineligible for long-term care insurance.13 We use as insur-
ance purchase and risk occurrence two binary variables, namely Long-Term Care
Insurance which takes value one if the individual has long-term care insurance,
12They alternatively use as controls a rich set of covariates typically used by insurance com-
panies to price contracts, but their results do not change signicantly.
13FM's dataset is available in the AER website. We thank FM, and the AEA for their policy
of providing data for published articles.
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and Nursing Home which takes value one if the individual enters a nursing home
in the following 5 years. In this sample about 17% of individuals have long-term
care insurance in 1995 and 10% enter a nursing home in the following 5 years
period. As observed characteristics used by insurance company (x) we use the
probability of entering a nursing home, which is calculated by FM from a stan-
dard actuarial model. We create 10 risk categories by considering deciles, so x is
actually a vector of 9 dummies since we exclude the 5th decile.
As indicators for the residual unobserved heterogeneity we use the follow-
ing binary variables: Seat Belt which takes value 1 if the subject always wears seat
belts; No Smoking and Drinking which takes the value 1 if the subject either cur-
rently does not smoke or has less than three drinks per day; Subjective Riskiness
which takes value 1 if the individual self-reported probability of nursing home
utilization is higher than the insurance company estimated probability; Preven-
tive Care which takes value 1 if the subject has taken more gender appropriate
preventive care procedures in the past year than the median value.14
3.6.2 Results
We rst attempted estimation of a standard semiparametric nite mixture model.
However, in this sample the standard model does not robustly identify residual
heterogeneity, since even with only two types the information matrix is badly
conditioned and mixture parameters have very high standard errors. We thus
estimate the extended model using the 4 indicators to set the auxiliary system
(3.8). To choose the number of mixture types we use Schwartz's BIC, which
achieves the minimum value with two mixture types. The model we estimate
and report has thus 31 parameters: 18 regression coecients , 12 's for the six
responses and the two types, and 1 parameter for the marginal probability of T .
For completeness, estimates of 's and 's and their standard errors are reported
in Appendix B, but for economy of space estimated coecients are not discussed
in the main text. About 66% of individuals are of type 1, and 34% of type 2.
Table 3.1 below reports the conditional probabilities by types for the six
responses.15 Conditionally on x there seems to be a substantial dierence in in-
14Gender appropriate preventive care is a discrete variable derived from a list of possible
preventive activities. The median individual undertakes about 80% of these activities.
15The conditional probability for nursing home use and long-term care insurance are averaged
across insurance risk classication.
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surance purchase and nursing home use between the two types; type 1 individuals
are 4 times more likely to buy a long-term care insurance, but almost 3 times less
likely to use a nursing home than types 2. Thus the table hints at the presence
of residual heterogeneity, and in particular at favourable selection.16
To understand the dierences between the two types identied in this
sample, it is instructive to look again at table 3.1: there seems to be a natural
ordering of the types in terms of their cautiousness, such that, going from types
2 to types 1, there is a signicant increase in the probability of using seat belts
and preventive care, of refraining from smoking and drinking, and believing that
one may need a nursing home in the near future with a higher probability than
that predicted by insurance companies.
Table 3.1: Estimated conditional probabilities
T=1 T=2
Seat Belt 0.9379 0.6361
Subjective Riskiness 0.5002 0.3523
Preventive Care 0.4567 0.2785
No Smoking and Drinking 0.9528 0.8034
Long-Term Care Insurance 0.2335 0.0568
Nursing Home 0.0667 0.1657
From the estimated joint distribution of the indicators and the unobserved
types we can also get an estimate of the so called posterior type probabilities for
some focal observable individual behaviour. Let ~Y be a vector of observable
indicators of focal interest, then from the estimated joint distribution P (T; ~Y ),
posterior type probabilities are obtained using
P (T = t j ~Y = ~y) = P (T = t;
~Y = ~y)
P ( ~Y = ~y)
:
We consider two focal behaviours: a `cautious' individual who always wears a
seat belt, does not smoke and drink, has a cautious estimate of his probability of
16The question naturally arises whether these dierences in insurance choice and nursing
home entry are simply due to sampling variation. The LR test statistic for the null of no
residual heterogeneity in insurance choice (that is, LTCI(T = 1) = LTCI(T = 2)) and loss
occurrence (NH(T = 1) = NH(T = 2)) are equal to 17.56 and 7.99, which are asymptotically
distributed as a 2 with one d.f., overwhelmingly rejecting the null respectively with p-values
lower than 10 5 and .005. For comparison, in the standard PC test (see Table 4, column 2
of Finkelstein and McGarry [58]), the hypothesis of the absence of private information has a
p-value of .10.
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needing a nursing home in the future and engages in preventive care, and a `reck-
less' individual with the opposite attitudes.17 Table 3.2 reports the estimated
posterior type probabilities for these two individuals. A glance at the table con-
rms the presumption that types 1 are predominantly the `cautious' types, while
types 2 are the `reckless' ones.
Table 3.2: Estimated posterior type probabilities
T=1 T=2
Cautious 0.8872 0.1128
Reckless 0.0439 0.9561
Overall, our analysis seems to conrm Finkelstein and McGarry's [58] mes-
sage that the standard unidimensional RS adverse selection model does not hold
in this insurance market, with a little twist: at least in this sample, we cannot
exclude the possibility that there is a single unidimensional private information
variable (say `cautiousness') which drives the favourable selection mechanism. In
other words, the data are compatible with the possibility that there is underlying
negative correlation between cautiousness and actual risk, but individuals do not
act upon (or are ignorant about) such correlation. In the end, more cautious
individuals would be taking insurance and at the same time present less risky
outcomes.
3.6.3 The unconditional model
Table 3.3 below reports the estimated probabilities by types without conditioning
on x, and shows a broad agreement with the estimated probabilities in Table 3.1.
Unconditional probabilities may be of independent interest, and are obtained in
a saturated nonparametric model, so that they help checking the robustness of
our results.18
17Thus ~Y = [Seat Belt, No Smoking and Drinking, Subjective Riskiness, Preventive Care].
18Table B.3 in the Appendix reports estimated  coecients and standard errors; recall that
in this saturated model the 's are simply reparametrizations of the conditional probabilities,
so no parametric restriction is imposed.
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Table 3.3: Estimated probabilities in the unconditional model
T=1 T=2
Seat Belt 0.9369 0.6589
Subjective Riskiness 0.5138 0.3392
Preventive Care 0.4653 0.2762
No Smoking and Drinking 0.9486 0.8211
Long-Term Care Insurance 0.2462 0.0526
Nursing Home 0.0587 0.1664
3.7 Application to the US medigap insurance
market
Our second application focuses on selection eects in the \Medigap" insurance
market for elder individuals. A Medigap insurance plan is a health insurance
contract sold by a private company to ll \gaps" in coverage of the basic Medicare
plan. Medigap plans oer additional services and help beneciaries pay health
care costs (deductibles and co-payment) that the original Medicare plan does not
cover, so that health care costs of Medigap enrollees is covered by both plans.
As a relevant example for our application, Medicare's coinsurance or copayments
for hospital stays, physician visits or outpatient care are covered by the Medigap
plan.
The Medigap insurance market is quite interesting to study as a further
application of our methods since, contrary to the long-term care market, it is
highly regulated. In fact, Federal Law aects the Medigap market at least in
three ways. First, Medigap plans are standardized into ten plans,\A" through
\J", and the basic plan \A" must be oered if any other more generous plan is also
oered. Second, there is a free enrolment period which lasts for six months from
the rst month in which people are both 65 years old and enrolled in Medicare.
During this period Medigap cannot refuse any person even if there are pre-existing
conditions. Third, pricing criteria are mainly based on individual's age and sex.
Therefore, insurers are not free to oer any insurance contract at any price they
choose (see e.g. Cutler et al. [32], Fang et al. [53] and Finkelstein [54], for
theoretical and applied analysis of selection in the Medigap market).
In a recent inuential paper, Fang et al. [53] consider private information
in the Medigap market using data obtained by imputing HRS observations for
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year 2002 in the Medicare Current Beneciary Survey. They nd a negative corre-
lation between Medigap supplemental coverage and ex post medical expenditure,
and argue that individual cognitive ability is the main source driving favourable
selection in the Medigap market.
3.7.1 Data and variables denition
We use data from waves 4-6 of the HRS, which covers respectively the following
years: 1998, 2000 and 2002. This data set contains detailed information on indi-
vidual insurance status and sources of supplemental coverage. Our main focus is
to study selection eects in the last period (2002), but we exploit the panel nature
of the dataset using past insurance and utilization decisions to help identify resid-
ual heterogeneity. Following Fang et al. [53] we dene Medigap status (Insurance
98, Insurance 00, Insurance 02 ) to be equal to one if an individual is covered by
Medicare and has deliberately purchased a supplemental plan additional to Medi-
care. Therefore we excluded from the dataset individuals who were younger than
65 years at 1998 and are also enrolled in any other public program dierent from
Medicare or receive Medigap insurance coverage by his/her or spouse's former
employer. Risk occurrence is measured by the following binary variables which
take 1 if an individual: i) had any hospital stay (Hospital 98, Hospital 00, Hospi-
tal 02); ii) had more than ve doctor visits (Doctor 98, Doctor 00, Doctor 02); iii)
used any outpatient service such as surgery or home care facilities in the twelve
months prior to the interview (Outpatient 98, Outpatient 00, Outpatient 02). As
additional indicators to identify unobserved types we also use Subjective Health,
which equals 1 if the individual reports good or very good health; Wealth which
equals 1 if the individual is in the top wealth quartile; Cognitive Skills which
takes value 1 if individual's performance is equal to or greater than the median
score in the Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status (TICS); Risk Tolerance
which takes value 1 if individual is less risk adverse than the median individual.19
As observed characteristics used by insurance companies (x) we use gender and
11 age dummies. Our sample is composed of individuals aged 65 or more in 1998.
There are 1,231 observations in the sample; the median individual is 71 years old
in 2002, and there are about 45% of females.
19This indicator of nancial risk tolerance is based on a set of risk aversion measures provided
by Kimball et al. [87], who estimate risk aversion for each respondent using a set of hypothetical
income gambles, and has been also used by Fang et al. [53] in their analysis of Medigap insurance
market.
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3.7.2 Results
We rst attempted estimation of the main model of interest (Medigap and the
three medical care utilization variables in 2002) by means of a standard semi-
parametric nite mixture model. In this sample the standard model does not
robustly identify residual heterogeneity, since even with only two types the in-
formation matrix is badly conditioned and mixture parameters have very high
standard errors. We then estimated the extended model using the 12 indicators
discussed above to set the auxiliary system (3.8).
Table 3.4 reports the maximized log-likelihood and the BIC for dierent
numbers of unobserved types. The BIC seems to indicate that four types are
adequate to represent any residual unobserved heterogeneity. The model we
estimate and report has four heterogeneous types,20 and has 115 parameters: 48
regression coecients 's, 64 's for the 16 responses and the four types, and 3
parameters for the marginal probability of T . Again, for completeness we report
estimates of 's and 's and their standard errors in Appendix B, but for economy
of space estimated coecients are not discussed in the main text.
Calculating the types membership probabilities, about 35% of individuals
are of type 1, 38% of type 2, 17% of type 3 and 10% of type 4.
Table 3.4: Log-likelihood and BIC
2LC 3LC 4LC 5LC
Log-Likelihood -11563.60 -11255.03 -11144.18 -11104.86
BIC 23703.56 23207.40 23106.65 23148.99
# of parameters 81 98 115 132
Estimated coecients are reported in Appendix B. Table 3.5 below reports
the estimated conditional probabilities by types for the four variables of interest
and the twelve auxiliary indicators. Conditionally on age and gender, there seems
to be a striking heterogeneity in Medigap purchase decisions and loss occurrence
across dierent types: types 3 and 4 are roughly ten times more likely to buy
supplemental insurance than types 1 and 2, while types 1 and 4 are on average
20Estimated parameters for the other cases are available from the authors. The general
picture emerging under three and ve types is similar to the results discussed below. For
robustness we also estimated the model controlling for age and sex also in the auxiliary equation
system, without any signicant dierence in the conclusions.
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two or three times more likely to use medical resources than types 2 and 3.21
Looking at Panel B in table 3.5, which reports conditional probabilities for
the auxiliary indicators, we see that types 3 and 4 have much stronger preference
for supplementary insurance and are more likely to be wealthier and with higher
cognitive abilities; on the other hand, types 1 and 4 are much heavier users of
medical care and report lower subjective health status. Financial risk tolerance
does not seem to vary across types.22 From the estimated joint distribution of the
observed responses and T we can again calculate the posterior type probabilities
for some focal individuals. Table 3.6 below reports the conditional probability of
being a type T = t for individuals who are: i) high risk (have used all the three
types of medical care in previous periods, and reported low subjective health);
ii) low risk (have not used any of the three types of medical care in previous
periods, and reported high subjective health); iii) high risk preference (have not
bought supplementary insurance in any previous periods, and have low wealth and
cognitive skills); iv) low risk preference (have bought supplementary insurance in
both previous periods, and have high wealth and cognitive skills).
21Since the dierences in behaviour across types are so dramatic, it is very unlikely they are
due to sample variations; in fact a LR tests for the equality of insurance purchase and loss
occurrence across types rejects the null in each case with p-value lower than 10 6. Regarding
the possible eect of moral hazard on our estimates, while there is some evidence that the
demand for hospital care is price inelastic (see e.g. Manning et al. [91]), there is no concluding
evidence on the eect of supplementary insurance on the other medical care uses (see e.g.
Ettner [51]). Given the magnitude of the eects we nd in the data, and the similar pattern
found in all the three types of use, it is unlikely that accounting for moral hazard might change
signicantly our conclusions.
22Fang et al. [53] report that cognitive ability is one of elements driving the selection into
supplemental insurance, but nancial risk tolerance does not have a signicant eect.
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Table 3.5: Estimated conditional probabilities
T=1 T=2 T=3 T=4
Panel A: Main Equations
Hospital 02 0.4200 0.1544 0.1975 0.5875
Doctor 02 0.7931 0.2791 0.2862 0.8729
Out. Services 02 0.3987 0.1689 0.2216 0.4318
Insurance 02 0.0634 0.0917 0.7113 0.8112
Panel B: Auxiliary Indicators
Hospital 98 0.3550 0.1103 0.1310 0.4354
Doctor 98 0.7540 0.2145 0.2957 0.8451
Out. Services 98 0.2868 0.0831 0.1514 0.3546
Insurance 98 0.1038 0.1214 0.7916 0.8271
Hospital 00 0.3757 0.0867 0.1378 0.4326
Doctor 00 0.8627 0.2333 0.2727 0.8684
Out. Services 00 0.3337 0.1276 0.2089 0.3377
Insurance 00 0.0436 0.0538 0.8526 0.8691
Sub. Health 0.2771 0.5428 0.6732 0.1677
Cog. Skills 0.5947 0.6446 0.7228 0.7177
Wealth 0.2889 0.2681 0.4291 0.4365
Risk Tolerance 0.3721 0.3388 0.3794 0.3238
Estimated probabilities in the main system are averaged out for x.
Notice that by risk preference we do not refer simply to nancial risk
aversion in the usual Arrow-Pratt sense, but also to the perception of the risk
related to the specicity of the health insurance market. In a recent paper,
Einav et al. [49] study ve insurance coverage decisions (health, prescription
drugs, dental, and short-term and long-term disability) to investigate how well
an individual's willingness to bear risk in one context predicts his willingness to
bear risk in other contexts. They nd that among the ve contexts considered, the
magnitude of the domain-general component of preferences appears substantial;
however, they also nd higher correlation in choices that are closer in context (e.g
health insurance and disability insurance), indicating the existence of non-trivial
context specicity. Einav et al. [49] results support the choice of past insurance
choices in modelling individual risk perception.
Table 3.6 suggests the existence of heterogenous types, with low and high
actual risk and low and high preference for risk, which can be cross-classied as
high,high (types t = 1), low,high (types t = 2), low,low (types t = 3) and high,low
(types t = 4), with striking dierences in estimated insurance and medical care
choices.
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Table 3.6: Estimated posterior probabilities
T=1 T=2 T=3 T=4
High risk 0.6054 0.0003 0.0007 0.3937
Low risk 0.0057 0.7305 0.2634 0.0004
High risk preference 0.4996 0.4908 0.0070 0.0026
Low risk preference 0.0055 0.0085 0.5797 0.4063
The overall picture which emerges from our estimates is strongly sugges-
tive of multidimensional residual private information, with strong local selection
in the Medigap insurance market. Comparing with the average insurance and
loss probabilities, the Medigap contract seems to be favourably selected by types
1 and 3, and adversely selected by types 2 and 4;23 in other words the contract
is favourably selected by individuals who have the same (high or low) propensity
for insurance purchase and health care use, and adversely selected by individu-
als who have opposite attitudes. Thus, our results show the existence of heavy
cross subsidization of some types at the expense of others. Notice that the se-
lection eects we nd should not necessarily be interpreted solely as evidence of
asymmetric information.
On the other hand, after estimating a multivariate probit model for the
four response variables of interest, the PC test in our sample shows a correla-
tion coecient equal to -0.051 (p-value .29) between insurance and doctor visits;
0.092 (p-value .07) between insurance and hospital visits; and 0.027 (p-value .59)
between insurance and outpatient visits.24 Thus the PC test in this sample sug-
gests that there is no signicant residual heterogeneity in the Medigap insurance
market, in stark contrast with our results. This suggests that the PC test may
run into serious problems in detecting selection eects when private information
is multidimensional, since it appears to simply average out local selection eects.
However, a rened version of the PC test of Fang al. [53] which compares claims
for individuals with and without Medigap insurance under dierent conditioning
sets, using proxies for propensity to use health care and buy insurance, paints a
23A glance at the estimated conditional probabilities in Table 3.5 suces to realize that the
standard RS model of adverse selection clearly does not hold, since it requires that insurance
choice and medical care use probabilities have the same ordering across types. Formally, the
LR test statistic for the null of global adverse selection is equal to 124.08; the conservative 1%
critical value (Kodde and Palm ([88], page 1246) is equal to 32.196.
24The LR test statistic for conditional independence of insurance purchase and the three
medical care use variables is equal to 4.98, and is asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared
with three d.f. with p-value .17.
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broad picture which does not contradict our results, since they nd both adverse
and favourable selection depending on the conditioning set used to control for un-
observables. Our nite mixture model claries precisely who are the types who
adversely and favourably select Medigap insurance, by simultaneously identifying
the behaviours of unobservable types in both insurance purchase and claims.25
Table 3.7: FMP's Testing Procedure
Variables Hospital 02 Doctor 02 Out.Serv.02 Ins. 02
fem 0.0186 (0.0888) 0.0136 (0.0845) -0.0289 (0.0870) 0.189 (0.0993)
age02==69 0.225 (0.394) 0.152 (0.319) 0.245 (0.389) 0.174 (0.303)
age02==70 0.256 (0.391) 0.143 (0.316) 0.258 (0.386) 0.104 (0.301)
age02==71 0.411 (0.396) 0.184 (0.322) 0.485 (0.389) -0.105 (0.311)
age02==72 0.518 (0.414) 0.209 (0.338) 0.0903 (0.408) 0.193 (0.342)
age02==73 0.283 (0.425) 0.135 (0.354) 0.241 (0.416) 0.237 (0.339)
age02==74 0.231 (0.425) 0.110 (0.351) 0.0846 (0.419) 0.204 (0.355)
age02==75 0.577 (0.438) 0.194 (0.375) 0.211 (0.435) 0.160 (0.365)
age02==76 0.187 (0.491) 0.289 (0.410) 0.494 (0.463) -0.414 (0.449)
age02==77 0.526 (0.493) -0.459 (0.428) 0.348 (0.480) 0.197 (0.421)
age02==78 0.698 (0.534) -0.0502 (0.509) 0.558 (0.523) 0.320 (0.458)
age02>=79 0.695 (0.470) 0.433 (0.423) 0.380 (0.459) -0.287 (0.419)
Sub. Health -0.424 (0.0856) -0.541 (0.0835) -0.170 (0.0843) 0.00488 (0.0955)
Cog. Skills -0.0297 (0.0389) 0.0240 (0.0547) 0.0130 (0.0405) 0.0350 (0.0490)
Wealth -0.139 (0.0923) 0.219 (0.0853) 0.245 (0.0863) 0.106 (0.0977)
Risk Tol. -0.0915 (0.0841) 0.0999 (0.0803) 0.138 (0.0813) 0.110 (0.0934)
Hospital 98 0.186 (0.0983) 0.0319 (0.103) -0.0220 (0.0991) -0.0326 (0.111)
Doctor 98 0.00676 (0.00372) 0.0285 (0.00994) 0.00426 (0.00437) 0.00349 (0.00378)
Out.Serv.98 0.191 (0.102) 0.155 (0.103) 0.298 (0.0997) 0.0146 (0.118)
Ins. 98 0.0788 (0.105) -0.0156 (0.106) -0.0285 (0.101) 0.699 (0.103)
Hospital 00 0.486 (0.0952) 0.168 (0.0994) -0.0617 (0.0994) 0.125 (0.109)
Doctor 00 -0.000177 (0.00431) 0.0414 (0.0116) 0.0114 (0.00437) -0.00942 (0.00542)
Out.Serv.00 0.117 (0.0962) -0.201 (0.0960) 0.505 (0.0920) -0.0774 (0.106)
Ins.00 0.161 (0.108) -0.0475 (0.108) -0.00468 (0.104) 1.342 (0.105)
Constant -0.772 (0.554) -0.695 (0.602) -1.328 (0.561) -1.849 (0.562)
Standard errors in brackets.
Finally, we can compare our results with those obtained performing the
FMP test suggested by Finkelstein and Poterba [56] and applied by Finkelstein
and McGarry [58] and Cutler et al. [32], where the auxiliary indicators of unob-
servable types are used as proxies in the probit regressions for the four response
variables of main interest. The estimated coecients of the four probits are re-
ported in Table 3.7 below. While many of the proxies used to detect residual
25Even though Fang al. [53] uses the HRS dataset, strictly speaking their results cannot be
directly compared with ours since they use a dierent variable for risk occurrence (in particular,
they use medical expenses rather than our three binary measures), and employ imputation
techniques to derive it.
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heterogeneity are signicant in each of the four equations, which is a clear in-
dication of the existence of private information in this Medigap market, their
pattern does not give any clear indication of the nature of the selection eects;
for example, no single proxy seems to be signicant in both the insurance and
the medical care equations.
3.7.3 The unconditional model
Along the same lines as the previous application, we nally estimate the uncon-
ditional (saturated) model. Table 3.8 reports the estimated conditional proba-
bilities by types, and shows a broad agreement with the estimated probabilities
in Table 3.5.26
Table 3.8: Estimated probabilities in the unconditional model
T=1 T=2 T=3 T=4
Panel A: Main Equations
Hospital 02 0.4034 0.1317 0.1701 0.5650
Doctor 02 0.8092 0.2937 0.2909 0.8806
Out. Services 02 0.4000 0.1674 0.2133 0.4294
Insurance 02 0.0725 0.1067 0.7483 0.8423
Panel B: Auxiliary Indicators
Hospital 98 0.3567 0.1101 0.1300 0.4255
Doctor 98 0.7531 0.2157 0.2924 0.8384
Out. Services 98 0.2871 0.0835 0.1504 0.3498
Insurance 98 0.1040 0.1206 0.7952 0.8287
Hospital 00 0.3784 0.0857 0.1357 0.4249
Doctor 00 0.8617 0.2349 0.2667 0.8632
Out. Services 00 0.3345 0.1278 0.2095 0.3315
Insurance 00 0.0453 0.0535 0.8544 0.8680
Sub. Health 0.2768 0.5427 0.6764 0.1765
Cog. Skills 0.5941 0.6448 0.7241 0.7174
Wealth 0.2887 0.2696 0.4263 0.4372
Risk Tolerance 0.3717 0.3397 0.3781 0.3254
26For completeness Table B.6 in the Appendix reports the estimated  coecients and their
s.e.
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3.8 Conclusion
In this paper we study how to detect selection eects in insurance markets under
multidimensional private information. We rst discuss how the standard PC
test performs in this setting. Since insurance contracts may be both adversely
and favourably selected by dierent individuals, the PC test -relying on a single
statistic to appraise the risk-coverage correlation- may run into serious diculties
if there is more than one source of private information.
We show how multidimensional unobserved heterogeneity can be modeled
using a nite number of heterogeneous types, and extend the standard adverse
and favourable selection denitions into local and global ones. We propose a nite
mixture model which allows estimation of the insurance and loss probabilities of
the unobserved types, and explain how these can be used to analyze selection
eects and test for the multidimensionality of private information.
We apply our procedure to the US long-term care and Medigap insurance
markets. In both markets we nd that there is signicant evidence of residual
heterogeneity, and that the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz adverse selection model
is not supported by the data. In the long-term care insurance market, data are
compatible with the existence of a single private information variable, namely
cautiousness, which yields a negative risk-coverage correlation. In the Medigap
market, data are compatible with the existence of two unobservable dimensions
of private information, namely actual risk and risk preference, which yield very
strong local adverse and favourable selection of Medigap insurance by dierent
unobserved types. Notice that since on average these selection eects roughly
oset each other, the PC test yields insignicant risk-coverage correlation even
in the presence of huge residual heterogeneity in the data. Since the analysis is
carried conditional on variables used by insurers to price risks in the underwrit-
ing process, it is not surprising that the extent of residual heterogeneity seems
substantially larger in the Medigap market which is heavily regulated than in the
rather competitive long-term care insurance market. Notice however that our
results do not provide exhaustive evidence of the role provided by regulation in
comparing the Medigap and the long-term care insurance markets. In particular
the eect of regulation we capture is mainly due to the additional noise in private
information due to limitation in the information gathered by insurer (see Einav et
al. [47]). Clearly regulation's eects in these two markets may also involve several
other dimensions - such as price and insurance coverage denition, etc. - that
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need further investigations. Another important source explaining the dierences
on results related to asymmetric information between the long-term care and the
Medigap application is the dierences in the structure of the insurance contract.
In particular Medigap oers supplemental coverage for services that are already
covered by Medicare, while long-term care insurance oers additional coverage
that it is not provided by any other insurance. Thus, while in the long-term
application risk preferences play the main role in dening the insurance purchase
decision for additional services, it is possible that the part of private information
due to adverse selection in the Medigap application is mainly related to moral
hazard. In fact it could be possible that individuals are selecting insurance on
the basis of their anticipated behavioural response to it. However this is another
possible explanation of the dierences we found in the dimensionality of private
information that should be combined with the particular structure of the markets.
A couple of caveats are in order. First our approach, while providing
useful descriptive evidence on the existence and the extent of selection eects
under multidimensional private information in a given insurance market, does
not explain the structural forces which determine insurance demand and market
equilibrium, and thus is of limited direct use in appraising market eciency
and welfare eects of policy interventions. Some recent work in this direction
is discussed by Einav et al. [47]. Second, as we discuss in the paper, moral
hazard may limit the interpretation of the empirical results, so that care should
be exercised when it is not reasonable to ignore incentive eects, or selection
eects are marginal.
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Appendix A
Proof of the Proposition
To show that 3 is equivalent to 4, rewrite 4 as P (O = 1; I = 1)P (O = 0; I = 0) >
P (O = 1; I = 0)P (O = 0; I = 1), substitute P (O; I) with P (O j I)P (I), then use
P (O = 1 j I) = 1 P (O = 0 j I), and simplify; to show that 1 is equivalent to 2,
substitute PO and PI = P (R = 0)P (I = 1 j R = 0) + P (R = 1)P (I = 1 j R = 1)
in 2 and simplify.
To show the equivalence between 3 and 1 under Assumption (3.1), use the
Law of Total probability
P (O j I) = P (R = 0 j I)  P (O j I; R = 0) + P (R = 1 j I)  P (O j I; R = 1)
and (3.1) to get
P (O j I) = P (R = 0 j I)  P (O j R = 0) + P (R = 1 j I)  P (O j R = 1):
Thus,
P (O = 1 j I = 1)  P (O = 1 j I = 0) = 
P (R = 1 j I = 1)  P (R = 1 j I = 0)   P (O = 1 j R = 1)  P (O = 1 j R = 0)
using P (R = 0 j I) = 1   P (R = 1 j I). By the same argument used above to
show the equivalence of 3 and 4, it is easily seen that P (R = 1 j I = 1) > P (R =
1 j I = 0) if and only if P (I = 1 j R = 1) > P (I = 1 j R = 0).
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Appendix B
Tables
Table B.1: Long-Term Care Insurance: Estimated  parameters
(T = 1) (T = 2)
Seat Belt 2.7118 (0.5392) 0.5543 (0.3222)
Subjective Riskness -0.0005 (0.1074) -0.6094 (0.1946)
Preventive Care -0.1748 (0.1163) -0.9530 (0.2321)
No Smoking and Drinking 3.0033 (0.4021) 1.4048 (0.2552)
Long-term Care Insurance -1.4843 (0.2971) -3.1169 (0.7182)
Nursing Home -3.5377 (0.5043) -2.4243 (0.4787)
Standard errors in brackets.
Table B.2: Long-Term Care Insurance: Estimated  Parameters
LTCI NH
Risk Classication 1 0.2606 (0.3419) -0.7322 (0.6656)
Risk Classication 2 0.6510 (0.3318) -0.2574 (0.5958)
Risk Classication 3 0.2460 (0.3510) 0.1542 (0.5616)
Risk Classication 4 0.3489 (0.3534) 0.2120 (0.5664)
Risk Classication 6 0.0624 (0.3637) 0.6418 (0.5261)
Risk Classication 7 0.3640 (0.3447) 1.0169 (0.4987)
Risk Classication 8 0.6142 (0.3355) 0.8207 (0.5067)
Risk Classication 9 0.3231 (0.3567) 1.6761 (0.4842)
Risk Classication 10 -0.0625 (0.3717) 2.2320 (0.4728)
Standard errors in brackets.
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Table B.3: Long-Term Care Insurance: Estimated  parameters of the uncondi-
tional model
(T = 1) (T = 2)
Seat Belt 2.698 (0.5091) 0.6582 (0.2874)
Subjective Riskness 0.0554 (0.1194) -0.667 (0.1999)
Preventive Care -0.139 (0.1241) -0.9634 (0.2265)
No Smoking and Drinking 2.9151 (0.3535) 1.5236 (0.232)
Long-term Care Insurance -1.1189 (0.1607) -2.8907 (0.7049)
Nursing Home -2.7749 (0.2956) -1.611 (0.223)
Standard errors in brackets.
Table B.4: Medigap: Estimated  parameters
(T = 1) (T = 2) (T = 3) (T = 4)
Sub. Health -0.9589 (0.1233) 0.1718 (0.1055) 0.7226 (0.1789) -1.6019 (0.3088)
Cog. Skills 0.3834 (0.108) 0.5952 (0.1077) 0.9585 (0.1765) 0.9329 (0.2278)
Wealth -0.9007 (0.1174) -1.0044 (0.1174) -0.2853 (0.1588) -0.2555 (0.2056)
Risk Tolerance -0.5234 (0.1097) -0.6688 (0.109) -0.4923 (0.1614) -0.7363 (0.219)
Hospital 98 -0.5971 (0.1118) -2.0873 (0.1768) -1.8925 (0.2437) -0.26 (0.208)
Doctor 98 1.1202 (0.1417) -1.2979 (0.1452) -0.868 (0.1845) 1.6962 (0.3266)
Out. Services 98 -0.9111 (0.1172) -2.4008 (0.2028) -1.7239 (0.2229) -0.5988 (0.2124)
Insurance 98 -2.1555 (0.1926) -1.9794 (0.1832) 1.3346 (0.2367) 1.5653 (0.3115)
Hospital 00 -0.5078 (0.1115) -2.3542 (0.2041) -1.8336 (0.2366) -0.2711 (0.2078)
Doctor 00 1.8375 (0.1977) -1.1896 (0.1484) -0.981 (0.1935) 1.887 (0.3602)
Out. Services 00 -0.6913 (0.1127) -1.9222 (0.164) -1.3317 (0.1941) -0.6735 (0.2147)
Insurance 00 -3.0892 (0.3323) -2.8669 (0.3262) 1.755 (0.3237) 1.8919 (0.3903)
Hospital 02 -1.0278 (0.6781) -2.4702 (0.6909) -2.1611 (0.7059) -0.3128 (0.7009)
Doctor 02 1.2053 (0.6406) -1.1684 (0.6372) -1.1327 (0.6519) 1.8056 (0.7339)
Out. Services 02 -0.9376 (0.6622) -2.1448 (0.671) -1.8023 (0.6825) -0.7974 (0.685)
Insurance 02 -2.8742 (0.8632) -2.4718 (0.8518) 0.815 (0.8514) 1.3904 (0.8893)
Standard errors in brackets.
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Table B.5: Medigap: Estimated  Parameters
Hospital 02 Doctor 02 Out. Services 02 Insurance 02
age02==69 0.3875 (0.6812) 0.2801 (0.6352) 0.5392 (0.6644) 0.3020 (0.8409)
age02==70 0.4893 (0.6774) 0.2916 (0.6316) 0.5405 (0.6613) 0.1731 (0.8368)
age02==71 0.7077 (0.6842) 0.3753 (0.6407) 0.8979 (0.6669) -0.3093 (0.8522)
age02==72 0.8861 (0.7126) 0.3170 (0.6763) 0.2818 (0.7025) 0.1765 (0.8989)
age02==73 0.4409 (0.7380) 0.2221 (0.6976) 0.5020 (0.7159) 0.3500 (0.9234)
age02==74 0.3765 (0.7382) 0.0316 (0.6969) 0.2312 (0.7213) 0.3417 (0.9228)
age02==75 1.0867 (0.7472) 0.3994 (0.7220) 0.4716 (0.7376) 0.3316 (0.9590)
age02==76 0.3848 (0.8337) 0.4893 (0.7947) 0.8507 (0.7854) -0.8240 (1.0905)
age02==77 1.1896 (0.8379) -0.9171 (0.8568) 0.6003 (0.8313) 0.3634 (1.1104)
age02==78 1.4694 (0.8933) 0.0013 (0.9209) 1.0484 (0.8726) 0.7073 (1.1789)
age02>=79 1.5162 (0.8019) 0.9322 (0.7986) 0.8482 (0.7890) -0.4868 (1.0880)
fem 0.0280 (0.1528) -0.0346 (0.1575) -0.1234 (0.1451) 0.4043 (0.2117)
Standard errors in brackets.
Table B.6: Medigap: Estimated  parameters of the unconditional model
(T = 1) (T = 2) (T = 3) (T = 4)
Sub. Health -0.9603 (0.1235) 0.1712 (0.1053) 0.7371 (0.1819) -1.5402 (0.2979)
Cog. Skills 0.3809 (0.1081) 0.5964 (0.1075) 0.9648 (0.1789) 0.9315 (0.2252)
Wealth -0.9017 (0.1176) -0.9965 (0.117) -0.2968 (0.1608) -0.2524 (0.2033)
Risk Tolerance -0.5249 (0.1098) -0.6647 (0.1087) -0.4977 (0.1635) -0.7292 (0.2163)
Hospital 98 -0.5897 (0.1119) -2.0894 (0.1769) -1.9008 (0.2476) -0.3003 (0.206)
Doctor 98 1.1151 (0.1416) -1.2912 (0.1445) -0.8839 (0.1879) 1.6466 (0.3167)
Out. Services 98 -0.9093 (0.1173) -2.3955 (0.202) -1.7317 (0.2265) -0.6198 (0.2107)
Insurance 98 -2.153 (0.1928) -1.9864 (0.1839) 1.3563 (0.2425) 1.5764 (0.3103)
Hospital 00 -0.4964 (0.1116) -2.3675 (0.2055) -1.8513 (0.2414) -0.3027 (0.2059)
Doctor 00 1.8296 (0.1969) -1.1808 (0.1475) -1.0113 (0.1984) 1.8422 (0.3502)
Out. Services 00 -0.6878 (0.1128) -1.9203 (0.1637) -1.3282 (0.1962) -0.7014 (0.2134)
Insurance 00 -3.0475 (0.3244) -2.8725 (0.3276) 1.7698 (0.331) 1.883 (0.3843)
Hospital 02 -0.3912 (0.1101) -1.8862 (0.1638) -1.5852 (0.2233) 0.2613 (0.2118)
Doctor 02 1.4451 (0.1564) -0.8772 (0.1261) -0.8912 (0.1924) 1.9985 (0.3773)
Out. Services 02 -0.4054 (0.1094) -1.6045 (0.145) -1.3054 (0.1976) -0.2843 (0.2044)
Insurance 02 -2.5491 (0.2404) -2.1248 (0.1915) 1.0893 (0.2167) 1.6755 (0.3362)
Standard errors in brackets.
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Chapter 4
Incentive and selection eects of
Medigap insurance on inpatient care
4.1 Introduction
Medicare is a public program which provides health insurance for the elderly
(aged 65 or older) and some disabled non elderly. As many other standard health
insurance plans, Medicare relies deeply on mechanisms such as coinsurance, de-
ductibles and copayments to control health care expenditure for many covered
services. This insurance structure leaves beneciaries at risk for large out-of-
pocket expenses. As a result, many beneciaries purchase voluntary supplemen-
tal private policies, such as Medigap, to ll Medicare's gaps in non-covered health
care services and limit cost sharing.
Medicare cost-sharing structure reects the belief that health insurance,
by lowering the price per services, gives individuals' an incentive to increase the
demand for health care. Although the presence of an incentive eect - usually
called ex-post moral hazard - is very well known by the theoretical literature
on contract theory (Arrow[6], Pauly [97] and Zweifel and Manning [122]), its
empirical relevance is still debated in the literature see Abbring et al. [1] - [2],
Buchmuller et al. [17], Cardon and Henderl [21], Cohen [28], Schellhorn [106],
and Cohen and Spiegelman [30] for a review. A major diculty in estimating the
presence of moral hazard in Medigap insurance is the existence of self-selection,
since individuals who expect high health care costs may choose a more generous
coverage and then ex-post purchase more services.
In an important body of literature following the seminal paper by Chi-
appori and Salanie [25], the presence of asymmetric information in insurance
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markets is appraised using the so called \positive correlation" (PC) test (see two
recent reviews by Cohen and Spiegelman [30] and Einav et al. [47]), which re-
jects the null hypothesis of no asymmetric information when there is a positive
correlation between insurance purchases and risk occurrence, conditional on the
individual characteristics used by insurers to price contracts. The PC test, how-
ever, cannot disentangle incentive and selection eects, since nding a positive
insurance coverage-risk occurrence correlation in the data does not provide con-
clusive evidence whether there is adverse selection into insurance contracts, moral
hazard, or both.
There are dierent ways to distinguish empirically selection from incentive
eects. A strategy is to use experimental data such as the RAND Health Insur-
ance Experiment (RHIE), where to identify the incentive eect controlling for
self-selection individuals were randomly assigned to plans with dierent cover-
ages so that insurance choice becomes exogenous. Another strategy is to exploit
(quasi) natural experiments where insurance choice or the incentive structure
has been modied exogenously (Chiappori et al. [26] and Eichner [45]). In obser-
vational studies, the standard approach to evaluate incentive eects controlling
for self-selection is to model endogenously the insurance choice and estimate a
bivariate probit model with a recursive structure between insurance and health
care utilization (Holly, et al. [73], Jones et al. [80], Buchmuller et al. [17]).
The aim of this paper is to evaluate how dierent empirical strategies per-
form in trying to separate incentive and selection eects of Medigap supplemental
insurance on inpatient care. The econometric approach relies on a recursive bi-
variate probit model and on a multiresponse discrete nite mixture model. We
use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which contains informa-
tion on a rich set of variables concerning health status and individual preferences
for risk, Medigap purchase and hospital admissions as binary dependent variables
representing insurance purchase and health care utilization.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we report a brief
overview of Medicare and Medigap insurance programs; section 3 reviews the
main empirical contribution in the related literature; we then discuss the model
to be estimated (section 4) using the data described in section 5. Finally section
6 and 7 report estimation results and some concluding remarks respectively.
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4.2 Health insurance and access to care for el-
derly in US
4.2.1 Medicare
Medicare is probably the main source of health insurance for all individuals aged
65 in US and the coverage is near universal (about 97% of the elderly have
Medicare)1.
The Medicare program consists mainly of two plans in which people may
be enrolled. The rst plan, named Medicare Part A, is also known as \Hospi-
tal Insurance" since it covers the basic hospital's health care services such as
inpatient's admissions. Most of beneciaries, who have paid Medicare taxes for
at least 10 years, are automatically enrolled with their spouse in Part A when
they turn 65. Part A plan pays almost the entire medical expenditure (except
a deductible) for the rst 60 nights of inpatient hospital staying and imposes an
increasing cost sharing structure if hospital admission lasts over this rst period.
The second plan is Medicare Part B. Most of beneciaries choose to extend
Medicare Part A insurance coverage to Part B because it covers several medicare
services such as doctors' services, outpatient care and some preventive services.
Part B enrollment requires the payment of a monthly premium which may depend
on income. Part B's deductible and co-payment amount respectively to $110 and
to 20% of expenses.
4.2.2 Supplemental insurance coverage and medigap pol-
icy
There are several limitations of Medicare original plans: limitation in the coverage
of health care services, high out-of-pocket expenses to beneciaries and lack of a
catastrophic cap expenditure. These induce seniors to seek additional coverage
provided by private insurance.
There are three main sources of supplemental private insurance which pay
1Current Population Reports (2005) \Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in
the United States: 2004"
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for some additional (to Medicare) services or help pay the share of the costs of
Medicare-covered services. The rst one is the employer-sponsored supplemental
insurance and it is purchased usually by a former employer or union. The sec-
ond one is represented by Tricare (available only to military personal) and the
Medicare Advantage plans (Part C) provided by private health insurance.
The third one and also the most common source of supplemental coverage
comes from Medigap-private health insurance which are specically designed to
cover those \gaps" of coverage left by original Medicare plans. Since 1990 the
Medigap insurance market is highly regulated by Federal law. Medigap plans
are standardized into ten plans,\A" through \J", which cover a single individual,
oer certain additional services and help beneciaries pay health care cost (de-
ductibles and co-payment) that the original Medicare plan does not cover. This
means that if individuals are enrolled in Medicare plus a supplemental Medigap
insurance, health care cost is covered by both plans. For example the basic plan,
A, covers the entire coinsurance or copayments for hospital stays, physician visits
and outpatient care.
Federal regulation of the Medigap market designed a particular mechanism
favoring the insured: Medigap insurance companies must oer the basic plan \A"
if they oer any other more generous plan. In addition, there is a free enrolment
period which lasts for six months from the rst month in which people are both 65
years old and enrolled in Medicare Part B. During this period Medigap cannot
refuse any insurer even if there are pre-existing conditions. Legal restrictions
involve also the pricing criteria, which are mainly based on individual's age and
gender.
In the supplemental health insurance market the most popular Medigap
plans are C and F, because they cover major benets and are less expensive
than other plans. For example, plan C oers coverage for skilled-nursing-facility
coinsurance, foreign-travel emergencies, deductibles that are required under tradi-
tional Medicare and other basic benets like hospital and outpatient coinsurance.
All these plans include Medigap A, which is the basic one, the least expensive
and least comprehensive. This plan covers several losses; for example it provides
(increasing) coverage for daily medicare copayment per day for hospitals stays;
it reimburses the full cost of up to 365 additional hospitals days and the partial
cost of other services related to doctor's (outpatient) visits, preventive health
screening and outpatient prescription drug.
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4.3 Related Literature
The empirical literature on the incentive and selection eects in health insurance
is growing at a fast pace and controversial since disentangling the two eects is
not straightforward because the unobserved nature of individual preferences and
health status pose serious endogeneity problems.
A \radical" solution is to exploit experiments or some particular features
of the data which make insurance choice exogenous. The best known study is
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment conducted in 1974. To control for self-
selection, individuals were randomly assigned to insurance plans with dierent
coinsurance rate. Manning et. al. [91] show that patients ensured by a plan
with rst dollar coverage had 37% more physician visits than those facing co-
insurance rates of 25% suggesting strong evidence of ex-post moral hazard, but
they found no signicant dierences among the alternative coinsurance plans in
the use of inpatient services; individuals with free insurance plan tended to use
slightly more inpatient services than individuals with coinsurance.
In non-experimental settings most of the studies use large observational
data sets which include information on individuals, health care services and in-
surance status. There are dierent econometric strategies to empirically appraise
this issue. The rst approach considers insurance choice as exogenous in the
health care utilization equation, and estimates health care utilization with a pro-
bit model (Hurd and McGarry [76]) or a two-parts model (Ettner [51], Khandker
and McCormack [86]) using health indicators to mitigate the presence of unob-
served heterogeneity in health status.
Another approach is to model endogenously insurance choice considering
both selection on observable and unobservable factors. In this framework many
studies conducted in the European health insurance market exploited a recursive
bivariate probit to model simultaneously the probability to have at least one
inpatient stay and purchasing supplemental insurance (Holly et al. [73], Jones
et al. [80], Buchmueller et al. [17]). In general the most common nding in
these empirical studies exploiting the bivariate probit model is to nd a positive
(direct) eect of insurance on health care demand and no positive (statistically
signicant) correlation between residuals of the insurance and the health risk
occurrence equations.
In general results from observational data show that Medicare enrollees
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with supplemental insurance (Medigap or employer plans) have higher levels of
total spending, though dierences are small for inpatient care, and that indi-
viduals reporting better health are signicantly more likely to enroll in private
supplemental plans (see e.g. Ettner [51], Cartwright et al. [22], Hurd and Mc-
Garry [76]).
These ndings are arousing a great deal of interest among researchers. In
particular Finkelstein and McGarry [58] and Cutler et al. [32] take an innovative
approach based on insurance company unused variables to test the (positive)
correlation between health care utilization and insurance coverage. Using one
wave of the Health Dynamics Among Oldest (AHEAD) Cutler et al. [32] identify
two groups of individuals who purchase supplemental insurance and use health
care services: those who prefer insurance for cautionary reasons and ex-post
are less likely to use health care, and those who are subjectively riskier and
ex post have higher risk occurrence.2 Their ndings show that individuals who
engage in risky behavior are systematically less likely to hold Medigap. Moreover
people with higher preferences for insurance appear to have lower expected claims,
creating osetting advantageous selection.3
Using the the same dataset of Cutler et al. [32], Fang et al. [53] provide
strong evidence of advantageous selection in the Medigap market and nd cog-
nitive ability is an important factor inuencing selection. They conclude that
this reects the idea that senior citizens may have diculties in understanding
Medicare and Medigap rules. Therefore, the existence of multiple sources of pri-
vate information depending for example on cognitive skills (Fang et al. [53]) or
actual risk and risk preferences (Cutler et al. [32]), may seriously aect the in-
terpretation of zero correlation between insurance and health care utilization in
the bivariate probit model, since these dierent unobserved forces may wash each
other out (see also Dardanoni and Li Donni [35]).
A rather dierent approach is to control for unobserved heterogeneity using
LC analysis. Deb and Trivedi [38]-[39] develop a nite mixture negative binomial
model and estimate health care demand for several health care measures. They
2AHEAD is a cohort of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) from which our sample is
drawn.
3The rst paper to notice a negative risk/coverage correlation is Hemenway [70], which called
it propitious selection. A theoretical paper which analyzes advantageous selection is De Meza
and Webb [37]. A review of the extensive empirical literature who found advantageous selection
in insurance markets is Cohen and Spiegelman [30] and Einav et al. [47]. Evidence of positive
and statistical signicant relationship between risk aversion and health attitudes have been
found in the US health insurance market by Vistnes and Banthin [8] and Landerman et al. [89]
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distinguish two unobserved groups in the population: the \healthy" and the \ill".
After controlling for these two \types" of people, they nd that individuals with
supplementary private health insurance tend to seek care from physicians and
non-physicians more often than the uninsureds, while this eect is not signicant
for inpatient staying.4
Our paper could be located ideally in this framework, drawing inspiration
from the recursive bivariate probit literature, from the studies on multiple dimen-
sion of private information of Fang et. al [53], Cutler et al. [32] and Finkelstein
and McGarry [58], and the LC models of Deb and Trivedi [38]-[39].
4.4 Modeling incentive and selection eects
Suppose at time t = T we observe a binary variable ST 2 f0; 1g which takes value
1 if an individual has bought a supplemental insurance contract which protects
from a xed loss, and a binary variable MT 2 f0; 1g which takes value 1 if the
individual incurs the loss. In general, ST and MT need not be binary variables,
but frequently the researcher can only observe whether the individual occurred
in the risk or whether she is covered by an insurance plan.
Standard economic theory predicts that risk occurrence and insurance
coverage are positively correlated and this relationship depends on two sources
(Rothschild and Stiglitz [104] and Arnott and Stiglitz [5]). On the one hand
when individuals have private information about their actual risk, the insurance
contract will be adversely selected, with high risk individuals choosing higher in-
surance coverage. On the other hand insurance contract may give the incentive to
increase risk occurrence by increasing the probability to incur in the risk (ex-ante
moral hazard) or by increasing utilization (ex post moral hazard). Both sources
of asymmetric information (adverse selection and moral hazard) will cause the
same observed positive correlation in the data.
The predicted positive correlation between risk and coverage has inspired
4A general limitation aecting many studies on incentive and selection eects in this context
is to leave out a third possible \health improving" eect of insurance purchase. If Medigap
increases outpatient visits or expands drugs coverage, this can increase health status and de-
crease subsequent medical care use. Some studies have investigated the eects of supplementary
insurance on the health status of the elderly (see. e.g. Doescher et al. [42] and Dor et al. [43])
supporting this possibility. In our application, we have tried to control for this eect by using
various aggregate health status measures. We thank an anonymous referee for this remark.
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the seminal contribution by Chiappori and Salanie [25], who considered the
testable implications of asymmetric information in insurance markets, and pro-
posed the so called Positive Correlation (PC) test. The PC test rejects the null
of absence of private information in a given insurance market when, conditional
on consumers' characteristics used by insurance companies to price contracts,
individuals with more coverage experience more of the insured risk.
4.4.1 The insurer's model
Let w denote the set of variables used by insurance companies to price a given
insurance contract. Notice that conditioning on w is crucial to properly iden-
tify selection eects, since without conditioning on w it would not be possible
to know whether a correlation arises because individuals which are oered the
same contract have dierent risk (adverse selection) or rather because they face
contracts at dierent prices (Chiappori and Salanie [25], Einav and Finkelstein
[46]).
Since individuals with the same value of w face the same insurance con-
tract, one can study incentive and selection eects using the same logic as the
PC test by considering the following recursive model:
MT = 1
 
a+ bST + c
0
w + M

(4.1)
ST = 1
 
d+ e
0
w + S

(4.2)
(with 1(.) denoting the indicator function), where the residual heterogeneity
which is induced by all variables not used by insurance companies is collected
in two random variables (M ; S). Within model (4.1){(4.2), adverse selection
implies a positive correlation between M and S, while the incentive eect implies
a positive value of the coecient b. Model (4.1){(4.2) can be estimated with
standard maximum likelihood methods by assuming that (M ; S) are normally
distributed with standardized margins and correlation coecient equal to, say,
, in which case it is called a recursive bivariate probit model.
Estimating (4.1){(4.2) with a recursive bivariate probit to disentangle in-
centive and selection eects has some theoretical and econometric diculties.
From an econometric point of view, identication of model (4.1){(4.2) relying
on the normality assumption, though theoretically feasible as long as data on w
are of full rank (see Wilde [118]), it is quite fragile in the absence of exclusion
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restrictions. On the other hand, from the theoretical perspective, the bivariate
normality assumption can be severely limiting when residual heterogeneity is ac-
tually multidimensional. For example, as explained by Dardanoni and Li Donni
[35], if there are two conicting sources of private information (following Finkel-
stein and McGarry [58], say individual's actual risk and risk preference), one can
observe that the insurance contract could be at the same time both adversely
and favorably selected by dierent types (where a type is dened as a given com-
bination of actual risk and risk preference), but these selection eects could go
undetected by using the single statistic .5
A standard practice in the applied economics literature is to check the
robustness of recursive bivariate probit estimates by comparing them to the es-
timates obtained by performing separate probit regressions for the two response
variables. It is not uncommon, however, that the two sets of estimates dier sub-
stantially, even in the case when a standard LR test does not reject the null of
 = 0. When this happens, it can be taken as evidence of potential identication
problems in the bivariate probit model estimates.
Discrete multivariate nite mixture model
An alternative procedure to estimate equations (4.1){(4.2) is by using a latent
class model, trying to control for residual heterogeneity by identifying a nite
number of \types" which dier with respect to their attitude to buy insurance
and to use medical care. In particular, we can assume that U is a discrete
random variable taking values in, say, f1; : : : ;mg, which dene m unobservable
heterogeneous \types"; in practice, U can be seen as a cross-classication of
underlying unobservable individual characteristics, such as risk tolerance and
attitudes to use medical care. Equations (4.1){(4.2) can be rewritten as
MT = 1
  mX
u=1
MT (u)U(u) + bST + c
0
w + M

(4.3)
ST = 1
  mX
u=1
ST (u)U(u) + e
0
w + S

(4.4)
5Dardanoni and Li Donni [35] give various theoretical and empirical examples with mul-
tidimensional private information implies the presence of selection eects which are however
undetected by .
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where U(1); : : : ; U(m) denote the set of m dummy variables indicating \latent
type" membership, so that the coecients MT (u) and MT (u) can be inter-
preted as random intercepts with a nonparametric discrete specication, like in
Heckman and Singer [68]. Since no underlying structure is imposed on U , it can
capture in a unrestrictive way any variable which aects medical care use and
insurance demand after conditioning on w, and thus take into account the po-
tential multidimensionality of residual heterogeneity. (M ; S) on the other can
be seen as uncorrelated idiosyncratic errors. Estimation of equations (4.3){(4.4)
involves rst the choice of an appropriate distribution for (M ; S); we assume a
standard logistic in order to use logit parameters for estimation. However, while
relying on the parametric choice of the distribution of the idiosyncratic errors,
no parametric structure is imposed on the residual heterogeneity variable U ; for
this reason model (4.3){(4.4) is known in the literature as a semiparametric nite
mixture model. Well known applications are Deb and Trivedi ([38] and [39]) in
health economics and Cameron and Heckman [20] in education.
The semiparametric nite mixture model is well established and achieves
nonparametric estimation of residual heterogeneity. However, conditionally on
w we observe only two binary variables (that is, 3 parameters), while even with
two mixture types there are 5 parameters to estimate (four 's and a mixture
probability). Thus, it must rely on covariates' variation to achieve parameters'
identication. In practice, it typically achieves identication of very few unob-
served types; in many applications only two types are identied.
To achieve sharper identication of the heterogeneous types we may use a
set of observable indicators of the variables which aect insurance choice and loss
occurrence after conditioning on w. To identify U , we exploit the panel nature
of the dataset, and in particular lagged values of M and S, to dene a set of
auxiliary equations which are used as indicators of U and help identifying the
mixture components probabilities in (4.3){(4.4), which are of primary interest:
Pr(MT t = 1 j u;w) = (MT t(u) + 
0
MT tw); t = 1; : : : ; T   1
Pr(ST t = 1 j u;w) = (ST t(u) + 
0
ST tw); t = 1; : : : ; T   1
(4.5)
where  denotes the binary logit link.6
6In the auxiliary system (4.5) one could also condition the probabilities of medical care and
insurance choice on lagged values, in which case the latent types would be dened relatively to
past choices. For example, if one conditions current insurance choice on its lagged values, one
identies risk attitudes relatively to past choices, while if no conditioning is made, one tends
to identify unadjusted risk preferences. In our experience, for the purpose of estimating the
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Our discrete multiresponse latent class model is completed by the types'
membership probabilities P (u). To force the types probabilities to lie between
zero and one and sum to one, it is convenient use a multinomial logit parameter-
ization:
Pr(U = u) =
exp(U(u))Pm
u=1 exp(U(u))
; U(m) = 0 (4.6)
so that the m  1 logit parameters U are simply reparametrization of the mem-
bership probabilities, and do not impose any parametric restriction on the distri-
bution of U .
The discrete multiresponse nite mixture model is dened by the main
equations (4.3){(4.4), the auxiliary equations (4.5), and the membership probabil-
ity equation (4.6). It can be seen as an instance of a discrete multivariate MIMIC
(Joreskog and Goldberger[81]) model (see Goodman [63] for the seminal paper
on nite mixture models with multivariate binary responses, and Huang and
Bandeen-Roche [75] for a recent general treatment). Dierently to the MIMIC
model, the residual heterogeneity U is not a continuous univariate variable on the
real line, but an unstructured nonparametric variable. Notice that, contrary to
the semiparametric nite mixture model which does not use the auxiliary system
of equations (4.5), the discrete multiresponse nite mixture model can achieve
identication of a considerable number of heterogeneous types without relying on
covariates variation.7
Within this model the absence of incentive and selection eects can be
tested by imposing appropriate restrictions on the model parameters: one rejects
the null of no incentive eects when b in equation (4.3) is positive, while the
null of the absence of selection eects is rejected when the equality constraints
MT (1) =    = MT (m) and ST (1) =    = ST (m) are rejected.
parameters of the main system of interest, in practice there is little dierence in the results
obtained under the two approaches.
7For an intuitive explanation on how this can be done, notice that conditionally on w, if
for example T = 3, we observe the joint distribution of 6 response variables with 26   1 = 63
observable parameters, with 7m 1 unknown parameters. Thus, in principle up to 9 dierent
types can be identied. However, this is only a necessary condition for the identication of the
unobservable parameters; there are well known pathological examples in the literature on nite
mixture models which show that this counting condition is not sucient.
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4.4.2 An extended model
Following the seminal paper by Chiappori and Salanie [25], current practice on
testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets appraises the existence
of asymmetric information after conditioning on individual characteristics which
are used by insurance companies to set premiums and price contracts. For the
purpose of detecting selection eects, this approach seems by now universally
accepted (see e.g. Cohen and Spiegelman [30], Einav et al. [47]). However,
this approach contrasts with previous studies which have tried to estimate the
incentive eect of medical care insurance.
Research on moral hazard distinguishes between ex ante moral hazard,
which refers to the attitudes of insured to take reduced precautions, and ex post
moral hazard, which refers to actions engaged by insured after a loss occurs. The
main issue to measure this second source of moral hazard consists of disentan-
gling the variation of medical care consumption corresponding to a given level of
information (e.g. related to individual tastes, preferences beliefs, etc.) from the
variation of consumption due to the structure of the contract. For this reason the
standard applied approach is to include in addition to variables used to price in-
surance contracts, also additional controls devoted to capture potential variation
in consumption.
To study asymmetric information, it is not clear whether conditioning on
all the possible determinants of demand for medical care should be necessarily
preferred to conditioning only on variables used by insurers, since both moral
hazard and adverse selection directly depend on the structure of the insurance
contract and then on the variables used to price individual risk (see e.g. Gardiol et
al. [61] and Chiappori et al. [26]). Thus, for completeness we present both model
specications by including all controls traditionally employed in the empirical
literature on insurance and demand for medical care (see e.g. Buchmuller et al.
[17], Holly et al. [73], Jones et al. [80]).
In this section we will thus extend model (4.1){(4.2) by considering
Mt = 1
 
a+ bSt + c
0
wM + M

(4.7)
St = 1
 
d+ e
0
wS + S

(4.8)
where wM and wS denote all observable determinants of individual's medical
care and insurance choices, and M and S collect all residual unobservable het-
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erogeneity which aects medical care use and insurance demand.
Recursive bivariate probit
In equations (4.7)-(4.8), wM , wS, M and S denote all observable and unobserv-
able determinants of individual's medical care and insurance choices, reecting
individuals' preferences and constraints, and are likely to include individuals'
characteristics such as risk tolerance, attitude towards medical care use and in-
surance purchase, actual (health) riskiness and so on. Following standard models
in the literature (Ettner [51], Holly et al. [73], Buchmuller et al. [17], Jones et
al. [80]), we assume that wM and wS include demographic, socio-economic and
health status observables, which we denote xM and xS, and lagged medical care
and insurance partecipation which may act as proxies for unobservable attitudes
to buy insurance and use health care. We then rewrite equations (4.7) and (4.8)
as
MT = 1
 
a+ bST + c
0
xM +
T 1X
t=1
dT tMT t +
T 1X
t=1
eT tST t + M

(4.9)
ST = 1
 
f + g
0
xS +
T 1X
t=1
hT tMT t +
T 1X
t=1
kT tST t + S

(4.10)
Assuming that (M ; S) are distributed as a bivariate normal with standard mar-
gins and correlation coecient , equations (4.9)-(4.10) dene a standard recur-
sive bivariate probit.
The recursive bivariate probit model above is simple to estimate and to
interpret, allows estimation of the eect of supplementary insurance on medical
care use and testing for selection eects with standard software, and has been
much used in this context (Buchmueller et al. [17], Holly et al. [73], and Jones
et al. [80]). Furthermore, by appropriate inclusion/exclusion restriction, it can
allow a much more robust parameters' identication compared to model (4.1){
(4.2) above. However, it still relies on bivariate normality to achieve parameters'
identication, and, as explained above, it can still run into diculties in detecting
selection eects when residual unobserved heterogeneity is multidimensional.
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Discrete multivariate nite mixture model
Following the same logic as above, our strategy is to control for residual unob-
served heterogeneity by identifying a nite number of \types" which dier with
respect to their attitude to buy insurance and to use medical care, by letting
again U denote a discrete random variable taking values in f1; : : : ;mg. Equa-
tions (4.7){(4.8) can then be rewritten as
MT = 1
  mX
u=1
MT (u)U(u) + bST + c
0
xM +
T 1X
t=1
dT tMT t +
T 1X
t=1
eT tST t + M

(4.11)
ST = 1
  mX
u=1
ST (u)U(u) + g
0
xS +
T 1X
t=1
hT tMT t +
T 1X
t=1
kT tST t + M

(4.12)
where again the idiosyncratic errors (M ; S) are assumed logisticly distributed in
order to use logit parameters for estimation.
To achieve sharper identication of the heterogeneous types we dene again
a set of auxiliary equations:
Pr(MT t = 1 j u;xM) = (MT t(u) + 
0
MT txM); t = 1; : : : ; T   1
Pr(ST t = 1 j u;xS) = (ST t(u) + 
0
ST txS); t = 1; : : : ; T   1
(4.13)
and complete the model by modeling the types membership probabilities P (u)
as in equation (4.6).
An interesting feature of this model is that past medical care use and insur-
ance choice variables perform a `double duty': they help identication of residual
heterogeneity with the system of auxiliary equations (4.13) (as in the model of
section 4.4.1 above), but they also enter directly the conditional distribution of
current medical care and insurance choice in equations (4.11) and (4.12). Ab-
sence of selection eects and moral hazard can be tested by imposing appropriate
restrictions on the  parameters.
4.4.3 Estimation of the discrete multiresponse nite mix-
ture model
Estimation of the model parameters can be obtained by the EM algorithm, which
is the standard approach for maximum likelihood estimation of nite mixture
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models, and has been shown (Dempster et al. [40]) to converge to the maximum of
the true likelihood. Given the binary nature of the response variables, the E-step
is equivalent to compute, for each subject, the posterior probability of belonging
to each unobservable type; the M-step requires maximization of a multinomial
likelihood with individual covariates. A detailed discussion of the EM algorithm
in a system of non linear structural equations with latent classes can be found in
Bergsma et al. [14].8
It is well known that the EM algorithm may converge even if the model
is not identied, which is a crucial issue for nite mixture models. Conditions
for parametric identication are discussed in Theorem 1 of Huang and Bandeen
Roche [75]; local identication can be checked using the the numerical test de-
scribed by Forcina [59], which consists in checking that the Jacobian of the trans-
formation between the parameters of the observable responses and the mixture
model parameters is of full rank for a wide range of parameter values.
Despite the usefulness of nite mixture models to detect underlying resid-
ual heterogeneity, one unresolved issue in their application is how to determine
the number of unobserved types m. The currently preferred approach suggests
the use of Schwartz's Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to guide this choice,
which in certain conditions is known to be consistent and generally helps pre-
venting overparametrization (see McLachlan and Peel [93] for a thorough intro-
duction to nite mixture models and a review of existing criteria for the choice
of the number of types). BIC is calculated from the maximized log-likelihood L
by penalizing parameters' proliferation, BIC =  2L+ log(n), where n denotes
sample size and  the number of parameters; the model with the lowest BIC is
preferred.
Finally, it may be worth noticing that, since the number of types m is not
predetermined, formal hypotheses tests performed in nite mixture models are
in fact conditional on m, and pre-testing for the number of types may invalidate
distributional results of the test statistics employed. Of course, while pre-testing
is a common problem in most applied research whenever nal estimates are ob-
tained after searching for appropriate specication, this is an issue which should
be kept in mind whenever test results dier signicantly when performed under
dierent values of m.
8We are grateful to Antonio Forcina for kindly providing the Matlab code for the EM
estimation.
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4.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Since 1992 the HRS
is a biennial survey targeting elderly Americans over the age of 50 sponsored by
the National Institute on Aging. Although the survey is not conducted on an
yearly basis, from 1998 it provides longitudinal data for an array of information,
consistently administrated, on several dierent elds such as health and health
care utilization, type of insurance coverage, socioeconomic condition, retirement
plans and family structure and transfers.
For our purpose we use the last available wave on 2006 (that is, T =
2006) as reference point to collect information on insurance status, health care
utilization, health and socio-economic characteristics from the previous two waves
(2002 and 2004). To evaluate more closely the eect of asymmetric information
on Medicare expenditure, we consider a sample restricted to Medicare Part A or
B enrollees over the last wave. This means that we consider only individuals older
than 65 in 2002. Information about Medicare is binary coded and it is clearly
reported in the survey as the rst question asked in the insurance section.
Since we study the eect of supplemental insurance (Medigap) on health
care, we also exclude those individuals that received additional coverage through
a former employer, spouse or some other government agency. Following Fang et
al. [53] we dene an individual as having additional health insurance coverage
(Medigap) if she purchased directly health insurance policy in addition to Medi-
care. The HRS asked respondents whether they are also covered by Medicaid,
CHAMPUS or CHAMPVA (Tri-care) and who payed for the supplemental in-
surance. This detailed information allows to identify any source of (additional)
coverage available to individual. Since our focus is to disentangle incentive and
selection eects at time 2006 for those individual who deliberately choose to pur-
chase additional coverage, our sample should be limited only to people who are
covered by Medicare part A or B, are not covered by additional public insurance
and pay personally the required monthly premium. Therefore we exclude those
who are enrolled in any other public program dierent from Medicare or that
are covered at year 2006 by Medigap insurance plan provided by own or spouse's
former employer.
Our sample is composed by 3368 individuals and descriptive statistics are
reported in table A.1. Supplemental insurance status at 2002 (spins02), 2004
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(spins04) and 2006 (spins06) is coded as binary variable which takes 1 if re-
spondent has any (no long-term care) supplemental private Medigap insurance
coverage. Almost 50 percent of Medicare beneciaries in the sample has a sup-
plemental insurance, and 87 percent of them are continuously covered since they
turn 65; thus, most of Medicare beneciaries purchase a supplemental insurance
coverage as soon as they are enrolled in Medicare Part A or B. In addition to
these variables we also use information on whether additional coverage was pro-
vided in the previous years by a former employer (iemp04) or by the spouse
(iemps04). These variables have been used in the literature to explain individual
choice to take out voluntary supplemental coverage, and can be considered as
appropriate instruments since they are likely to aect insurance choice but they
can be excluded from the inpatient care equation (Ettner [51] nds that selection
into additional coverage can be driven by employer-provided plans since high-risk
(or risk averse) workers may self-select into jobs that provide better retirement
medical benets).
The HRS oers detailed information on health care consumption. We focus
on hospital staying over the three waves (h02, h04 and h06). Hospital admissions
account for 29% of the Medicare's total expenditure and it is an important part of
the Medicare total expenditure (see CMS, Oce of the Actuary, National Health
Expenditure Accounts, 2007). These variables are binary and take value 1 if
individual had at least one hospital admission, and 0 otherwise. In the Medigap
market insurance companies are constrained by Federal law to use only age and
gender to price contracts. Therefore as variables used by insurer to predict risk
we only use these two measures; for age we use four ve-years dummies for added
exibility.9
In the extended model we follow previous studies on health care demand
(Cameron et al. [19], Jones et al. [80], Deb and Trivedi [39] Vera-Heranandez
[113]) and insurance choice (Propper [100]-[101], Cameron and Trivedi [18]) as
guidance in selecting ve groups of variables describing individual socioeconomic
characteristics, insurance status, health care consumption, health status and in-
dividual risk preferences. Health conditions, in particular, have an important
inuence both on the decision to subscribe supplementary insurance as well as on
the utilization of health care services. In the HRS, health condition is measured
9Using dummy variables is a common strategy to increase the computational speed of maxi-
mization methods, such as the the EM algorithm, that tend to be slow. However for robustness
we performed all estimations using dierent age-band denitions and found that estimated
relationships did not vary substantially.
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along dierent measures. We include in the analysis the number of self-reported
doctor diagnosed longstanding or chronical diseases (DIS) - such as high blood
pressure, hypertension, cardiovascular disease, lung disease, kidney conditions,
emotional and psychiatric problems - and the index of Activities of Daily Living
(ADL), which measures diculties in bathing, dressing, eating, getting in/out of
bed and walking across a room and is dened on a discrete scale ranging between
0-5. Both indices are averaged out over the three years period to capture the per-
sistency of need status and any preexisting condition which may aect insurance
choice over the time.
Finally the last group of variables includes socio-economic characteristics,
such as education and wealth. Education is measured using three dummy vari-
ables indicating whether individual i) is a high-school graduate, ii) has a degree
which is less than a BA, or iii) has a college degree which is a BA or greater. The
base category includes people with no qualication or lower than high-school. In-
dividual wealth is measured using four dummy variables indicating the quartile
of the total wealth (including the second home) distribution. The base category
represents the poorest.
As reported in table A.1, comparing the sub-sample averages for the two
groups of people with and without supplemental insurance, we nd that people
with additional insurance tend to have higher education, to be in the top wealth
quartile, and to have a lower score of ADL, though the average number of diseases
does not vary substantially.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Insurer's model: single probit and bivariate probit
results
Table A.2 reports in the rst two columns the estimated parameters from the two
single binary probit models for hospital admission and Medigap purchase, and in
the third and fourth columns the estimated parameters of the bivariate recursive
probit model (4.1)-(4.2). For all model specications one observes that age has a
signicant positive eect on inpatient staying and females are more likely to be
covered by Medigap.
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Estimated coecients for the recursive bivariate probit reveal a strongly
signicant incentive eect; the average marginal eect is unbelievable huge at
0.517.10 Regarding selection eects, the estimated  coecient is equal to -
.880, with a s.e. equal to .137. The Wald test statistic is equal to 5.09 and is
asymptotically distributed as a 21, so the null  = 0 is rejected with p-value
0.024. On the other hand, the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic is equal to 1.26
and is also asymptotically distributed as a 21, so the null  = 0 is not rejected
with p-value 0.262. Thus, the two testing procedures for the null of absence
of selection eects give very contrasting results. Monfardini and Radice [95]
show that the LR test in general performs signicantly better compared to the
Wald test, and argue that when the two test give contrasting results it usually
signals identication problems. This is certainly possible in this case since no
inclusion/exclusion restrictions are exploited to identify model parameters in the
two equations.
As a robustness check, and since the LR test cannot reject the null hypoth-
esis that conditional on w insurance choice is exogenous from hospital utilization,
we may look at the results of the single equation probits. In this framework the
key variable of interest is the incentive eect. Conditioning on buyer character-
istics used by insurer to price contract, individuals with supplemental Medigap
coverage are more likely to have any hospital inpatient staying, since b is positive
and statistically signicant at the 5% level. The average marginal eect is equal
to 0.0382, which can be compared with the huge estimated eect of 0.517. The
dierence between these two estimates is a further indication of possible identi-
cation problems with the bivariate probit model. Summing up, it is probably safe
to consider estimated parameters of the recursive bivariate probit with healthy
skepticism.
4.6.2 Insurer's model: discrete multiresponse nite mix-
ture model
We start by estimating the model under dierent numbers of latent classes. Pa-
rameters estimates for m = 2; 3; 4; 5 are reported in tables A.3{A.7 in the Ap-
pendix.11 A glance at tables A.6-A.7 reveals that: i) the incentive eect param-
10Average marginal eects here and hereafter are computed averaging individuals marginal
eects.
11We rst performed the numerical test of Forcina [59] described in Section 4.4.3 to check
model identiability. The model passed such a test for each m = 2; 3; 4; 5 with samples of
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eter b of main interest is quite robust to the number of types m = 3; 4; 5; ii)
older individuals seem to signicantly have more hospital admissions; iii) there
is a substantial amount of heterogeneity as described by the  coecients, which
seem to vary very signicantly across types.
Table 4.1 below reports the maximized log-likelihood L and Schwartz's
Bayesian Information Criterion BIC. BIC indicates that four types are adequate
to represent residual heterogeneity. We comment on incentive and selection eects
focusing on the case m = 4.
Table 4.1: Model Selection Criteria for the insurer's model
Number of Latent Classes
m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5
L -11591.58 -11477.28 -11400.12 -11397.15
BIC 23540.54 23368.79 23271.32 23322.237
# of parameters 44 51 58 65
Let us rst focus on the incentive eect parameter b reported in table A.6.
This eect is positive and statistically signicant at the 10% level. The average
marginal eect is equal to 0.0383, which is practically identical to the average
marginal eect calculated in the single equation probit model reported (0.0382).
For robustness, we also calculated the marginal eect in the linear probability
model (0.0382).
Regarding selection eects, we can derive the conditional probabilities of
hospital admission and medigap purchase for the 4 types from the estimated
coecients  in Tables A.4 and A.5.
Table 4.2: Estimated conditional probabilities
U=1 U=2 U=3 U=4
h06 0.2391 0.2923 0.6538 0.6860
h04 0.1575 0.1474 0.8338 0.7790
h02 0.2531 0.2115 0.5862 0.5691
spins06 0.8121 0.1327 0.1050 0.8050
spins04 0.9526 0.1012 0.0977 0.9167
spins02 0.8469 0.1235 0.1618 0.8784
Estimated probabilities are averaged out for w.
10,000 draws. For robustness, we also estimated all versions of the discrete multiresponse nite
mixture model from dierent starting points in order to check the presence of possible local
maxima.
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The table above shows very substantial heterogeneity in hospital admission
and Medigap purchase by the four types: types 3-4 tend to have a much higher
probability of hospital admission than types 1-2, while types 1-4 have a much
higher probability of buying Medigap than types 2-3. Thus, it appears that there
are at least two dierent sources of residual heterogeneity: the attitude to buy
insurance (which is high for types one and four and low for types two and three),
and the propensity to use medical care (which is high for types three and four and
low for types one and two). Comparing to the average hospital admission and
Medigap purchase probabilities, it emerges that types two and four adversely
select Medigap insurance, while types one and three favorably select Medigap
insurance. Thus the overall picture which emerges from our estimates is strongly
suggestive of multidimensional residual private information, and there appears
to be both favorable and adverse selection in this market, since the contract is
favourably selected by individuals who have the same (high or low) propensity for
insurance purchase and hospital admission, and adversely selected by individuals
who have opposite attitudes.
While it is apparent that residual heterogeneity coecients 's (and thus
the conditional probabilities above) vary substantially across types, we can still
check whether this simply reects sampling variation by testing the equality con-
straint h06(1) =    = h06(4) and spins06(1) =    = spins06(4). As expected,
the LR test statistic overwhelmingly rejects the null with p-values less than 10 4.
4.6.3 Extended model: binary probit and bivariate probit
results
Table A.8 shows the single equation probits and the recursive bivariate probit
estimated coecients of insurance choice and inpatient stay for the extended
model (4.9)-(4.10).
Estimated coecients from the recursive bivariate probit model reveal that
the probability of a hospital staying increases with age, but not with education
and wealth, and it is positively associated with low persistent health status and
past inpatient stay. On the other hand, the probability of enrolling in a supple-
mentary insurance plan increases with past insurance status, wealth and educa-
tion. In addition, having better coverage in the past (provided either individually,
spins02 and spins04, or by a former employer, iemp04 and iemps04) signicantly
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increases the probability of having supplementary insurance. These results seem
to indicate that individuals with a persistent coverage over the years tend to be
more likely to purchase supplemental insurance.
Estimated coecients for the recursive bivariate probit reveal again a large
but insignicant incentive eect; the average marginal eect is rather large at
0.183. Regarding selection eects, the estimated  is equal to 0.248, with a s.e.
equal to 0.281. The Wald test statistic and LR test statistics are equal to 0.71
and 0.92 and are asymptotically distributed as 21. Both statistics cannot reject
the null  = 0 with a p-values of 0.397 and 0.336 respectively. Thus, the two
testing procedures for the null of absence of selection eects in this case give very
similar conclusions.
Although Wilde [118] shows that identication can be obtained even when
the same exogenous regressors appear in both equations (provided that regressors
satisfy an appropriate full rank condition), a more robust identication can be
obtained by appropriate exclusion/inclusion restrictions. In our model it implies
excluding variables from the outcome (hospital) equation which are correlated
with insurance choice but, conditional on exogenous variables, uncorrelated with
hospital utilization. Following Ettner [51], in our specication we have adopted
as instruments past supplemental insurance coverage provided by own (iemp04)
or spouse's (iemps04) former employer.
To show sensitivity of the estimated coecients to the assumed exclusion
restrictions, we estimated the bivariate probit model under dierent specica-
tions of the outcome equation, analogously to Buchmuller et al. [17]. Table A.9
reports results on the two parameters of interest: the incentive eect b and the
selection eect  for several versions of the model. Although the point estimates
vary only slightly depending on which variables are excluded from the utilization
equation, the qualitative results are similar across the dierent specications.
For all versions of the recursive bivariate probit model, the insurance coecient
is larger than the one from the single equation probit model, and in all cases
the correlation coecient is negative and never statistically signicant. There-
fore it is plausible to conclude that insurance choice is exogenous in the hospital
utilization equation, and then single equation probit model gives a more reliable
estimate of the incentive eect parameter b, with an average marginal eect equal
to 0.0409.
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4.6.4 Extended model: discrete multiresponse nite mix-
ture model
We rst estimate the model under dierent numbers m of latent classes. Results
for m = 2; 3; 4; 5 are reported in Appendix, while table 4.3 below reports the
maximized log-likelihood L, the BIC and the number of parameters in each LC
model specication.12 BIC seems to indicate that three LC are adequate to
represent unobserved heterogeneity. A glance at tables A.12-A.15 reveals also
that estimated coecients do not seem to vary substantially with respect to the
number of LC specications. We comment on parameters' estimates focusing on
the case m = 3.
Table 4.3: Model Selection Criteria for the extended model
Number of Latent Classes
m = 2 m = 3 m = 4
L -11104.58 -11072.95 -11058.65
BIC 23037.62 23031.21 23059.47
#ofparmaters 102 109 116
Estimated coecients reveal a very similar picture to the probit models
above; the probability of a hospital staying increases with age, but not with
education and wealth, and is positively associated with past utilization and low
persistent health status; the probability of enrolling in a supplementary insurance
plan increases with past insurance status and wealth. The variables iemp04 and
iemps04 are again very strongly signicant, so that generally individuals with a
persistent coverage over the years tend to be more likely to purchase supplemental
insurance.
Regarding incentive eects, the coecient b is positive and signicant at
the 10% signicance level. The average marginal eect is equal to 0.0439, which
is slightly higher than the probit marginal eect of 0.0409. Again, for robustness,
we also calculated the marginal eect in the linear probability model (0.041).
Finally, looking at the estimated  coecients for the main system (Ta-
ble A.11), it emerges that, contrary to the model estimated in section 4.6.2,
estimated coecients of the residual heterogeneity U do not vary signicantly
12We also performed the numerical test of Forcina [59] and the model passed such a test for
each m = 2; 3; 4 with samples of 10,000 draws. For robustness, we also estimated all versions of
the discrete multiresponse nite mixture model from dierent starting points in order to check
the presence of possible local maxima.
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across types. Thus, we rst can check whether the observed pattern of 's in
the main equation system is simply due to sampling variation by imposing equal-
ity constraints. The LR test statistics when h06(1) = h06(2) = h06(3) and
spins06(1) = spins06(2) = spins06(3) are equal to 4.71 and 3.91 respectively.
These are distributed as 22, so that the null hypothesis of no selection eects
cannot be rejected at 5% signicance level with p-values of 0.094 and 0.141.
Our results suggest that after controlling for all relevant observable de-
terminants of inpatient staying and Medigap purchase, there seems to be no
signicant residual private information.
4.7 Final remarks
In the health insurance market consumers have private information about their
health status (actual risk) and preferences. As a result, insurance contracts may
be aected by incentive and/or selection eects. A standard way to study these
eects is to measure the impact of insurance purchase on health care use and their
residual association, after conditioning on variables used by insurance companies
to price contracts. The standard econometric approach for this purpose relies on
a recursive bivariate probit model.
In this paper, we explore the extent to which supplemental health insur-
ance (Medigap) aects inpatient care in two distinct cases: using as conditioning
variables those used by insurers' to price individual's risk, or alternatively using
the rich set of observable characteristics which are available in the HRS data.
While in highly competitive and unregulated markets the two sets of variables
may coincide, in heavily regulated markets (such as Medigap) the two models
may give very dierent results.
In both cases, we estimated two alternative econometric models: a stan-
dard recursive bivariate probit, and a discrete multiresponse nite mixture model.
The main picture which emerges from our estimation is the following:
 Estimated incentive eects are quite similar across models, with average
marginal eects ranging from 0.0382 to 0.0439, which are slightly smaller
than the dierence, in the sample, between the probability of hospital ad-
mission of individuals who are covered (0.36) and those who are not cov-
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ered (0.31) by Medigap. Estimated coecients of the incentive eects are
generally signicant between the 5% and 10% signicance level. These re-
sults are broadly consistent with previous studies on Medigap (Ettner [51],
Cartwright et al. [22], Hurd and McGarry [76]).
 There seems to be very signicant selection eects when one conditions only
on variables used by Medigap insurers, with the presence of both adversely
and favorably selected individuals. This stems from the multidimensional
nature of residual heterogeneity.
 On the other hand, when a rich set of observable variables, including past
insurance decisions and past inpatient stay, are employed for conditioning,
there seems to be no statistically signicant private information in this
market. Thus, one may conclude that selection eects in Medigap are
mainly due to regulatory constraints. This suggests that future research
may fruitfully investigate the welfare implication of regulatory Medigap
constraints. A very simple intuitive explanation of the welfare loss due to
adverse and favorable selection is contained in Einav and Finkelstein [46].
 In this setting, the recursive bivariate probit model runs into theoretical
problems to detect selection eects when residual heterogeneity is multidi-
mensional. Furthermore, in this data, the model seems to run into empirical
problems probably due to identication issues.
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Appendix A
Tables
Table A.1: Sample characteristics and variables denition
Variable Denition of Binary Variables Full Sample No Ins With Ins
Insurance Status
spins06 1 = enrolled in Medigap at 2008. 0.42 0.00 1.00
spins04 1 = enrolled in Medigap at 2004. 0.45 0.21 0.80
spins02 1 = enrolled in Medigap at 2002. 0.43 0.22 0.72
iemp04 1 = additional coverage from former emp. at 2004. 0.08 0.10 0.05
iemps04 1 = additional coverage from spouse emp. at 2004. 0.04 0.05 0.04
Hospital Admission
h06 1 = entered a hospital in 2005-2006. 0.33 0.31 0.36
h04 1 = entered a hospital 2003-2004. 0.29 0.29 0.29
h02 1 = entered a hospital in 2001-2002. 0.27 0.26 0.28
Variables Used by insurer to price Medigap plan
age75 1 = aged between 76 and 80 years. 0.24 0.26 0.22
age80 1 = aged between 81 and 85 years. 0.18 0.17 0.20
age85 1 = aged between 86 and 90 years. 0.11 0.09 0.13
age90 1 = older than 90 years. 0.05 0.05 0.05
fem 1 = female. 0.61 0.59 0.63
Other Controls unused by insurer
edu3 1 = if individual is high-school graduate. 0.35 0.33 0.39
edu4 1 = if individual has a degree lower than BA. 0.19 0.17 0.20
edu5 1 = if individual has college degree or greater. 0.16 0.16 0.15
wealth2 1 = if individual is in the second wealth quartile. 0.25 0.26 0.24
wealth3 1 = if individual is in the third wealth quartile. 0.25 0.24 0.27
wealth4 1 = if individual is in the top wealth quartile. 0.25 0.23 0.28
dis 1 = average number of disease over 2002-2006. 2.23 2.24 2.21
adl 1 = average ADL over 2002-2006. 0.29 0.31 0.26
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Table A.2: Insurer's probit models for hospital admission and insurance choice
Probit Model Bivariate Probit Model
Independent Variables Hospital 2006 Insurance 2006 Hospital 2006 Insurance 2006
spins06 0.105 . 1.435 .
(0.0456) . (0.161) .
age75 0.216 -0.0401 0.177 -0.0307
(0.0579) (0.0561) (0.0546) (0.0552)
age80 0.356 0.127 0.184 0.129
(0.0626) (0.0610) (0.0765) (0.0610)
age85 0.396 0.238 0.148 0.239
(0.0752) (0.0736) (0.0950) (0.0739)
age90 0.413 0.0743 0.256 0.0793
(0.103) (0.102) (0.105) (0.101)
fem -0.00646 0.0915 -0.0551 0.0903
(0.0463) (0.0450) (0.0424) (0.0446)
Constant -0.660 -0.312 -0.974 -0.314
(0.0490) (0.0433) (0.0462) (0.0433)
# of Obs. 3368
Log-likelihood -2111.97 -2275.96 -4387.31
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets
Table A.3: Estimated Class Membership Probabilities for the insurer's model
m = 2 m = 3 m = 4 m = 5
(1) 0.4440 0.3872 0.2913 0.2705
(2) 0.5560 0.1771 0.3878 0.3827
(3) . 0.4357 0.1680 0.1419
(4) . . 0.1530 0.0531
(5) . . . 0.1517
Table A.4: Estimated intercepts for the insurer's model: main equations
m = 2 m = 3 m = 4 m = 5
Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er.
Hosp. Adm. 2006
h06(1) -0.77 0.11 -1.40 0.12 -1.62 0.22 -1.81 0.29
h06(2) -0.78 0.05 0.31 0.17 -1.34 0.12 -1.35 0.12
h06(3) . . -0.86 0.12 0.22 0.17 0.22 0.18
h06(4) . . . . 0.37 0.26 -0.04 0.35
h06(5) . . . . . . 0.30 0.26
Sup. Ins. 2006
spins06(1) 1.37 0.08 -2.03 0.11 1.38 0.11 1.38 0.13
spins06(2) -2.08 0.09 -2.03 0.19 -2.00 0.11 -2.10 0.15
spins06(3) . . 1.42 0.08 -2.26 0.23 -1.84 0.16
spins06(4) . . . . 1.34 0.18 0.79 1.92
spins06(5) . . . . . . 1.36 0.17
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Table A.5: Estimated intercepts for the insurer's model: auxiliary equations
m = 2 m = 3 m = 4 m = 5
Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er.
Hosp. Adm. 2002
h02(1) -0.93 0.06 -1.78 0.14 -1.49 0.14 -1.62 0.17
h02(2) -1.07 0.06 0.03 0.16 -1.73 0.14 -1.73 0.14
h02(3) . . -0.95 0.06 -0.02 0.17 -0.02 0.18
h02(4) . . . . -0.10 0.16 -0.33 0.28
h02(5) . . . . . . -0.15 0.16
Hosp. Adm. 2004
h04(1) -0.90 0.06 -2.39 0.35 -2.36 0.40 -2.54 0.49
h04(2) -0.92 0.05 1.07 0.34 -2.44 0.39 -2.57 0.43
h04(3) . . -0.95 0.06 1.13 0.40 1.25 0.46
h04(4) . . . . 0.76 0.34 0.60 0.50
h04(5) . . . . . . 0.39 0.27
Sup. Ins. 2002
spins02(1) 1.59 0.09 -2.23 0.13 1.50 0.12 1.49 0.13
spins02(2) -2.09 0.09 -1.66 0.16 -2.19 0.13 -2.21 0.15
spins02(3) . . 1.63 0.09 -1.88 0.19 -2.01 0.60
spins02(4) . . . . 1.77 0.21 -0.18 0.92
spins02(5) . . . . . . 1.76 0.32
Sup. Ins. 2004
spins04(1) 2.50 0.15 -2.48 0.16 2.75 0.25 2.84 0.34
spins04(2) -2.54 0.14 -2.30 0.23 -2.54 0.18 -2.57 0.19
spins04(3) . . 2.57 0.15 -2.58 0.30 -2.66 0.33
spins04(4) . . . . 2.14 0.26 -2.09 2.58
spins04(5) . . . . . . -1.69 0.17
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Table A.6: Estimated parameters for the insurer's model: main equations
m = 2 m = 3 m = 4 m = 5
Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er.
Hosp. Adm. 2006
spins06 0.16 0.11 0.24 0.12 0.25 0.13 0.23 0.17
age75 0.36 0.10 0.39 0.10 0.41 0.11 0.41 0.11
age80 0.59 0.10 0.61 0.11 0.69 0.12 0.68 0.12
age85 0.65 0.12 0.65 0.13 0.74 0.15 0.73 0.15
age90 0.68 0.17 0.73 0.18 0.79 0.20 0.80 0.20
fem -0.01 0.08 0.00 0.08 -0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.09
Sup. Ins. 2006
age75 -0.23 0.14 -0.24 0.14 -0.23 0.14 -0.25 0.15
age80 0.26 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.26 0.16 0.25 0.17
age85 0.50 0.19 0.46 0.19 0.51 0.19 0.61 0.22
age90 -0.09 0.26 -0.12 0.26 -0.09 0.26 -0.19 0.27
fem 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.12
Table A.7: Estimated parameters for the insurer's model: auxiliary equations
m = 2 m = 3 m = 4 m = 5
Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er.
Sup. Ins. 2002
age75 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15
age80 0.28 0.17 0.23 0.16 0.28 0.17 0.25 0.16
age85 0.56 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.57 0.20 0.57 0.21
age90 0.12 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.12 0.28 0.04 0.27
fem 0.24 0.12 0.25 0.12 0.22 0.12 0.25 0.12
Sup. Ins. 2004
age75 -0.20 0.24 -0.21 0.23 -0.19 0.24 -0.25 0.32
age80 0.46 0.25 0.36 0.24 0.45 0.25 0.52 0.30
age85 0.83 0.29 0.72 0.28 0.86 0.29 1.01 0.31
age90 0.54 0.41 0.48 0.39 0.56 0.41 0.48 0.48
fem 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.32 0.23
Hosp. Adm. 2002
age75 0.27 0.10 0.29 0.11 0.29 0.11 0.29 0.11
age80 0.53 0.11 0.55 0.12 0.60 0.12 0.59 0.12
age85 0.66 0.13 0.67 0.14 0.72 0.14 0.71 0.15
age90 0.65 0.17 0.69 0.19 0.73 0.20 0.73 0.20
fem -0.05 0.08 -0.04 0.09 -0.06 0.09 -0.05 0.09
Hosp. Adm. 2004
age75 0.25 0.10 0.34 0.13 0.42 0.18 0.39 0.17
age80 0.42 0.11 0.52 0.14 0.75 0.20 0.69 0.19
age85 0.69 0.12 0.81 0.16 1.15 0.25 1.09 0.25
age90 0.77 0.17 1.00 0.22 1.34 0.32 1.34 0.32
fem -0.07 0.08 -0.08 0.10 -0.15 0.14 -0.13 0.13
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Table A.8: Extended probit models for Hospital Admission and Insurance Choice
at 2006
Probit Model Bivariate Probit Model
Independent Variables Hospital 2006 Insurance 2006 Hospital 2006 Insurance 2006
spins06 0.125 . 0.559 .
(0.0601) . (0.483) .
spins04 0.0678 1.401 -0.140 1.402
(0.0672) (0.0635) (0.217) (0.0635)
spins02 -0.0367 0.736 -0.136 0.733
(0.0613) (0.0595) (0.127) (0.0598)
h04 0.530 -0.0175 0.525 -0.0179
(0.0522) (0.0599) (0.0544) (0.0597)
h02 0.148 0.0202 0.145 0.0255
(0.0541) (0.0601) (0.0541) (0.0605)
dis 0.169 -0.0150 0.169 -0.0140
(0.0198) (0.0218) (0.0199) (0.0220)
adl 0.180 -0.0249 0.180 -0.0240
(0.0360) (0.0395) (0.0353) (0.0391)
age75 0.139 -0.0763 0.146 -0.0711
(0.0607) (0.0661) (0.0603) (0.0668)
age80 0.255 0.107 0.241 0.112
(0.0664) (0.0737) (0.0689) (0.0741)
age85 0.165 0.186 0.142 0.190
(0.0792) (0.0879) (0.0830) (0.0882)
age90 0.158 0.00672 0.156 0.0111
(0.112) (0.129) (0.112) (0.128)
fem -0.0213 0.0799 -0.0252 0.0810
(0.0512) (0.0554) (0.0514) (0.0553)
edu3 -0.0330 0.0751 -0.0401 0.0789
(0.0594) (0.0651) (0.0595) (0.0654)
edu4 -0.0498 0.0900 -0.0593 0.0943
(0.0727) (0.0803) (0.0730) (0.0806)
edu5 0.0523 0.0629 0.0443 0.0742
(0.0794) (0.0860) (0.0797) (0.0880)
wealth2 -0.0433 -0.0393 -0.0378 -0.0379
(0.0677) (0.0767) (0.0671) (0.0765)
wealth3 -0.0843 0.114 -0.0933 0.113
(0.0702) (0.0773) (0.0720) (0.0775)
wealth4 -0.0715 0.145 -0.0815 0.146
(0.0783) (0.0862) (0.0812) (0.0863)
iemp04 0.0567 0.536 . 0.535
(0.0888) (0.0957) . (.0.0951)
iemps04 0.140 0.617 . .0.627
(0.110) (0.117) . (.0.116)
Constant -1.205 -1.468 -1.213 -.1.478
(0.0914) (0.102) (0.0901) (.0.103)
# of Obs. 3368
Log-likelihood -1932.60 -1560.62 -3492.76
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets
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Table A.9: Partial results for alternative bivariate probit specications
Variables excluded in the utilization equation Insurance Coecient  Likelihood Ratio
Probit Model 0.125 - -
(0.0601)
iemps04 0.579 -0.266 0.69
(0.581) (0.362)
iemp04 0.307 -0.103 0.09
(0.769) (0.449)
iemp04+iemps04 0.559 -0.254 0.92
(0.483) (0.300)
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
The sample size for all models is 3368
Table A.10: Estimated Class Membership Probabilities for the extended model
m = 2 m = 3 m = 4
(1) 0.4806 0.1412 0.2961
(2) 0.5194 0.3701 0.2150
(3) . 0.4887 0.2762
(4) . . 0.2127
Table A.11: Estimated intercepts for the extended model: main equations
m = 2 m = 3 m = 4
Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er.
Hosp. Adm. 2006
h06(1) -1.07 0.40 -1.81 0.30 -1.05 0.15
h06(2) -1.20 0.07 -1.07 0.10 -1.54 0.45
h06(3) . . -1.13 0.39 -0.90 0.51
h06(4) . . . . -1.01 0.48
Sup. Ins. 2006
spins06(1) -1.40 0.42 -2.48 0.41 -2.57 0.37
spins06(2) -2.19 0.10 -2.16 0.13 -1.45 0.42
spins06(3) . . -1.28 0.39 -2.89 0.79
spins06(4) . . . . -1.09 0.52
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Table A.12: Estimated intercepts for the extended model: auxiliary equations
m = 2 m = 3 m = 4
Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er.
Hosp. Adm. 2002
h02(1) -0.99 0.06 0.14 0.37 -2.67 0.56
h02(2) -1.15 0.06 -1.94 0.29 -0.26 0.27
h02(3) . . -0.98 0.06 -1.88 0.36
h02(4) . . . . 0.04 0.32
Hosp. Adm. 2004
h04(1) -0.94 0.06 0.39 0.41 -2.13 0.40
h04(2) -1.02 0.06 -1.81 0.29 -0.15 0.23
h04(3) . . -0.95 0.06 -1.44 0.21
h04(4) . . . . -0.31 0.21
Sup. Ins. 2002
spins02(1) 1.73 0.34 -2.62 0.47 -2.71 0.42
spins02(2) -2.98 0.57 -2.83 0.41 -2.74 0.57
spins02(3) . . 1.54 0.19 2.24 0.50
spins02(4) . . . . 0.87 0.24
Sup. Ins. 2004
spins04(1) 1.77 0.27 -4.07 1.45 -2.09 0.35
spins04(2) -2.45 0.45 -2.49 0.37 1.11 0.28
spins04(3) . . 1.87 0.24 2.34 0.43
spins04(4) . . . . 1.42 0.36
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Table A.13: Estimated parameters for the extended model: main equations
m = 2 m = 3 m = 4
Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er.
Hosp. Adm. 2006
spins06 0.22 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.27 0.18
spins04 0.03 0.21 -0.02 0.22 -0.15 0.30
spins02 -0.14 0.24 -0.12 0.20 -0.21 0.25
h04 0.87 0.08 1.02 0.12 0.97 0.19
h02 0.24 0.09 0.37 0.11 0.35 0.26
dis 0.29 0.03 0.27 0.04 0.28 0.04
adl 0.29 0.06 0.28 0.06 0.28 0.06
age75 0.24 0.10 0.24 0.10 0.25 0.10
age80 0.43 0.11 0.43 0.11 0.43 0.11
age85 0.29 0.14 0.28 0.14 0.30 0.14
age90 0.28 0.19 0.28 0.19 0.30 0.19
fem -0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.09 0.00 0.09
edu3 -0.04 0.10 -0.04 0.10 -0.03 0.10
edu4 -0.08 0.12 -0.10 0.12 -0.09 0.12
edu5 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.13
wealth2 -0.05 0.12 -0.05 0.12 -0.03 0.12
wealth3 -0.10 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.08 0.13
wealth4 -0.07 0.13 -0.05 0.14 -0.04 0.14
Sup. Ins. 2006
spins04 2.02 0.23 1.87 0.24 2.66 0.45
spins02 0.84 0.28 0.84 0.23 1.49 0.34
h04 -0.03 0.11 0.01 0.13 -0.42 0.24
h02 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.13 -0.60 0.32
dis -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.05
adl -0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.07 0.01 0.08
age75 -0.12 0.12 -0.12 0.12 -0.12 0.13
age80 0.21 0.14 0.22 0.14 0.24 0.15
age85 0.38 0.17 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.18
age90 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.23 0.08 0.25
fem 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.11
edu3 0.21 0.13 0.22 0.13 0.16 0.14
edu4 0.20 0.15 0.21 0.15 0.22 0.16
edu5 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.14 0.17
wealth2 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.15 -0.10 0.16
wealth3 0.31 0.15 0.34 0.15 0.20 0.16
wealth4 0.35 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.22 0.18
iemp04 0.97 0.17 0.99 0.17 1.02 0.18
iemps04 1.11 0.21 1.13 0.22 1.19 0.23
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Table A.14: Estimated parameters for the extended model: auxiliary equations,
insurance choice
m = 2 m = 3 m = 4
Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er.
Sup. Ins. 2002
dis 0.23 0.08 0.20 0.06 0.21 0.07
adl -0.28 0.13 -0.25 0.10 -0.27 0.11
age75 0.28 0.21 0.29 0.19 0.34 0.20
age80 0.39 0.25 0.35 0.21 0.28 0.21
age85 0.80 0.36 0.69 0.28 0.86 0.30
age90 0.53 0.41 0.52 0.36 0.67 0.38
fem 0.45 0.20 0.35 0.16 0.41 0.17
edu3 0.77 0.31 0.65 0.22 0.69 0.23
edu4 0.40 0.28 0.38 0.23 0.43 0.24
edu5 -0.55 0.26 -0.45 0.23 -0.40 0.24
wealth2 0.84 0.31 0.74 0.23 0.86 0.26
wealth3 0.76 0.31 0.68 0.24 0.76 0.26
wealth4 0.79 0.32 0.69 0.25 0.73 0.27
Sup. Ins. 2004
dis 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.07
adl -0.20 0.11 -0.22 0.12 -0.25 0.12
age75 0.03 0.18 0.08 0.20 0.15 0.21
age80 0.46 0.23 0.51 0.24 0.45 0.24
age85 0.82 0.30 0.89 0.32 1.14 0.35
age90 0.89 0.39 1.08 0.43 1.44 0.48
fem 0.39 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.45 0.19
edu3 0.81 0.25 0.89 0.25 0.95 0.27
edu4 0.56 0.25 0.64 0.27 0.69 0.28
edu5 -0.13 0.24 -0.10 0.26 -0.01 0.27
wealth2 0.89 0.27 0.98 0.26 1.11 0.29
wealth3 1.13 0.30 1.31 0.31 1.41 0.34
wealth4 1.07 0.31 1.17 0.30 1.21 0.32
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Table A.15: Estimated parameters for the extended model: auxiliary equations,
hospital utilization
m = 2 m = 3 m = 4
Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er.
Hosp. Adm. 2002
dis 0.39 0.03 0.42 0.04 0.49 0.06
adl 0.21 0.05 0.24 0.06 0.27 0.08
age75 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.13
age80 0.42 0.11 0.42 0.12 0.47 0.14
age85 0.39 0.14 0.40 0.15 0.45 0.17
age90 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.47 0.24
fem -0.13 0.09 -0.14 0.10 -0.17 0.11
edu3 0.21 0.10 0.23 0.11 0.24 0.13
edu4 0.33 0.12 0.35 0.13 0.40 0.15
edu5 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.17
wealth2 -0.07 0.12 -0.07 0.13 -0.10 0.14
wealth3 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.05 0.15
wealth4 -0.20 0.13 -0.22 0.15 -0.26 0.16
Hosp. Adm. 2004
dis 0.42 0.03 0.47 0.04 0.48 0.04
adl 0.23 0.05 0.27 0.06 0.27 0.06
age75 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.12
age80 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.13
age85 0.43 0.13 0.45 0.15 0.46 0.15
age90 0.56 0.18 0.55 0.20 0.59 0.21
fem -0.12 0.09 -0.14 0.09 -0.15 0.10
edu3 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.11
edu4 0.22 0.12 0.24 0.13 0.24 0.14
edu5 -0.04 0.14 -0.03 0.15 -0.03 0.15
wealth2 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.13
wealth3 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.13
wealth4 -0.05 0.13 -0.06 0.14 -0.07 0.15
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Chapter 5
Risk preference heterogeneity and
multiple demand for insurance
5.1 Introduction
There is an emerging economic literature which examines the relationship between
risk tolerance, insurance demand and attitude to risky behaviours (see Cutler et
al. [32], Einav et al. [49], Barseghyany et al. [9]). Importantly, there is little
consensus among these studies on how general are individual's nancial and non-
nancial risk preferences to predict insurance demand.
Classical economic theory assumes that individuals have the same attitude
to bear risk in dierent contexts, and then models all risky individual decisions
using the same value (utility) function over wealth.
This implies that multiple choices over dierent risk dimensions (such as
dierent insurance markets) taken by the same individual should reect the same
degree of risk aversion even if the contexts of decisions are dierent. Although
there are evidence of positive correlation between nancial and no nancial risk
aversion which may support the domain-general component of risk preference
hypothesis (DGC), there is a large and important literature mostly related to
behavioral economics which poses serious concerns on the internal validity of
this assumption (Rabin [102] and Rabin and Thaler [103]). They argue that
individuals' decision to take risk is inuenced by the context of choice. This idea
is supported by several ndings obtained by exploiting lab experiments which
show little or even no signicant commonality between risky choice in dierent
domains. As a result one would need to impose more theoretical assumptions to
extend risk preference parameter estimated for one market to another one (Cohen
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and Einav [29]). The existence of this debate does not pose a clear view on where
the reality lies especially when survey data, mainly employed in empirical research
in economics, are used.
Some recent papers consider this issue in insurance markets and evaluate
whether risk preferences are general. Cohen and Einav [29] and Barseghyan et al.
[9] model individual choice following the standard expected utility theory and use
insurance data on deductible choices to estimate risk aversion parameters in the
sample by comparing the variation in the deductible menus across individuals and
their choices from these menus. Their results show the existence of substantial
heterogeneity in risk preferences and in general data do not support the context-
invariant risk preferences hypothesis. Clearly since this approach estimates the
distribution of risk aversion in the sample from individuals' deductible choices and
claims, it requires a domain-specic model of ex-ante heterogeneity in risk. Einav
et al. [49] propose another approach which focuses on within-person correlation
between risky choices an individual makes across dierent domains. The idea is
that under the no DGC hypothesis, individuals have dierent attitudes to bear
risk among domains and then insurance decisions should not be inter-related after
conditioning on individual characteristics. They reject the null that there is no
domain-general component of preferences and nd that the common element of
an individual's preferences may be stronger among domains that are \closer" in
context.
In this paper we propose an alternative framework to examine how gen-
eral are risk preferences in the multiple demand of insurance using survey data.
Specically we extend previous setting focused on residual correlation across in-
surance (Einav et al. [49]) by identifying unobserved \types" with dierent risk
preferences and examining the eect of these \types" on insurance purchase deci-
sion. We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) on four insurance
purchase decisions: life insurance, Medicare supplemental insurance (Medigap),
long-term care insurance and annuity. Using these data we investigate the stabil-
ity of unobserved individual risk preferences across insurance choices and whether
the context-specic dierences are relevant. Our results show the existence of a
stable pattern of individual risk preferences over dierent insurance domains,
which supports the idea of domain-general component of preference. In addition
we also provide further evidence, as found by Einav et al. [49], that context plays
an important role in determining insurance choices particularly when insurance
coverage decisions involve similar specic contexts.
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the main
empirical literature; section 3 reports a brief overview of insurance markets we
are analysing and describes the data; we then discuss the model to be estimated
(section 4). Section 5 and 6 report respectively the main ndings and some
concluding remarks.
5.2 Literature Review
The paper is related to three literatures that cut across insurance economics,
health economics and experimental economics. The rst stream of literature
studies the determinants of the demand for insurance and has been mainly de-
veloped in the context of the analysis of asymmetric information. Friedman and
Warshawsky [60] study the selection eect in the annuity market, which is mainly
related to the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences and risk
aversion. In a more recent series of papers Finkelstein and Poterba [55]-[56] and
McCarthy and Mitchell [92] using data from dierent countries provide more ev-
idence of the existence of unobservables in the decision to purchase annuity and
suggest the possible existence of risk preference-based selection eect.
In contrast to the papers on the demand for annuity, those studying se-
lection in life insurance markets reach generally puzzling conclusions, since data
do not show clear conclusion on how heterogenous private information aects the
purchase decision (see Cawly and [23]). Browne and Kim [16] study the demand
for life insurance across dierent countries and nd the religion being an impor-
tant determinant. They claim that the degree of risk aversion in a country could
be related to the predominant religion, and therefore, religion aects the demand
for life insurance.
Long-term insurance combines elements of both annuity and life insurance.
Finkelstein and McGarry [58] study the US market using data from the Asset and
Health Dynamics (AHEAD) that is part of the HRS. They nd that demand for
coverage is substantially related to risk aversion. In particular they use as proxy
of risk preferences the share of preventive care activities undertaken by a subject
and whether individual always wear seat belt, and assume that who take more
of these actions are more risk-averse. Their results show that insurance purchase
decision is positively associated with preventive care and the use of seat belts
suggesting that risk aversion is an important factor aecting insurance demand.
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In another paper Cutler et al. [32] use data from the HRS and examine the
relationship between risk reducing behaviours (such as smoking, drinking, job-
mortality risk, etc.), risk occurrence and ve insurance purchase decisions in the
Unites States. They consider each market separately and nd that people who
engage in risky behavior, and then who are more risk tolerant, are systematically
less likely to hold life insurance, acute private health insurance, annuities, long-
term care insurance, and Medigap. Moreover, they show that this preference
eect has dierent sign across markets, suggesting that heterogeneity in risk
preference may be important in explaining the dierential patterns of insurance
coverage in various insurance markets.
The second related literature focuses on estimating risk preferences from
observed choices. This is a vast and constantly growing literature which is hard
to fully summarize here - for a review see Blavatskyy and Pogrebna [15]. In
general these studies use individual observed choice obtained from survey data -
sometimes with experimental module (e.g., Viscusi and Evans [116]; Evans and
Viscusi [52]; Barksy et al. [10]; Dohmen et al. [111]) or laboratory or natural
experiment experiment (Holt and Laury [74], Jullien and Salanie [82], Guiso and
Paiella [67]) to estimate risk preference.
Barsky et al. [10] use survey responses to hypothetical situations from the
HRS to construct a measure of risk preferences. They compare the measured risk
tolerance with a set of risky behaviours and nd that smoking, drinking, failing
to have insurance, and holding stocks rather than Treasury bills are positively
related with risk tolerance. Dohmen et al. [111] also nd statistically signicant
evidence of relationship between nancial and non-nancial risk aversion on the
basis of survey data. Guiso and Paiella [66] use household survey data to con-
struct a direct measure of absolute risk aversion and nd individual risk aversion
having a considerable predictive power for a number of key household decisions
such as choice of occupation, portfolio selection, moving decisions and exposure
to chronic disease. Cutler and Glaeser [33] used a similar approach to investigate
what the extent health-related behaviours are correlated and nd that those in-
dividuals who choose to follow an healthy life style are also more likely to behave
healthier in another context.
Another group of studies use data on insurance choice to analyse individ-
ual risk aversion (Cicchetti and Dubin [27], Sydnor [109]). In a recent paper
Cohen and Einav [29] develop a structural econometric model to estimate risk
preferences from data on deductible choices in auto insurance contracts. Their
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empirical strategy relies on modelling individual insurance purchase decision fol-
lowing the expected utility theory in which risk aversion parameter depends on
unobserved characteristics and then compare variation in the deductible menus
across individuals and their choices from these menus to estimate risk aversion in
the sample. They nd the existence of heterogeneity in risk preferences and that
risk aversion is also related to sex and age. Each of these studies, however, ex-
amine risk aversion in a single insurance context. More recently another group of
studies examined the insurance multicontext choice and focused on the stability
of risk preferences across contexts.
This is the third stream of literature which studies multiple demand for in-
surance and whether risk preferences are invariant across risk domains. In general
the principle of general component of risk preference has received considerable
attention in the economic literature and in particular in behavioral economic
studies, which mainly involve laboratory or natural experiments (for reviews,
Kahneman [83]-[84]). Standard economic theory predicts that individual risk
preferences are stable across decision contexts. This principle of invariance of
risk preferences implies that multiple risky choices by the same economic agent
should reect the same degree of risk aversion even when decision is taken in
dierent contexts. This principle has motivated a vast empirical research. Many
studies found the existence of a common, but small, element of domain-general
risk preferences (see for example Barsky et al. [10], Dohmen et al. [111], Kimball
et al. [87]), while several other studies based on laboratory experiments and hy-
pothetical money gables showed that context is the most important factor (Wolf
and Pohlman [120]) or even that choice depends on whether questions are framed
as a \gamble" or as \insurance" (Hershey et al. [72], Johnson et al. [78]).
Recently Barseghyan et al. [9] take an innovative approach to test gen-
erality of individual risk preference. Following Cohen and Einav [29] they use
insurance company data to examine whether risk preferences are stable over a
set of multiple insurance choices. In particular they test whether individuals'
deductible choices in automobile and home insurance are consistent with the
context-invariant risk preferences hypothesis. They nd that some individuals
are more risk averse in their home deductible choices than their auto deductible
choices. Therefore, the hypothesis of stable risk preferences across domain is
rejected by their data.
Einav et al. [49] focus on within-person correlation in the ordinal rank-
ing of the riskiness of the choice an individual makes across dierent domains.
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They use data on employee benet choices for the U.S. workers at Alcoa.Inc re-
garding the 401(k) asset allocation and ve dierent employer-provided insurance
domains, that include health and disability insurance. Since they are mainly in-
terested on the rank correlation within individuals across domains in their choice
among options in a domain, their econometric strategy relies on a multivariate
regression to estimate residual correlation between domains conditional on indi-
vidual characteristics. Since they are mainly focused on risk preferences across
domains, they use observable characteristics capturing individual predicted (by
insurer) and ex-post risk to control whether conditional on these variables there is
no residual correlation between insurance choices. However proxies may not cap-
ture perfectly individual risk and then the residual correlation could also indicate
correlation in the unobserved risk rather than commonality of risk preferences.
To address this issue they focus not only on residual correlations between insur-
ance choices, but also on the correlation between insurance coverage and 401(k)
portfolio allocation, which they claim to be uncorrelated with individual risk.
They found a small eect of individual risk controls on the correlation pattern as
well as a statistically signicant residual correlation between 401(k) and insur-
ance. Thus, they conclude that correlations are more likely to capture correlation
in underlying risk aversion and that risk preferences are likely to be stable across
domains.
Although our paper is closer in spirit with those of Barseghyan et al. [9]
and Einav et al. [49], since we model multiple insurance purchase decisions and
estimate how stable are risk preferences across these contexts, our approach dif-
fers substantially from two perspectives. First we study risk preference stability
using survey data on insurance choices. Although information on insurance plans
are more detailed in insurance company data, survey data oer a wide set of in-
formation over individual risk attitudes to bear risk in several contexts. Moreover
survey data are more often employed by applied economists and it could be inter-
esting to examine how an empirical appraisal based on residual correlation across
insurance choices perform to study the stability of risk preferences. Second we
exploit latent variable techniques, which allow to interpret and identify directly
the residual correlation related to individual risk preference and that one poten-
tially introduced by non-preference factors (such as context specicity, unpriced
risk, etc.).
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5.3 Data and Institutional background
Our analysis uses individual-level data from the fth wave of the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is a biennial survey targeting elderly Amer-
icans over the age of 50 and provide detailed information on insurance coverage,
health status, life style and nancial and socioeconomic status. We use these
data to study four insurance purchase decisions among people older than 65 in
2002: in particular we study whether the individual has: a term life insurance,
a Medicare supplemental coverage (Medigap), a long-term care insurance and
an annuity. Previous theoretical and empirical studies model the demand for
insurance as a function of individual risk aversion and individual risk. Since our
main focus is to study how risk tolerance is related to the decision of holding
any of these insurance plans and whether there exists an heterogenous patter of
risk preferences across domains, we need to control for both predicted (by in-
surer) and unobserved heterogeneity in risk (adverse selection). Conditioning on
the characteristics used in pricing insurance, which is the risk classication of
insurer, and on the ex-post risk is crucial to identify the eect of risk aversion
on the decision to purchase an insurance. For this purpose we follow previous
studies on demand for insurance (see Cutler et al. [32], Finklstein and McGarry
[58]) and exploit the dynamic structure of the data to track both predicted and
actual individual riskiness in each domains (such as mortality, subsequent health
care utilization, etc.). In addition since risk tolerance is not directly observed, we
use a rich set of indicators on individual's characteristics and behaviours that has
been shown being likely to capture individual risk aversion (see Barsky et al. [10],
Kimball et al. [87]). After cleaning for missed (or inconsistent) observation and
considering only those individuals who are at least 65 years old, the remaining
sample size consists of 2488 observations. Descriptive statistics of the sample and
variables' denition are reported in table A.1, while in the following subsections
we describe the variables used to measure insurance coverage, individual risk and
risk preferences.
5.3.1 Insurance
The rst measure of insurance refers to whether an individual has a Medicare sup-
plemental health insurance in 2002. This supplemental insurance is often named
Medigap, since it is specically designed to cover \gaps" of coverage left by Medi-
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care public plans. These gaps include for example limitations in the coverage of
health care services, high out-of-pocket expenses to Medicare beneciaries and
lack of a catastrophic cap expenditure. Since Medigap-private health insurance
plan oer coverage only when people turn elder, we exclude from the sample all
individuals who are younger than 65 in 2002. In addition we focus on individ-
ual who have deliberately purchased supplemental insurance as our interest is
mainly on the demand for insurance (see Fang et al. [53]). Therefore we dene
an individual as having additional health insurance coverage (Medigap) if they
purchased directly health insurance policy in addition to Medicare. As result we
exclude those who received coverage by a former employer or spouse and who
have free access by other public founded program such as Medicaid, CHAMPUS
or CHAMPVA (Tri-care).
The second measure of insurance purchase decision we consider is the long-
term insurance. Long-term care expenditure risk is one the greatest nancial risks
faced by the elderly in the US. This markets, dierently from the Medigap insur-
ance markets, is not subject to heavy regulation and then insurance companies
are free to price contracts according to individual riskiness. We dene an indi-
vidual as having long-term insurance if the declare to be covered by long-term
insurance during the year 2002.
Finally ours third and fourth insurance purchase decision are life insurance
and annuity. We dene an individual as having a life insurance or an annuity in
the 2002 HRS if they answer positively to the question about these two coverage
options. In the sample there is about 52% holding a supplemental health insur-
ance, about 15% is covered by a long-term insurance, about 63% and 46% has
respectively a life insurance and an annuity.
5.3.2 Risk Occurrence
The corresponding measures to control for predicted and ex-post risk occurrence
change according to the insurance risk domain one considers.
Consider rst our measures of predicted (by insurer) risk. These are con-
trols for risk that we use in each insurance market. Which factors to include
depends on the information insurers collect and use in pricing premiums. Clearly
the insurance company denes the premium according to the predicted risk. We
follow previous studies on demand for insurance to better dene which variables
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to use as controls (see for example Cutler et al. [32], Cohen and Einav [29], Cohen
and Spiegelman [30]).
In the supplemental health insurance market, Medigap companies use only
individual age and sex to price contracts. This is so because by law there is a free
enrolment period which lasts for six months from the rst month in which people
are both 65 years old and enrolled in Medicare. During this period Medigap
cannot refuse any person even if there are pre-existing conditions and pricing is
allowed only on the basis of age and sex. We therefore include only individual
gender and age as dummy variables to control for predicted risk. In particular
gender is measured by fem which takes 1 if individual is a female, while age is
decomposed in four dummies, one for each ve-years age band from 65 to 80. In
the sample there is about 50% of female and on average individuals are 72 years
old.
In the long-term care insurance market insurers collect with age and sex
also many information on health status. Using a rich set of health related vari-
ables such as the number of diseases, the total number of limitations in the
activities of daily living (ADL), the number of limitations with respect to in-
strumental activities of daily living (IADL) and a mental health index which
measure any cognitive impairments,1we construct a synthetic binary indicators
(health status) which takes 1 if individual has both a number of disease, ADL,
IADL and impairments greater then the median individual.
In the life insurance market the premium depends mainly on age, gender
and health status and on the size of policy the applicant is considering. Unfor-
tunately we cannot observe the size of the policy and we include as control in
addition to age and sex dummies mentioned above, a binary indicator of health
status. Finally annuity classication risk is based solely on age and sex and
therefore only these two variables are included as controls.
Let consider now our measures of ex-post risk. These measures should
capture the residual unobserved heterogeneity which remains after conditioning
on risk classication made by insurer. This residual association between risk oc-
1This mental health index is based on a score developed by the Center for Epidemiologic
Studies Depression (CESD) and it is given by the dierences between ve \negative" indica-
tors and two \positive" indicators. The negative indicators measure whether the respondent
experienced depression or other mental impairments status. The positive indicators measure
whether the respondent felt happy and enjoyed life, all or most of the time. Mehta et al. [94])
showed that this measure is associated with the existence of psychiatric problems.
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currence and insurance purchase decision is often mentioned as source of adverse
selection (Cohen and Spiegelman [30] and Einav et al. [47]). A standard mea-
sure of risk occurrence in the analysis of health insurance market is health care
utilization. We employs the subsequent two waves (from 2004 and 2006) to track
utilization. This is measured as the average number of hospital inpatients stay-
ing, doctor visits and outpatient services an individual used during the periods
2003-2006. Since the sample is based on elders, which are expected to register
high level of health care utilization, and we want to capture the relative individ-
ual riskiness as compared with the sample, we construct a binary variable (health
care) which takes 1 if the average number of services used by the individual is
greater than the number of services used by the median. Clearly ex-post moral
hazard can aect this measure, however it should be less eective when one con-
siders subsequent utilization over a longer period and use it to model previous
individuals' insurance choice decisions (see Cohen and Einav [29]).
For the life insurance market we use whether an individual is still alive
in the subsequent two waves. The variable mortality equals 1 if the individual
is deceased in the following waves, 0 otherwise. The ex-post risk measure for
the annuity is clearly the opposite of that for life insurance, specically whether
the individual survives in the subsequent years. In the sample 6% of individual
died in the subsequent years. Finally for the long-term insurance our measure is
whether the individual had any nursing home entry in the following waves. The
variable nursing home takes 1 if individual entered a nursing home, 0 otherwise.
In the sample about 26% had a health care utilization greater than the median,
about 8% of people used a nursing home and about 6% of individual died between
years 2002 and 2006.
5.3.3 Risk Tolerance Indicators
Since individual risk tolerance is not directly observable, it is also not easy to
measure. A standard strategy is to use proxy based on individual characteristics
and behaviours which are likely to capture risk aversion. Thus we use the follow-
ing set of indicators: job-based mortality risk, receipt of preventive health care,
no risky portfolio choice, number of jobs the respondent reports having through
job history, the subjective probability to leave over a certain age, wealth and a
composite indicator of health related behaviours based on drinking, smoking and
the body mass index. Barsky et al. [10] and Cutler and Glaeser [33] showed
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that most of these variables are signicantly associated with individual risk aver-
sion and then they can be eective to identify unobserved heterogeneity in risk
preferences.
The rst indicator is the job-based mortality risk. Following Cutler et al.
[32] we derive the mortality rates from Viscusi [115]. He used data from the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries to estimate job
mortality rates by industry. We assign mortality rates in our HRS sample using
industry-occupation cells (or occupation alone) and current job (if any), including
self employment. If the respondent is not employed in the 2002 HRS, we then use
the last available job information. Missing values for this variable are assigned if
the individual has never held a job or if it is not possible to identify either job or
industry code. Job mortality (job-mort) is then set equal to 1 if individual has
job-mortality rate lower than the median.
Portfolio decision and the demand for risky assets are important dimen-
sions of risk aversion. We dene an individual as holding less risky assets if
he/she has a total positive nancial assets and the share of portfolios invested
in Treasury bills and savings accounts is greater than those invested in stock.
Therefore we set norass equal to 1 if individual has no risky assets, 0 otherwise.
Notice that, since information on nancial assets are collect at the household level
and no information on asset ownership within the household are available, this
measure could reect risk preferences of the household rather than the individual.
Although Barsky et al. [10] show that risk tolerance measure is positively, but not
strongly, correlated within couples. In particular when the most knowledgable
respondents is less risk averse than the second respondent in the couple, the
share of portfolio in risky asset is lower, but the dierences are not statistically
signicant.
Our third risk aversion indicator is derived by looking at the individual job
history. Guiso and Paiella [66]-[67] show the existence of a negative relationsihip
between the decision to leave a job and risk aversion. They argue that leaving a
sure and known prospect for a new one unknown could imply incurring in new
risks. Therefore we dene our variable (job-num) equal to 1 if individual had a
number of jobs lower than the median during his/her job history.
The fourth indicator refers to the self-reported probability of leaving to a
given age. In the HRS the question varies according with the individual age. If
the respondent is 75 or younger, than s/he is asked to report the probability to
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live to 75, while if he is older than 75, he/she is asked to report the probability
of leaving to 100. Our indicator (prlife) is a binary variable which equals 1 if
individual reports a probability greater than the median. Risk aversion could also
be related with individual wealth since being more risk-averse can be translated
into lower expected labour income (see for example Guiso and Paiella [66]-[67]).
Individual wealth indicator is dened as a binary variable (wealth) which takes 1
if individual is in the top wealth quartile.
Finally we construct two binary indicators of individual health behaviours.
The rst one measures individual attitudes to health-related life styles. This in-
dicator (healthb) takes 1 if the respondent has a normal body mass index (namely
the BMI should have a score between 30 and 18), has less than three drinks per
day and does not smoke. The second indicator which has been used in many
other studies on risk and insurance (see Cutleret al. [32] and Finkelstein and Mc-
Garry [58]) refers to the fraction of gender-appropriate preventive health activity
undertaken by individual. Preventive activities include: a u shot, a blood test
for cholesterol, a check of her breasts for lumps, a mammogram or breast x-ray, a
Pap smear and a prostate screen. Our binary indicator (preventive) takes one if
individual undertakes a fraction of gender-appropriate preventive health activity
greater than the median. In the sample there are about 52% who does not smoke,
drink and have a normal BMI; about 55% received sex-adjusted preventive care;
about 54% has a job-based mortality risk lower than the median; 63% changed
jobs less often than the median during the job history; 31% holds a share of no
risk asset greater than the share of portfolio in stock; about 30% is in the top
wealth quartile and 46% reports a subjective probability of leaving to a certain
age greater than the median.
5.4 The Model
Our aim is to study the extent to which choices across insurance domains display
a common risk aversion and test whether there is a residual correlation across
domains related to non-preference factors. To this aim we use some recent devel-
opments in latent class analysis to model multiple choices, and test the residual
association among choices after conditioning on covariates and latent variable
(Huang and Bandeen-Roche [75], Bartolucci and Forcina [13] and Dardanoni,
Forcina and Modica [36]).
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Let Ij denote a binary variable which takes value 1 if an individual has
purchased insurance in the risk domain j, with j = 1; : : : ; J . We want to study
the following conditional expectations:
Pr(I1 = 1 j w1; P )
...
Pr(IJ = 1 j wJ ; P )
(5.1)
where w1; : : : ;wJ are vectors of individual observable and unobservable charac-
teristics (such as individual risk) which aect insurance purchase decision in each
of the J domains; while P represents individual risk preferences.
Clearly if one would control properly for wj and P would be directly ob-
servable, then one could test directly the hypothesis of domain-general component
(DGC) of risk preferences by examining any variations in the direct eect of P
on the insurance purchase decision across domains. Suppose now that individual
risk may be captured relatively well by observables proxy (e.g. insurer risk clas-
sication, subsequent risk occurrence rate, etc.). Since P is not observable, how
can we detect whether individual risk preferences are general?
Consider that if risk preferences are specic and then depends mainly on
the insurance context involved in the decision, then there is no unique underlying
unobservable P aecting choices across domains. Thus P varies across domains
and the system of equations (5.1) can be written as:
Pr(I1 = 1 j w1; P1)
...
Pr(IJ = 1 j wJ ; PJ)
(5.2)
This means that individual's willingness to bear risk in one insurance domain is
dierent from his/her willingness to bear risk in another contexts. Einav et al.
[49] propose to test the null of DGC of preferences by looking at the residual
correlation between risk domains conditional on observables. Following this ap-
proach if the null of no correlation is reject then there are evidence of a sort of
common element in the unobserved risk preferences.
An alternative is to assume that P1; : : : ; PJ are discrete, with Pj taking say
mk levels, k = 1; : : : ; K. This is a fairly innocuous assumption since any contin-
uous variable can be approximated arbitrarily well by a discrete one. It implies
that we can cross-classify P1; : : : ; PK into a single discrete unobservable variable
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U which takes say m = m1     mK values, which identies m heterogeneous
\types". Dierences among \types" are driven by dierent attitudes to bear risk
across contexts.
To test then the DGC hypothesis suppose that for some arrangement of
the M types U we have
Pr(I1 = 1 j w1; U = 1)      Pr(I1 = 1 j w1; U = m)
...
Pr(IJ = 1 j wJ ; U = 1)      Pr(IJ = 1 j wJ ; U = m)
(5.3)
This means that each variable Pj, with (j = 1; : : : ; J), has a monotonic eect on
the insurance purchase decision across domains. Note that if equalities do not
hold for some unobserved \types", say for example that Pr(I1 = 1 j w1; U =
1)      Pr(I1 = 1 j w1; U = M)), then individual has dierent attitude
to bear risk in a context as compared with his/her peer in another context.
The simple idea is the following. If risk preferences are general then there is
a one-dimensional latent variable, representing unobserved types with dierent
attitudes toward risk, which aect each insurance purchase decisions. Note in
fact that types represent dierent attitudes to buy insurance and then dierent
risk preferences. Under the null of DGC each type should always buy the same
amount of insurance in each context as compared with another type, and then
the same pattern on insurance purchase decision should be observed. Suppose
for example three unobserved types with type one buying more health insurance
than type two and the same between type two and three. Suppose also that this
pattern holds also for the life insurance. If it so then there is an unidimensional
latent variable, representing the order between types, having a monotonic eect
on the two insurance purchase decisions.2 Let to analyse how this procedure can
be implemented empirically.
2This strategy relies on the idea that proxy variables of risk capture relatively well insur-
ance purchase attitudes related to individual risk. To the extent that unobserved risk is not
captured, abstracting from it will likely introduce bias in the identication of P that needs to
be controlled. However applied economic literature studying domain-generality of an individ-
ual's risk preferences and insurance markets (see Cutler et al. [32], Cohen and Einav [29] and
Einav et al. [49]) showed that using individual predict (by insurer) risk and subsequent risk
occurrence are eective in capturing unobserved individual risk. However a possible solution in
our framework, which still needs to be further investigated, is to set a model with two distinct
unobservables, say U1 and U2, capturing individual risk preferences and the residual unobserved
heterogeneity in risk occurrence.
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5.4.1 Empirical strategy
Following standard models in the literature on insurance demand (Cohen and
Einav [29], Cutler et al. [32], Einav et al. [49]), w1; : : : ;wJ include observable
characteristics designed to capture the risk classication used by insurers, which
we denote with xj, and a set of variables (rj) which proxy individual subsequent
risk. This set of covariates is an important confounding factor, since insurance
demand is usually driven by both risk and risk aversion and then actual risk may
cause potential residual correlation across domains. Assuming additive separa-
bility we can rewrite the equation system (5.1) as:
Pr(I1 = 1 j w1; P ) = F (x011 + r011 + v011)
...
Pr(IJ = 1 j w1; P ) = F (x0JJ + r0JJ + v0JJ)
(5.4)
where F denotes the appropriate link function and v1; : : : ;vJ are vectors of un-
observables capturing residual heterogeneity in risk preferences. To estimate the
equation system (5.4) and test the hypothesis of DGC which is the focus of the
analysis, we consider two possible models: a multivariate regression model as
proposed by Einav et al. [49] and extended LCA model.
5.4.2 Multivariate probit regression
In a recent paper Einav et al. [49] study the DGC hypothesis examining the
correlation structure of the error terms in a multivariate regression. Following this
approach, let the link function F be standard normal, so that we can equivalently
rewrite the system (5.4) as:
I1 = 1
 
x
0
11 + r
0
11 + v
0
11 + 1

...
IJ = 1
 
x
0
JJ + r
0
JJ + v
0
JJ + J
 (5.5)
where 1; : : : ; J are independent standard normal errors. If we let j = v
0
jj+ j
in each domain and assume that (1; : : : ; J) are distributed as a multivariate
normal with standard margins and correlation coecient equal to , we get the
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multivariate probit:
I1 = 1
 
x
0
11 + r
0
11 + 1

...
IJ = 1
 
x
0
JJ + r
0
JJ + J
 (5.6)
The multivariate probit is relatively easy to estimate and provide the baseline cor-
relations to evaluate how general are risk preferences across insurance purchase
decisions. However it does rely on multivariate normality to achieve parame-
ters' identication, and does not allow to control directly whether conditional
on individual risk preferences there exists a residual correlation between choices
indicating the residual role played by the specic context.
5.4.3 Extended LCA
As mentioned above an alternative way to control for the residual unobserved
heterogeneity in risk preference U is by identifying a nite number of unobservable
\types"M , which dier in their attitudes to bear risk in dierent contexts. Thus,
the equation system (5.4), which account for the unobserved U can be written
as:
I1 =
Pm
u=1 
I1
u Uu + x
0
11 + r
0
11 + 1
...
IJ =
Pm
u=1 
IJ
u Uu + x
0
JJ + r
0
JJ + J
(5.7)
where U1; : : : ; Um denote the set of m dummy variables indicating \latent type"
membership. Thus, the coecients 
Ij
u in each equations can be interpreted as
random intercepts with a nonparametric discrete specication.
To identify unobserved risk preferences U , we exploit in addition to ob-
served individual purchase decisions, which are of main interest in our framework,
a set of auxiliary equations that are used as indicators of U and then capture
individual attitudes to bear risk. Using a standard logit link in equations (5.7),
we estimate the model:
I1 =
Pm
u=1 
I1
u Uu + x
0
11 + r
0
11
...
IJ =
Pm
u=1 
IJ
u Uu + x
0
JJ + r
0
JJ
(5.8)
together with the class membership probabilities Pr(U = u) which can be written
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in terms of adjacent logits as
log
 Pr(U=u+1)
Pr(U=u)

= Uu = 
U
u u = 1; : : : ;m  1 (5.9)
and the following system which can be considered instrumental for identifying U :
H1 =
Pm
u=1 
H1
u Uu
...
HT =
Pm
u=1 
HT
u Uu
(5.10)
Note that the the system of equations (5.10) is used to capture and identify
individual unobserved types which dier in terms of risk preferences. Thus it can
be considered auxiliary to the simultaneous equation system (5.8).
In addition to equations (5.8-5.10) we also allow residual correlation among
insurance purchase decisions to capture conditional on U potential non-preference
factors - such as context-specicity - which may introduce correlation between
choices. This can be written as:
log

Pr(Ij=0;Ik=0)Pr(Ij=1;Ik=1)
Pr(Ij=1;Ik=0)Pr(Ij=0;Ik=1)

= Ij ;Ik = Ij ;Ik (5.11)
with j 6= k and j; k = 1; : : : ; J . This means to estimate one parameter for each
of the (J
2
) combinations of insurance purchase decision. Thus (5.11) allows to
control for residual correlation among risk domains introduced by non-preference
factors - for example some choices may be\closer" in context, such as health and
disability insurance purchase decision (Einav et al. [49]). Note that U is of main
focus to test the DGC hypothesis since it represents individual risk preference.
On the contrary  is only included to capture any residual association unrelated
with U .
Within the model dened by equations ((5.8)-(5.11)),
 the null hypothesis of DGC of individual risk preferences (that is equation
(5.3)) can be viewed as testing the null hypothesis that there is a underlying
unidimensional unobservable variable U such that choices are monotonically
dependent on it. This can be implemented by setting a system of linear
inequalities as explained for example in Bartolucci and Forcina [12]. Tech-
niques of order restricted inference can be used to show that the likelihood
ratio test statistic for the monotonicity null is asymptotically distributed
as a mixture of chi-squared distributions (see Gourieroux and Monfort [64]
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for a general exposition, Dardanoni and Forcina [34] for an explanation of
how the mixing weights can be calculated by simulations, and Kodde and
Palm [88] for bounds on the test distribution).
 the null hypothesis of absence of residual heterogeneity related to potential
non-preference factors (since they are unrelated to U) can be tested by
imposing for each of the (J
2
)  parameters the restriction that Ij ;Ik is not
statistically dierent from zero. This can be implemented with a standard
t-test statistic.
5.5 Results
In this section we rst examine results from a multivariate binary probit model
for the probability of purchase Medicare supplemental health insurance, life insur-
ance, long-term care insurance and annuity. We then analyse in the subsequent
section result from the extend LCA which both identies unobserved types with
dierent attitudes to bear risk across domains and allow residual correlation be-
tween insurance choices to capture non-preference factors.
5.5.1 Multivariate Regression
Tables A.2 and A.3 present respectively the estimated coecients of controls and
correlation terms from the baseline multivariate probit regression suggested by
Einav et al. [49] and described above in equation (5.6). Let consider rst the de-
terminants of supplemental health insurance purchase decision. Table A.2 reveals
that the probability of enrolling in a supplementary insurance plan increases with
age and sex. Not surprisingly people who are more risky and then tend to use
more health care resources - for example hospital inpatient stays, doctor visits
and outpatient services - are also signicantly more likely to buy additional cov-
erage. Therefore our result on ex-post risk occurrence conrms previous analysis,
which found the existence selection eect in the Medigap market related also to
private information on individual actual risk (see for example Fang et al. [53],
Ettner [51]).
The probability to purchase a long-term care insurance is also increasing
with individual age, but the eect is not statistically signicant, and with health
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status. In particular those who report having more diseases and physical impair-
ments in the daily living activities (measured by ADL and IADL) are also more
likely to hold a long-term insurance plan. As expected ex-post utilization of any
nursing home in the two waves following 2002 HRS increases the probability to
buy insurance, but surprisingly this eect is not statistically signicant.
Taking a glance at life insurance results, table A.2 shows that people who
are female and married are also more likely to purchase this type of insurance. On
the contrary ex-post measured risk does not seem to have a statistically signicant
eect although the estimated coecient has the expected sing.
Finally annuity purchase decision is positively related with age, but nega-
tively with individual gender. Although there is not a clear eect between gender
and the probability of having an annuity, in a recent paper Agnew et al. [3] nd
that women are more likely to buy annuity than man, since gender dierences
may indicate also dierences in risk aversion. However, if risk aversion and pre-
dicted risk are driving the decision to choose annuities, after controlling for these
two factors, gender dierences should not aect the annuity decision. Ex-post
measured risk in this market has a negative and statistically signicant eect. In
particular those who are more likely to live longer are also more likely to hold
an annuity, suggesting that individual private information on mortality risk is an
important sources of asymmetric information in this market after conditioning
on predicted (by insurer) individual risk (Cohen and Spiegelman [30]).
Consider now the estimated correlations between insurance purchase de-
cisions. In all of the pairs reported in table A.3, we can reject - at least at 10%
statistical signicance level - the null hypothesis of correlation being zero, except
for correlations between health and long-term care insurance with life insurance.
Following Einav et al. [49], this result can be interpreted as evidence that we can
reject the null of no domain general component of choice. Viewed alternatively,
this means that one's coverage choice in any of the other domains is predictive
of individual choice in a given domain. In particular the magnitude of the corre-
lations generally seems to be higher for those insurance purchase decision which
seems to be \closer", for example long-term care is more correlated with Medi-
care supplemental health insurance rather than annuity, and on the contrary life
insurance is correlated with annuity. A possible limitation of this approach when
only insurance choices are considered is that correlations across domains could
reect not just unobserved risk preference, but also unobserved correlation intro-
duced by unpriced risk. Note that predicted and realized (ex-post) risk may not
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perfectly capture heterogenous individual actual risk and then it could be hard
to interpret whether these correlation between insurance (risk) domains reect
systematic dierences in each of these domains or rather unobserved preferences.
5.5.2 Results from the Extended LCA Model
We start by estimating the system of equations (5.8)-(5.11) under dierent num-
bers m of latent classes. Maximum likelihood estimation is performed by a EM
algorithm. In particular while in the E step the posterior probability of latent
class M given the observed conguration of insurance choices and auxiliary indi-
cators is computed, in the M-step the likelihood function is maximized and further
rened in each iteration by the E-step. More details on estimation procedure of
parameters  and  can be derived by looking at Dardanoni, Forcina and Modica
[36] and at Bartolucci and Forcina [13].3 For completeness we report in tables
A.4-A.10 model's estimated parameters under dierent number of latent classes,
namely m = 2; 3; 4. Table A.4 reports the maximized log-likelihood L( ), the
Schwartz's Bayesian Information Criterion BIC( ) =  2L( ) + log(n), where
n denotes sample size and  is the number of parameters. BIC seems to indi-
cate that three LC are adequate to represent the unobserved heterogeneity U . A
glance at all tables reveals also that estimated ,  and correlation coecients
do not seem to vary substantially with respect to the number m of latent classes
specications. For sake of brevity we will discuss mainly results obtained under
m = 3 latent classes. Calculating the types membership probabilities reported
in table A.5, about 50% of individuals are of type 1, while 30% and 20% are of
type 2 and 3 respectively.
To understand what these types indicate, let consider the estimated prob-
abilities reported in table A.6, obtained using the  parameters of tables A.7 and
A.8. Type 3 individuals are those who are on average about three times more
likely to buy any Medicare supplemental health insurance, long-term insurance,
life insurance and annuity than type 1. The picture does not change substan-
tially comparing type 3 with type 2, although the latter seems to be more likely
to hold long-term insurance and annuity than type 3 individuals. Therefore a
rst glance at Panel A of table A.6 shows that types dier in the attitudes to
purchase insurance. In particular conditional on predicted and ex-post realized
risk, type 3 individuals are more risk averse that type 1 since they are always less
3We are grateful to Antonio Forcina for kindly providing the Matlab code for the estimation.
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prone than type 1 individuals to bear risk in any of the four insurance domains.
This result is also supported by looking at Panel B of table A.6, which re-
ports the relationships between no risky behaviours and unobserved types. The
table reveals that estimated probabilities to perform risky behaviours or charac-
teristics increase with m. In particular people who hold T-bills rather than stock
in their own nancial portfolio, who change job less frequently, have a mortality
rate of the individual's industry-occupation cell lower than the median rate, who
have a normal body mass index and do not smoke and drink, who invest into
health risk prevention activities and have a life expectation greater than the me-
dian are more likely to be of type 3 rather than any other unobserved types. Not
surprisingly type 3 individuals are less \wealthy" than type 2, which is in line
with the idea that more risk averse individuals are relatively less wealthy than
others (see for example Barsky et al. [10] Guiso and Paiella [67]). The pattern
we nd is consistent with other studies, such as Barsky et al. [10], who checked
the external validity of some risk tolerance measures using risky behaviours indi-
cators. Therefore results indicate two main conclusions. First, the picture which
emerges from the estimated probabilities is that, after conditioning on individual
predicted and ex-post realized risk there exists an important source of hetero-
geneity in the underlying risk preferences represented by the latent types, which
plays an important role in the insurance purchase decisions. This result is consis-
tent with recent studies (Cohen and Einav [29], Barseghyan et al. [9]and Einav
et al. [49]), which found heterogeneity in risk preferences being more important
than heterogeneity in risk to explain how heterogenous are insurance coverage
choices.
Second the three unobserved types which dier in their attitudes to bear
risk, and then in how individual are risk adverse seem to follow the same pattern
across domains. In particular those individuals who are less risk averse in one
domain are also more likely to bear risk in any other domains. For example, type
1 is on average less likely to perform risk reducing behaviours than type 2, who
is at the same time less likely than type 3 individuals. This pattern between no
risky behaviours and unobserved types seems to hold also for insurance choice,
providing evidence against the hypotheses of no domain-general component if the
insurance choices. In other words, after conditioning on predicted and realized
risk, it seems there is a single latent variable which is common to each insurance
choice domains.
The question naturally arises then whether this pattern in insurance choices
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is due to sampling variations, or rather to the presence of a single latent variable
that conditional on predicted and realized risk has a common eect on insurance
choice domains. The testing procedures described by equation (5.3) can however
be employed to formally test the unidimensionality of latent variable. The LR
test statistic for the model under the null that I11  I12  I13 is equals to 9.15.
Since U has three levels (m = 3) and the insurance choices we consider are four,
the conservative 1% critical value with 8 df is equal to 25.370 (Kodde and Palm
([88], page 1246); thus, the null of domain general component cannot be rejected
indicating the existence of a single underlying unobservable variables which each
insurance purchase decisions.
Although the existence of a general commonality of domain risk prefer-
ences is not really surprisingly, it is interesting to note that after conditioning on
individual unobserved types and individual risk, there still exists a sort of non-
preference based correlation (related for example to context specicity), which
renders some insurance choices more related than others. In fact taking a quick
glance at table A.10 reveals that correlations are statistically dierent from zero
in most of the cases and that are greater in magnitude when choices are \closer"
- for example long-term insurance is more correlated to Medicare supplemental
insurance rather than annuity, while life insurance is mainly correlated with an-
nuity. This result has also been found by Einav et al. [49] and support the
idea that choice is driven both by context and by how individuals are risk averse
in general. However the existence of this residual correlation between responses
can also indicate the existence of unpriced risk not captured by risk occurrence
proxies. The simple idea is that if risk proxies do not fully capture individual
risk then individuals, say, with higher health risk tend to purchase more health
related insurance coverage. Notice that these ndings are compatible with the
DGC, since risk preferences can be common across domains, but some choices can
be more correlated each other due to the presence of non risk preference factors
(e.g. similarity in the decision context, unpriced risk factors, etc.).
Finally let us to consider the eect of predicted (by insurer) and realized
ex-post risk in each insurance equation. Table A.9 shows a similar pattern of
the eects of risk controls on insurance purchase decisions. In particular age
and gender have a positive and statistically signicant eect on the decision
to buy Medicare additional coverage and annuity. Ex-post risk has always the
expected sign. Interestingly if compared with the multivariate probit the dummy
variable indicating whether an individual died in the succeeding two waves has
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positive and now statistically signicant eect in the decision to purchase life
insurance and negative for annuity. Therefore conditional on risk preferences,
ex-post realized risk proxies indicate how important could be the role of private
information on individual risk to determine the insurance choices which as been
documented in several other studies (see for a review Cohen and Spiegelman [30]
and Einav et al. [47]).
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper we examined the relationship between unobserved risk preferences
and insurance purchase decision and in particular how general are preferences
for risk across domains. Standard economic theory generally assumes that in-
dividuals take decisions over a set of risky domains according to their own risk
preference which is stable across decision contexts. This assumption of context-
invariant risk preference has motivated a large literature in microeconometrics
and has caused debate in the literature concerning its validity. There is a large
literature in psychology and behavioral economics which uses experimental lab
test to claim that risk preferences are mainly related to context, and that deci-
sions are not related to each other by any general risk domain components. To
study this issue in the framework of multiple demand for insurance, we follow
a recent stream of papers by Cohen and Einav [29], Barseghyan et al. [9] and
Einav et al. [49] which focus on how general are risk individual preferences.
In particular we start following an innovative approach proposed by Einav
et al. [49] that used residual correlation across insurance domains. Conditioning
on predicted (by insurer) and ex-post risk to test whether individuals show the
same willingness to bear risk across domains.
In our setting we model the correlations between insurance choices using a
latent class analysis. Conditioning on predicted and realized risk we exploit LCA
to identify individual risk aversion throughout a set of auxiliary variables which
are likely to capture individual risk preferences. In addition we also allow for
residual correlation between insurance choices in order to capture any residual
correlation related to non-preference factors.
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study and a rich set of infor-
mation on individual about risk and life-style behaviours, we study four insurance
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purchase decision: Medicare supplemental health insurance, long-term insurance,
life insurance and annuity. In our data we identify three unobserved types which
dier in terms of risk aversion. We nd that individual who tend to buy a certain
type a of insurance, say health insurance, are also more likely to buy insurance
in another context, for example long-term care insurance. This can be inter-
preted as source of commonality in how individuals bear risk across domains.
Thus our results provide an additional piece of evidence against the absence of
domain general component of risk preferences, although context plays an impor-
tant role in risky decision since insurance choices who are \closer" in context
are also more correlated conditional on unobserved risk preferences. Therefore
heterogeneity in risk preferences is also an important factor to consider in addi-
tion to heterogeneity in risk when individual choices on insurance coverage are
examined. The question of what drives this heterogeneity and why the residual
domain-specicity correlation still plays an substantial role remains an interesting
question for further exploration.
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Appendix A
Tables
Table A.1: Sample Characteristics and Variable Denition
Variable Denition of Binary Variables Mean
Insurance Status
Sup. Health Ins. 1 = enrolled in any health insurance (Medigap). 0.520
long-term Ins. 1 = enrolled in any long-term insurance. 0.148
Life Ins 1 = covered by life insurance. 0.636
Annuity 1 = has an annuity. 0.459
Controls used by insurer to assess risk
age65 1 = aged between 66 and 70 years. 0.387
age70 1 = aged between 71 and 75 years. 0.277
age75 1 = aged between 76 and 80 years. 0.158
age80 1 = older than 80 years. 0.073
fem 1 = female. 0.553
mar 1 = married. 0.610
health status 1 = # of disease, ADL and IADL 0.493
Ex-post Risk Indicators
mortality 1 = died in the subsequent years 2004-2006. 0.063
health care 1 = used health care service during years 2004-
2006.
0.262
nursing home 1 = entered in any nursing home in the years 2004-
2006.
0.078
Risk Preference Indicators
healthb 1 = does not smoke, has a normal weight and no
drinking problems.
0.518
preventive 1 = received sex-adjusted preventive care. 0.551
job-mort 1 = has a job-based mortality risk lower than the
median.
0.531
job-num 1 = has a number of jobs lower than the median. 0.632
norass 1 = holds no risk asset such as T-bills. 0.312
weatlh 1 = in the top wealth quartile. 0.301
prlife 1 = subjective life expectation grater than the me-
dian.
0.464
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Table A.2: Multivariate Probit Model's Estimated Parameters of predicted and
realized risk
Variables Sup. Health Ins. Long-term Ins. Life Ins. Annuity
Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er.
fem 0.1941 (0.0509) 0.0401 (0.0642) -0.2140 (0.0553) -0.1470 (0.0510)
age65 0.1012 (0.0883) 0.1630 (0.1110) 0.1240 (0.0900) 0.1970 (0.0888)
age70 0.1740 (0.0920) 0.0871 (0.1160) -0.0487 (0.0934) 0.2090 (0.0925)
age75 0.2265 (0.1010) 0.2100 (0.1250) 0.0787 (0.1030) 0.0385 (0.1010)
age80 0.5253 (0.1230) 0.0601 (0.1570) -0.1020 (0.1240) -0.3150 (0.1240)
mard02 0.1520 (0.0665) 0.1390 (0.0568)
health 0.1210 (0.0609) 0.1090 (0.0521)
nursing home 0.1540 (0.1130)
health care 0.5320 (0.1880)
mortality -0.1110 (0.1060) -0.2748 (0.1041)
constant -0.2370 (0.0850) -1.3650 (0.1220) 0.3011 (0.1000) -0.1410 (0.0845)
Robust standard errors in brackets.
Table A.3: Multivariate Probit Model's Estimated Correlation Terms Controlling
for Predicted and Realized Risk
Variables Sup. Health Ins. Long-Term Ins. Life Ins.
Long-Term Ins. 0.3121 (0.0392)
Life Ins. 0.0458 (0.0320) 0.0611 (0.0384)
Annuity 0.2180 (0.0318) 0.2810 (0.0393) 0.0572 (0.0323)
Robust standard errors in brackets.
Table A.4: Model Selection Criteria for System of Equations (5.8)-(5.11)
Number of Latent Classes
2LC 3LC 4LC
L( ) -17166.44 -17110.02 -17092.10
BIC( ) 34778.580 34759.58 34817.57
#ofparmaters 57 69 81
Table A.5: Estimated Class Membership Probabilities
2LC 3LC 4LC
U1 0.5051 0.4985 0.2242
U2 0.4949 0.2970 0.2585
U3 . 0.2045 0.2306
U4 . . 0.2867
123
Table A.6: Estimated Probabilities of Extended LC Model
2LC 3LC 4LC
M=1 M=2 M=1 M=2 M=3 M=1 M=2 M=3 M=4
Panel A: Main Eq.
Sup. Health Ins. 0.2464 0.5297 0.2625 0.5167 0.6437 0.7439 0.2181 0.9027 0.7434
Long-Term Ins. 0.0285 0.1411 0.0274 0.1588 0.0992 0.6379 0.5433 0.4501 0.5948
Life Ins. 0.6875 0.6627 0.7021 0.6269 0.7439 0.4851 0.6129 0.5675 0.5358
Annuity 0.1911 0.8681 0.2181 0.9027 0.7434 0.5371 0.6184 0.5991 0.5327
Panel B: Aux. Ind.
norass 0.1682 0.4383 0.1542 0.3879 0.5368 0.3879 0.5368 0.4934 0.6151
job-mort 0.4901 0.5727 0.4934 0.5015 0.6150 0.5005 0.5974 0.5946 0.7699
job-num 0.6131 0.6511 0.5974 0.5946 0.7699 0.0438 0.6928 0.3573 0.5029
weatlh 0.0431 0.5637 0.0438 0.6928 0.3573 0.4052 0.7171 0.4581 0.6196
healthb 0.5236 0.5116 0.4052 0.5029 0.717 0.6781 0.3887 0.3061 0.8782
preventive 0.4627 0.6412 0.4581 0.6196 0.678 0.2625 0.5167 0.6437 0.0274
prlife 0.4287 0.5005 0.3887 0.3060 0.8782 0.1588 0.0992 0.7021 0.6269
Table A.7: Estimated Intercepts  of Equation System (5.8)
Insurance 2LC 3LC 4LC
Choice Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er.
Sup. Health Ins.
I11 -1.1177 (0.1811) -1.0333 (0.1828) -1.0398 (0.231)
I12 0.119 (0.1757) 0.0668 (0.1930) -1.0457 (0.223)
I13 0.5913 (0.2390) 0.0211 (0.206)
I14 0.4525 (0.218)
Long-Term Ins.
I21 -3.5288 (0.3319) -3.5690 (0.3350) -3.5873 (0.494)
I22 -1.8071 (0.2828) -1.6670 (0.2966) -3.4400 (0.417)
I23 -2.2066 (0.3295) -1.5152 (0.306)
I24 -2.2834 (0.322)
Life Ins.
I31 0.7884 (0.1945) 0.8573 (0.1973) 0.5276 (0.267)
I32 0.6754 (0.1942) 0.5188 (0.2103) 1.3667 (0.276)
I33 1.0662 (0.2409) 0.4733 (0.230)
I34 1.2790 (0.238)
Annuity
I41 -1.4429 (0.2878) -1.2770 (0.2582) -0.6759 (0.354)
I42 1.8836 (0.2937) 2.2273 (0.3295) -3.0203 (1.496)
I43 1.0637 (0.2853) 2.6705 (0.485)
I44 0.7443 (0.295)
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Table A.8: Estimated Intercepts  of Equation System (5.10)
Indicators 2LC 3LC 4LC
Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er.
norass
H11 -1.5986 (0.0955) -1.7019 (0.1068) -1.6185 (0.222)
H12 -0.2481 (0.0685) -0.4563 (0.1041) -2.0098 (0.286)
H13 0.1475 (0.1529) -0.5861 (0.13)
H14 0.1173 (0.147)
job-mort
H21 -0.0397 (0.0634) -0.0265 (0.0645) -0.1626 (0.148)
H22 0.2928 (0.065) 0.0021 (0.1340) 0.0952 (0.123)
H23 0.4682 (0.1013) 0.6369 (0.131)
H24 -0.0227 (0.114)
job-num
H31 0.4603 (0.0647) 0.3945 (0.0664) -0.0041 (0.179)
H32 0.6233 (0.0672) 0.3831 (0.1033) 0.7116 (0.158)
H33 1.208 (0.1847) 0.4427 (0.119)
H34 0.9398 (0.131)
weatlh
H41 -3.1034 (0.3334) -3.0839 (0.3201) -2.2608 (0.375)
H42 0.2561 (0.0883) 0.813 (0.1782) -4.3692 (1.934)
H43 -0.5871 (0.1761) 1.0669 (0.251)
H54 -0.5535 (0.163)
healthb
H51 0.0945 (0.0632) -0.3837 (0.1213) -0.3529 (0.174)
H52 0.0465 (0.0639) 0.0117 (0.0663) 0.2317 (0.139)
H53 0.9297 (0.2011) -0.4121 (0.136)
H54 0.6618 (0.14)
preventive
H61 -0.1493 (0.0649) -0.1679 (0.0666) -0.5144 (0.184)
H62 0.5805 (0.0689) 0.4879 (0.0988) 0.0425 (0.136)
H63 0.7446 (0.1486) 0.5798 (0.122)
H64 0.634 (0.12)
prlife
H71 -0.2872 (0.0641) -0.4527 (0.0763) -1.9279 (0.809)
H72 0.002 (0.0641) -0.8191 (0.1881) 0.2918 (0.268)
H73 1.9757 (0.6201) -0.8432 (0.194)
H74 1.1622 (0.255)
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Table A.9: Extend LC Model Estimated  Parameters of Predicted and Realized
Risk
Variables 2LC 3LC 4LC
Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er.
Sup. Health Ins.
age65 0.2783 (0.1683) 0.2718 (0.1701) 0.2746 (0.169)
age70 0.3302 (0.1743) 0.1436 (0.176) 0.1306 (0.175)
age75 0.3984 (0.1885) 0.1485 (0.1904) 0.1354 (0.189)
age80 0.7782 (0.2099) 0.4828 (0.2105) 0.478 ( 0.210)
fem 0.4053 (0.0878) 0.4018 (0.0888) 0.3921 (0.088)
health care 0.1334 (0.0984) 0.1309 (0.0994) 0.1357 (0.099)
Long-Term Ins.
age65 0.4264 (0.2495) 0.4284 (0.2546) 0.4385 (0.255)
age70 0.2059 (0.2595) 0.2858 (0.2637) 0.2728 (0.264)
age75 0.3747 (0.2770) 0.5004 (0.2800) 0.4957 (0.281)
age80 0.1070 (0.3145) 0.2152 (0.3163) 0.2289 (0.316)
fem 0.1384 (0.1279) 0.1409 (0.1285) 0.1173 (0.128)
mard02 0.2297 (0.1328) 0.2179 (0.1334) 0.2219 (0.133)
health 0.2387 (0.1197) 0.2367 (0.1203) 0.2323 (0.120)
nursing home 0.3454 (0.2128) 0.3400 (0.2126) 0.3385 (0.213)
Life Ins.
age65 -0.0446 (0.1672) -0.0457 (0.1702) -0.0535 (0.177)
age70 -0.3185 (0.1719) -0.4209 (0.1745) -0.6164 (0.181)
age75 -0.1118 (0.1874) -0.2561 (0.1894) -0.5060 (0.195)
age80 -0.5510 (0.2038) -0.7161 (0.2064) -0.9822 (0.214)
fem -0.3621 (0.0903) -0.3693 (0.0912) -0.4011 (0.094)
mard02 0.2206 (0.0917) 0.2314 (0.0924) 0.2370 (0.095)
mort 0.1830 (0.0849) 0.1874 (0.0856) 0.1940 (0.088)
health -0.1512 (0.1727) -0.1462 (0.1739) -0.1611 (0.178)
Annuity
age65 0.0373 (0.2544) 0.0223 (0.2317) 0.0467 (0.246)
age70 -0.1736 (0.2640) -0.1568 (0.2406) 0.1348 (0.255)
age75 -0.7565 (0.2874) -0.584 (0.2632) -0.2740 (0.275)
age80 -1.8209 (0.3164) -1.5793 (0.3007) -1.3150 (0.319)
fem -0.2405 (0.1308) -0.2362 (0.1215) -0.2281 (0.129)
mort -0.4118 (0.2608) -0.4354 (0.2509) -0.4471 (0.265)
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Table A.10: Extend LC Model's Estimated Parameters of Equation System (5.11)
Sup. Health Ins. Long-Term Ins. Life Ins.
2LC
Long-Term Ins. 0.5284 (0.1399)
Life Ins. 0.1904 (0.0936) 0.3202 (0.1318)
Annuity -0.3966 (0.2206) -0.0977 (0.2189) 0.3784 (0.1567)
3LC
Long-Term Ins. 0.5661 (0.1423)
Life Ins. 0.1735 (0.0962) 0.3840 (0.1354)
Annuity -0.2008 (0.1815) -0.0601 (0.2141) 0.4594 (0.1515)
4LC
Long-Term Ins. 0.6192 (0.1433)
Life Ins. 0.1616 (0.1017) 0.4306 (0.1436)
Annuity -0.1669 (0.1947) -0.0785 (0.2404) 0.7033 (0.1834)
Standard errors are reported in brackets.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis presents four studies that make use of latent class analysis to model
unobserved heterogeneity in dierent empirical contexts applied to health and
health care. The latent classes analysis is a particular way to model unobserved
heterogeneity and it is exploited when both manifest dependent variables and la-
tent variable are dichotomous and/or categorical. Therefore, latent class analysis
requires computationally that the dependent variables are discrete. 1 Although
this approach is extremely suitable to model multiple sources of unobserved het-
erogeneity for some particular economic context where the dependent is binary
(e.g. having or not supplemental insurance, having any doctor visits or hospital
admissions, etc.), there could be a loss of information when additional (contin-
uous) indicators are discretized in order to be include in the model to identify
unobserved heterogeneity. However as long as discretizations of continuous vari-
ables are reasonable results should no be aected.
In the previous chapters unobserved private information is examined in re-
lation to 1) health production and self-reporting health behaviour, 2) the role of
asymmetric information in health insurance markets and health care utilization,
and 3) the generality of risk preferences in multiple demand for insurance. The
work presented in the thesis provides a useful basis to develop new methodology
and empirically evaluate policies in all of these contexts. The empirical appraisal
of the eect of individual characteristics on health production and self-reporting
behaviour introduced in Chapter 2 could be extended by modelling additional
relationships between biomarkers in order to capture the eect of pre-existing
health conditions on subjective health status. In addition, results provide evi-
dence of the importance of using biomarkers in measuring health status. However,
1Note that in many cases binary variables are preferred to categorical variables in order to
reduce the amount of time the model needs to converge throughout the EM algorithm (see.
Forcina [59]).
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more studies are required to determine the extent to which biomarkers are related
to dimensions of health which dier from physical health.
The analysis of asymmetric information proposed in Chapters 3 and 4 sug-
gests that multidimensionality of private information is an important issue when
evaluating adverse selection in insurance markets. Extending the framework used
in this thesis it would be interesting to understand whether there are other sources
of multiple private information in addition to risk preferences and actual risk and
their role in the selection eect. Moreover, a further stream of research might fo-
cus on understanding, both theoretically and empirically, the welfare implications
of multidimensionality. For example, in the Medigap market the welfare eect of
heavy cross subsidization of some types (who are high risk and risk averse) at the
expense of others (who are low risk, but with low preferences for risk) has not
been studied in detail. Finally, the analysis of the generality of risk preferences in
Chapter 5 shows not only the existence of a common general component of risk
preferences, but also the existence of residual specic heterogeneity related to the
insurance choice context that are similar (e.g Medigap and long-term care insur-
ance). Further research might extend several issues. From an econometric point
of view it would be interesting to extend the estimation procedure to two or more
latent variables in order to capture separately residual heterogeneity in risk and
risk aversion. In addition it would be interesting to understand the drivers of this
heterogeneity, what types of individuals domain-specicity are more relevant (e.g
is context more important in the health insurance market than in the life insur-
ance market?) and why should context still remain important after conditioning
on individual risk and risk preferences.
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